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Abstract
A key derivation function (KDF) is a function that transforms secret non-uniformly
random source material together with some public strings into one or more cryp-
tographic keys. These cryptographic keys are used with a cryptographic algo-
rithm for protecting electronic data during both transmission over insecure chan-
nels and storage. KDFs are widely used in Internet protocols to produce keys
for securing common applications such as online banking and remote logins. The
practical importance of KDFs is reflected in their adoption in industrial standard
documents, such as PKCS5, ISO/IEC 18033-2 and, more recently, NIST 800-135.
It is critical in the design of many security systems to have secure and efficient
KDF designs. An insecure KDF may provide an attacker with the means to
attack a cryptosystem which is otherwise secure.
In this thesis, a security framework for KDFs is established consisting of five
security models, extending previous research. The relationship between these
five security models is explained. This security framework allows us to analyse
and classify the security level of existing and newly designed KDF proposals.
The analysis identifies flaws in some published KDF proposals.
To date, many of the existing KDF proposals have been designed using hash
functions and block ciphers. Stream ciphers may offer higher speed, and in gen-
eral require less hardware than block ciphers and hash functions. Thus, stream
ciphers may offer a suitable alternative for the design of KDFs.
A secure and efficient stream cipher based KDF is proposed. This design is
analysed using the security framework and is shown to provide the highest level
of security based on the assumption that the underlying stream cipher is secure
from attacks. The proposed stream cipher based KDFs are simulated using
three ciphers: Trivium, Sosemanuk and Rabbit. The results show that stream
cipher based KDFs can execute significantly faster in software than current hash
function and block cipher based KDFs provided an efficient stream cipher is used
v
for the construction. However, this proposal has a lower security level compared
with hash function based KDFs against exhaustive key search.
Finally, a modification of the stream cipher based KDFs is presented, where
the main purpose of this modification is focused on increasing the security level
to be comparable with the hash function based KDF proposals. The results
show that the security level of the modified KDF based on stream ciphers are
comparable with hash function and block cipher based KDFs. At the same
time, the software performance of the modified stream cipher based KDFs is
significantly better than hash function and block cipher based KDFs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Protection of the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive data during transmis-
sion over insecure channels and storage can be achieved by using cryptographic
algorithms. For most applications the cryptographic algorithms are publicly
known, and the security relies mainly on the properties of the cryptographic
keys used. This is known as Kerckhoffs’ principle: The cipher method must not
be required to be secret, and it must be able to fall into the hands of the enemy
without inconvenience [35]. Provided there are no structural weaknesses in the
algorithm, the difficulty of obtaining the cryptographic keys determines security
of the applications, so cryptographic keys of an appropriate length should be
used.
Key derivation functions (KDFs) are fundamental mechanisms for obtaining
cryptographic keys for use with cryptographic systems. A KDF is a function that
takes an input that contains randomly generated secret information together with
some optional public strings and derives from it cryptographic keys. The private
string (which is secret from an adversary) can be a password, Diffie-Hellman
(DH) shared secret or non-uniformly random source material [3–5,18,27,34,40].
The public strings (which are known to the adversary) can be random salt value
and/or context information. Note that the private strings cannot be used directly
as encryption keys, as these private strings are not properly distributed. We need
the KDF to transform these private strings into one or more cryptographically
(uniform) strong keys.
In the current literature, there are two approachs to constructing KDFs;
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KDFs with single phase [1, 13, 34, 61], and KDFs with two phases consisting of
an extractor and an expander [14, 37]. Most previous KDF designs are single
phase [1, 13, 34, 61]. The input to the single phase KDF is the concatenation of
the private string and some public string. The public string consists of a random
string or a concatenation of counter, identifier or the identities of communicating
parties. A more recent KDF design trend which offers increased flexibility is the
two phase KDF [14, 37]. This typically consists of an extractor phase and an
expander phase. The inputs to the extractor are the private string and a public
salt value, while the inputs to the expander are the output from the extractor
and the context information. In this design, the extractor and expander are
two independent sub-functions, which can be designed and analysed separately.
This permits mixing and matching of different types of extractor and expander
functions to form good extract-then-expand KDF proposals, in terms of both
security and/or performance.
1.1 Research Motivation
It is critical in the design of security systems that KDF proposals themselves are
secure. Significant effort in designing a KDF proposal and security framework to
evaluate the proposal are justified. The practical importance of KDFs is reflected
in their adoption in industrial standard documents, for example PKCS5 [34],
ISO/IEC 18033-2 [51] and, more recently, NIST 800-135 [17].
There are two types formal security models introduced by Yao & Yin [61] and
Krawczyk [37]. However, the adversary in these two security models has a limited
capability. For example, both security models do not include the existence of a
passive adversary. Furthermore, the active adversay in both security models is
not allowed to choose the salt value. This has motivated us to extend the
existing security models and form a security framework that consists
of varying capabilities of the adversary.
To date, many of the existing KDF proposals are composed by using hash
functions and block ciphers. Hash functions and block cipher based MACs trans-
form a variable-size input into a fixed-length output, while the KDF is intended to
generate cryptographic keys of arbitrary length When the derived cryptographic
keys from the KDF based on hash functions and block cipher based MACs are
not a multiple of the output block size, modification is necessary. Generally, the
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approach is to produce multiple output blocks until the required length has been
obtained and to discard any bits in excess of the required length.
A KDF based on stream ciphers may generate arbitrary length of cryptro-
graphic key without discarding any bits in excess of the required length. In
addition, the stream cipher based KDFs may generate a long keystream (crypto-
graphic key), which can be partitioned into individual cryptographic keys. This
partitioned keystream may be suitable for the applications which require a large
amount of cryptographic keys.
Hash functions and block ciphers are often slower and require more resources
than stream ciphers. Stream ciphers can offer much higher speed, and can be
constructed to be much smaller in hardware. This has motivated us to pro-
pose an alternative approache of a KDF based on stream ciphers which
may offer an equivalent level of security instead of using hash functions
or block ciphers.
Stream ciphers are symmetric encryption schemes used mainly to provide
confidentiality for messages. Stream ciphers are suitable to employ for the ap-
plications in a constrained environment like mobile devices. The keystream gen-
erator for a stream cipher is designed to take two inputs: a short secret key and
some public information, and produce a output sequence of arbitrary length.
Given knowledge of a segment of the output sequence and the public informa-
tion, it should be computationally infeasible to calculate the secret key or the
correlation between the output with the secret key [47, 55]. Hence, in prin-
ciple these characteristics of stream ciphers as mentioned above may
be more appropriate than using hash functions or block ciphers for
developing KDF.
1.2 Aims and objectives of thesis
The overall aim of this research project is to investigate the use of stream ciphers
as an alternative to either hash functions or block ciphers as a cryptographic
primitive for KDFs. The plan is to conduct this research in two phases.
• In the first phase, the aim will be to construct a framework consisting of
formal security models which capture different capabilities of the adversary.
The plan will be to apply this framework to analyse existing KDFs.
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• The second aim is to construct new designs for KDFs based on stream
ciphers. The plan will be to design a stream cipher based KDF which is
more efficient than existing designs while offering an equivalent level of
security. The above framework will also be applied to this cipher.
1.3 Contribution and achievements
This thesis has two major contributions:
1. Security framework for key derivation functions. The major security goal
for a KDF is to produce cryptographic keys that are indistinguishable from
random binary strings. A formal security framework consisting of five se-
curity models for KDFs is presented. This includes four security models
that we define: known public inputs model with multiple salts (KPM),
known public inputs model with single salt (KPS), chosen context infor-
mation model with multiple salts (CCM) and chosen public inputs model
(CPM); and another security model, previously defined by Krawczyk, cho-
sen context information model with single salt [37], which we refer to as
CCS. These security models are defined using an indistinguishability game.
The proof of the relationship and implication between these five security
models are presented. Next, this security framework is used to evaluate
the security levels for existing KDF proposals.
2. Key derivation function based on stream ciphers. A new method is pro-
posed for constructing a generic stream cipher based key derivation function
which follows the two-phase model. The proposed KDF based on stream
ciphers is secure if the underlying stream cipher is secure. Instances of this
stream cipher based KDF are simulated using three stream ciphers: Triv-
ium, Sosemanuk and Rabbit. The simulation results show these stream
cipher based KDFs offer efficiency advantages over the more commonly
used KDFs based on block ciphers and hash functions.
The limitation of the proposed stream cipher based KDFs is its capability
of accommodating long secret key. Hence, to overcome the identified limi-
tation, a modification of stream cipher based KDFs which follow two-phase
model is proposed. For completeness, an additional stream cipher based
KDF is provided that follows the single phase model. The security for
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both modified stream cipher based KDFs is analysed. The results suggest
that the modified proposals have similar security levels compared with hash
function and block cipher based KDFs but are significantly more efficient
in software and hardware.
1.4 Outline of the thesis
This thesis is organised as follows:
• Chapter 2: This chapter explains the theoretical background used in the
subsequent chapters. Firstly the basic concept of entropy is explained.
This is followed by an overview of three extractors, namely deterministic
extractor, statistical extractor and computational extractor. Next, two dif-
ferent models of KDFs, which are single phase and two-phase are presented.
Finally, the basic notions of stream cipher and generic attack methods for
attacking key derivation functions are presented.
• Chapter 3: The security goal of key derivation functions is identified.
Next, a general security framework for KDFs is formed. The security
framework includes our proposed four security models together with the
security model proposed by Krawczyk [37]. The proof of relationships and
implications between these five security models are provided. Lastly, ex-
isting key derivation functions proposals are analysed by using these five
security models.
The proposed security framework presented in this chapter appear in the
following publication:
C. W. Chuah, E. Dawson, J. Gonza´lez Nieto and L. Simpson. A
Framework for Security Analysis of Key Derivation Functions. In
M. D. Ryan, B. Smyth, and G. L. Wang, editors, Information Secu-
rity Practive and Experience, volume 7232 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 199-216. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012 [15].
• Chapter 4: Stream cipher based key derivation function is proposed.
A formal security proof is provided for this proposal. We simulate this
stream cipher based key derivation functions with Trivium, Sosemanuk
and Rabbit. The perfomance of the stream cipher based KDFs is compared
with hash function and block cipher based KDFs.
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The proposed stream cipher based key derivation functions discussed in
this chapter appear in the following publication:
C. W. Chuah, E. Dawson, and L. Simpson. Key Derivation Func-
tion: The SCKDF Scheme. In L. J. Janczewski, H. B. Wolfe, and
S. Shenoi, editors, Security and Privacy Protection in Information
Processing Systems, volume 405 of IFIP Advances in Information
and Communication Technology, pages 125-138. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2013 [16].
• Chapter 5: A limitation of the stream cipher based KDFs proposed in
Chapter 4 is identified. Alternative stream cipher based key derivation
functions are proposed. Security analysis and performance results for these
modified stream cipher based KDFs are given.
• Chapter 6: In this chapter, the contributions of the thesis are summarized.
In addition, areas for future research are identified.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter presents the theoretical background of this research including key
derivation functions and keystream generators for stream ciphers. Firstly, the
basic notions of entropy are explained. Then, three different types of extractors
are defined: deterministic extractors, statistical extractors and computational
extractors. An overview of two existing key derivation function constructions
follows. Next, the formal definition of keystream generator is explained. Lastly,
general attacks on key derivation functions and keystream generator are iden-
tified. This information establishes the basis to build the security framework
in Chapter 3 and design the key derivation function based on stream ciphers in
Chapter 4.
Entropy in information theory is a measurement of uncertainty associated
with a random variable. Entropy is important in key derivation functions as the
effectiveness of the key derivation function depends on the amount of uncertainty
in the derived key. In this research, min-entropy is used to measure the amount
of uncertainty for the random sources. Min-entropy describes the worst case
scenario which allows the adversary to learn the maximum amount of information
about the random sources from the math event. In cryptography applications,
one needs to be assured the security in more conservative way which is in worse
case condition. An extractor is a basic component to transform an input with
a non-uniform probability distribution but containing a good amount of entropy
to an output with a close-to-uniform probability distribution that preserves the
entropy of the source.
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There are two types of KDF design in the current literature; single phase
and two-phase. Previous KDF designs are single phase [1, 3–5, 13, 34, 61] with
the inputs such as private string being concatenated with some public strings.
Many of these KDF proposals appear to have been designed in an ad-hoc fashion.
Once the KDF constructions are compromised, a new KDF proposal needs to be
rebuilt.
A more recent KDF design trend which offers increased flexibility is the two
phase KDF [14, 18–20, 27, 36, 37], where the phases consist of an extractor and
an expander. The extractor inputs are the private string and a public random
string, while the expander inputs are the output from the extractor and the public
context information. In this two-phase design, the extractor and expander are
two independent sub-functions, which can be designed and analysed separately.
This permits mixing and matching of different types of extractor and expander
functions to form good extract-then-expand KDF proposals, in terms of both
security and/or performance. In this research we investigate both single phase
and two-phase KDFs.
The chapter is organised as follows. A formal defintion of entropy is provided
in section 2.1. Three different types of extractors, namely deterministic extractor,
statistical extractor and computational extractor are presented in section 2.2.
The formal definition of key derivation functions is presented in section 2.3,
followed by two different key derivation constructions, namely single phase and
two phase key derivation functions. The properties of keystream generator are
described in Section 2.4. General methods for attacking existing key derivation
function proposals are described in section 2.5. A summary of the work in this
chapter is given in Section 2.6.
2.1 Entropy
Entropy is used to measure the uncertainty in a random variable, and its numer-
ical value can be computed based on the probability distribution of the random
variable. Shannon entropy and min-entropy are two basic notions of entropy
presented below. As the entropy of the random variable is expressed in bits,
hence logarithm base 2 is used in the formula.
The concept of Shannon entropy was introduced to estimate the average
information content associated with a random variable [50]. The output is the
2.1. Entropy 9
number of bits, on average, required to describe the random variable.
Definition 2.1 (Shannon entropy) [50]. For a random variable X with k out-
comes (x1, x2, . . . , xk), the entropy is defined as H(X ) = −
k∑
i=1
Pr(xi) log2 Pr(xi),
where Pr is probability.
Another entropy calculation is min-entropy from [43]. Min-entropy measures
the worst case scenario of uncertainty for random variable.
Definition 2.2 (Min-entropy) [43]. Given a random variable X taking values in
{0, 1}k the min-entropy of X denoted H∞(X ) is given by minx∈{0,1}k log2 1Pr[X=x] .
Shannon entropy and min-entropy measurements are compared in the following
examples.
2.1.1 Random variable with uniform distribution
Consider a random variable that has a uniform distribution over 16 outcomes.
The entropy of this random variable is
• Shannon entropy:
H(x) = −
16∑
i=1
Pr(x) log2 Pr(x) = −
16∑
i=1
1
16
log2
1
16
= 4 bits.
• min-entropy:
H∞(X ) = minx∈{0,1}pllog2 1Pr[X=x] = log216 = 4 bits.
2.1.2 Random variable with nonuniform distribution
Consider a random variable with eight possible outcomes, and the probability
distribution (1
2
, 1
4
, 1
8
, 1
16
, 1
64
, 1
64
, 1
64
, 1
64
). The entropy of this random variable is
• Shannon entropy:
H(x) = −
8∑
i=1
Pr(x) log2 Pr(x) = −12 log2 12 − 14 log2 14 − 18 log2 18− 116 log2 116 −
(4× 1
64
log2
1
64
) = 2 bits.
• min-entropy: H∞(X ) = minx∈{0,1}pllog2 1Pr[X=x] = log22 = 1 bit.
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2.1.3 Discussion
As shown in Section 2.1.1 above, the values for Shannon entropy and min-entropy
output are the same if the probability of a random variable is uniformly dis-
tributed. However, if a random variable has a non-uniform distribution then the
min-entropy value is a more conservative estimate of the entropy of the random
variable than Shannon entropy as shown in Section 2.1.2 above. The conserva-
tive estimation is of particular importance in key derivation functions that are
safety critical. Min-entropy is considered in this research rather than the Shan-
non entropy, as many of the KDF private inputs are randomly generated and
have a non-uniform distribution, for example, a password, DH-shared secret or
non-uniform random source material [3–5,18,27,34,40].
2.2 Extractor
In this section, three different types of extractor are presented. These are deter-
ministic extractors, statistical extractors and computational extrators.
An extractor is a function that transforms an input which has a non-uniformly
distributed into an output which is close-to-uniform distribution. The extrac-
tor is a component of a two-phase KDF, as the private string p usually is not
uniformly random. This is the case where the private input is a password, DH-
shared secret, or other non-random string. The extractor is used to transform p
into δ-close to uniformly distributed output, which we denote it as PRK . The δ-
close to uniform distribution is a statistical distance which measures the distance
between two statistical objects, which can be two random variables. A value of
δ which is small indicates the output is close-to-uniformly distributed.
Definition 2.3 (Statistical distance) [52]. Let X and Y be random variables
which both take values on a finite set V. We define the statistical distance between
X and Y as ∆[X ,Y ] := 1
2
∑
v∈V
|Pr[X = v] − Pr[Y = v]|, where Pr denotes the
probability.
2.2.1 Deterministic Extractor
A deterministic extractor is an explicit function on an arbitrary input with non-
uniformly distribution and generates an output which is statistically close-to-
uniform. A formal definition of a deterministic extractor is given below:
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Definition 2.4 (Deterministic extractor) [49]. Let C be a class of distributions
on an input with pl-bit such that {0, 1}pl. A function Ext : {0, 1}pl → {0, 1}kl is
a deterministic δ-extractor for C if for every distribution X in C the distribution
Ext(X ) (obtained by sampling x from X and computing Ext(x)) is δ-close to the
uniform distribution on output kl-bit string.
In order to perform extraction for the inputs with non uniform distribution, min-
entropy is used to formally measure the amount of random bits contained in the
probability distribution.
The first deterministic extractor can track back to Von Neumann who extract
the output close-to-uniform distribution from a sequence of independent tosses
of a biassed coin with unknown bias [57]. The unknown bias coin sequence
means that the sequence may be “heads” and “tails” are not equally likely. Von
Neumann gave a simple solution to obtain unbiased coins from this sequence as
below:
i. The sequence is divided into pairs.
ii. If the two coins matched, no output was generated.
iii. If the two coins differed, the first coin is the output. The two different coins
contribute 1 bit entropy for each toss of coins.
2.2.2 Statistical Extractor
A statistical extractor is a function that transforms a string p with certain entropy
together with an additional short known random string s, into an output (PRK )
that appears to be drawn from an almost uniform distribution. This is also
known as seeded extractor, where s is regarded as a seed value.
Definition 2.5 (Statistical Extractor) [48]. Let p be a random variable with
pl-bit string, p ∈ {0, 1}pl, s is public input with sl-bit string, s ∈ {0, 1}sl and
min-entropy m, H∞(p) ≥ m. A function Ext : {0, 1}pl × {0, 1}sl → {0, 1}kl
is a (m, δ)-statistical extractor such that for Ext(p, s) is δ-close to the uniform
distribution on the output with kl-bit string.
Many researchers are interested in constructing a statistical extractor by min-
imizing the salt length sl and maximizing the output length kl (PRK ), while
the δ is small as possible [42, 48]. As shown in Table 2.1, kl is determined by
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the min-entropy threshold and salt length sl, while salt length sl is determined
by private string length pl. These examples demonstrate that, to perserve the
security of PRK , p and s are fixed for that particular statistical extractor. For
example, both Impagliazzo et al. [32] and Srinivasan et al. [54] have designed
statistical extractors that can generate PRK of length kl = m + sl − O(1), for
any value of m. Goldreich et al. [24] proposed a statistical extractor that can
generate the same length PRK as in [32] and [54], but m is greater than pl
2
. The
required salt lengths for these three extractor designs are not the same. The
salt length for the extractor proposed in [32] is sl = O(pl), while the extractor
proposed in [54] only requires a salt of length sl = O(m + log pl), whereas the
salt length of extractor in [24] is sl = O(pl − m). Note, the symbol of O is a
notation which is used to describe an upper bound on the growth rate of the
function.
The comparison of the length of input and output for some of the statistical
extractor proposals are presented in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Comparison input and output length of statistical extractors.
Reference Min-entropy threshold, m Salt length, sl PRK length kl
Impagliazzo et al. [32] any m sl = O(pl) kl = m+ sl −O(1)
Srinivasan et al. [54] any m sl = O(m+ log pl) kl = m+ sl −O(1)
Goldreich et al. [24] m > pl
2
sl = O(pl −m) kl = m+ sl −O(1)
2.2.3 Computational Extractor
A computational extractor takes two inputs: secret p and publicly known s, and
generates an output value PRK , where the PRK is secret from the adversary.
The output PRK is only required to be computational indistinguishable from
a binary random string of the same length rather than statistically close to
uniform like deterministic extractor and statistical extractor. More description
of computational extractors are presented in Chapter 3. Note that s can be null
value [37]. Computational extractors are well-suited for the cryptographic setting
where the computational power of the adversary is polynomially bounded. That
is, it should be infeasible for an adversary who does not know p to distinguish
the PRK generated by the computational extractor from a binary random string
of the same length in polynomial time. The formal definition of computational
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extractor is in Chapter 3-Definition 3.2.
2.2.4 Comparison of Different Types of Extractors
Three different notions of extractors as above are presented. Table 2.2 provides
a summary overview of these three extractors. Deterministic extractors are the
specific algorithms designed for specific inputs such as independent tosses of a bi-
ased coin. The algorithms may not be suitable to apply for other non-uniformly
distributed sources. While in order for the statistical extractor to achieve a
δ-close statistical distance PRK , this statistical extractor requires a specific sig-
nificant difference between min-entropy m of private input, ramdom salt and
the required number kl of extracted bits. This prerequisite is a limitation to
construct a generic KDF scheme. For the current literature KDF proposals (Ap-
pendix A and the summary in Table 2.3), the value of m, sl and kl are varied
from each other. In addition, in terms of implementation statistical extractors
may require several hundred bits of salt to obtain the required number of bits
of PRK if the private string has low entropy m. However, some existing KDF
proposals have specific length of salt or null salt. This makes it difficult to im-
plement the statistical extractors into these KDF proposals. To obtain more
practical instantiations of extractors to build the generic KDF proposal, com-
putational extractor [37] is more appropriate in this generic context. That is,
the output derived from the computational extractor from arbitrary length of
private string and public salt is computationally indistinguishable from random
instead of statistically close to uniform. For the rest of the thesis, we will discuss
extractors from the computational extractors view point.
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Table 2.2: Comparison for three types extractors.
Features Deterministic Extractor Statistical Extractor Computational Extractor
Private input,
p
specific input, such as a
sequence of independent
tosses of a biased coin
any inputs any inputs
Private input
length, pl
any length specific length, based on the
design principle of the extrac-
tor
any length
Public input,
s
null compulsary it can be null or not null
Public input
length, sl
- specific length, determined by
private string length
any length
Output
length, kl
based on the randomness
bits contains in p
specific length, based on the
design principle of the extrac-
tor
any length
Output types δ-close to uniform δ-close to uniform computationally indistin-
guishability from a binary
random string of the same
length
Remarks It is an explicit extractor
that only can apply to a
concrete classes of p
It is a specific extractor that
only can apply to the applica-
tions that have specific length
of private input and public in-
puts, then generates a specific
length of output. Statistical
extractors are secure against
adversaries with unlimited
computing power.
Computational extractors
are well-suited for crypto-
graphic settings where the
computational power of
the adversary is polynomi-
ally bounded. Easy to be
implemented.
2.3 Key Derivation Function
Key derivation functions take a private string p which contains certain entropy
together with the public strings (salt s and/or context information c) and trans-
form these inputs into an n-bit cryptographic key, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
In particular, the derived cryptographic key is said to be computationally indis-
tinguishable from a binary random string, if no polynomial time algorithm can
distinguish between the cryptographic key and a binary random string of the
same length. This is explained in detail in Section 3.2. The length, n, of the
derived cryptographic key is an application specific security parameter.
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Figure 2.1: Design of KDFs.
Definition 2.6 (Key derivation function). A key derivation function is defined
as: K ← KDF (p, s, c, n), where
• p is a private string, which is chosen from the space of all possible private
strings PSPACE. We denote the length of p as pl and the probability
distribution of p as P.
• s is a salt, a public random string chosen from the salt space SSPACE. We
denote the length of s as sl and the probability distribution of s as S.
• c is a public context string chosen from a context space CSPACE. We
denote the length of c as cl and the probability distribution of c as C.
• n is a positive integer that indicates the number of bits to be produced by
the KDF;
• K is the derived n-bit cryptographic key.
The basic operation of a KDF is to transform the secret p and the public inputs
(s and/or c) into an n bit string which can be used as a cryptographic key.
The salt is usually obtained from a uniformly random distribution and is used
to create a large set of possible keys corresponding to a given p [61]. Context
information is arbitrary but application specific data; for example, a session
identifier or the identities of communicating parties [3, 4, 13,14,18–20,27,36].
Note that all inputs are publicly known, except for the private string p. The
value of p is secret. This private string may be obtained from a password, Diffie-
Hellman (DH) shared secrets or other non-uniformly random source material.
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In the current literature, there are two approaches to constructing KDFs:
KDFs with single phase and KDFs with two phase. The two phase KDF is
the composition of two subfunctions: extractor and expander. We discuss each
approach below.
2.3.1 Single Phase Key Derivation Function
A single phase KDF is a one step process to derive an output from the inputs.
Inputs are the private string p and public string (containing salts and/or context
information c). The output is an n-bit cryptographic key. F is a function that
is used to derive the cryptographic key from the inputs. This basic operation is
KDF (p, s, c, n) = F (p, s, c, n), as depicted in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Design of single phase KDFs.
2.3.2 Two Phase Key Derivation Function
For a two phase KDF, the inputs are not all introduced at the same time. The
first phase is an extractor process, denoted as Ext , which takes a private string
p and a salt s as the inputs, and generates an output, which denoted as PRK .
The PRK is an intermediate value derived from the secret p, so PRK is also
secret. The second phase is an expander process, denoted as Exp, that takes the
secret intermediate value PRK and public string namely context information c
as the inputs and produces an n-bit cryptographic key. This basic operation
is KDF (p, s, c, n) = Exp ({Ext (p , s)}, c, n), as illustrated in Figure 2.3. We
discuss each process in greater detail below.
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Figure 2.3: Design of two phase KDFs (Extract-then-expand).
a. First Phase: Extractor
Extractor is a function that takes as inputs the private string p which contains
randomly generated secret information and the salt s which is random string
which is not kept secret. From these inputs, the function generates an inter-
mediate value, which denoted as PRK . The input private p contains certain
entropy while the salt s is random string. The value of PRK is secret. The
aim of the extractor is to extract all the entropy from p and to transform the
entropy to the value of PRK which is computationally indistinguishable from
a random binary string of the same length.
b. Second Phase: Expander
Expansion is a function that takes as input the PRK and the context in-
formation c, then transforms these inputs into one or more arbitrary length
cryptographic key(s). The input PRK is the intermediate secret value which
is derived from the extractor phase while c is a publicly known string of arbi-
trary length. The aim of the expander is to form a cryptographic key(s) which
is computationally indistinguishable from a random binary string of the same
length.
2.3.3 Existing KDF Proposals
In current literature, both single phase and two-phase KDF proposals are con-
structed by using hash functions and block ciphers. A summary of these KDF
proposals is provided in Table 2.3 which includes the standard documents that
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illustrate the KDF designs. In addition, these KDF proposals are classified as
either single phase or two-phase KDF and the cryptographic primitives that are
used to construct these KDF proposals are also provided in this table. A detailed
explanation for each KDF proposal is presented in Appendix A.
Table 2.3: Summary of existing KDF proposals.
Standard Phase Cryptographic Primitive Key Block Derivation
NIST SP800-56A [3] Single Hash functions -
NIST SP800-56B [4] Single Hash functions -
NIST SP800-56C [14] Two Hash functions HMAC-SHA1
HMAC-SHA224
HMAC-SHA256
HMAC-SHA384
HMAC-SHA512
Block Ciphers AES-CMAC:
AES128, AES192, AES256
NIST SP800-108 [13] Single Hash functions HMAC
Block ciphers AES-CMAC
TLS version 1.0 [18], 1.1 [19] Two Hash functions HMAC-MD5
HMAC-SHA1
TLS version 1.2 [20] Two Hash functions HMAC-SHA256
IKEv1 [27] Two Hash functions HMAC-MD5
HMAC-SHA1
IKEv2 [36] Two Hash functions HMAC-SHA1
HMAC-SHA224
HMAC-SHA256
HMAC-SHA384
HMAC-SHA512
Block ciphers AES128, AES192, AES256
PBKDF1, PBKDF2 [34] Single Hash functions -
PBKDF3 [61] Single Hash functions HMAC-SHA1
HMAC-SHA224
HMAC-SHA256
HMAC-SHA384
HMAC-SHA512
Adam et.al [1] Single Hash functions HMAC
HKDF [37,38] Two Hash functions HMAC-SHA1
HMAC-SHA224
HMAC-SHA256
HMAC-SHA384
HMAC-SHA512
SRTP [5] Single Block ciphers AES128, AES192, AES256
References: SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm
HMAC - Keyed-hash Message Authentication Code
AES - Advanced Encryption Standard
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2.3.4 Provable Security - Random Oracle Model
The detailed formal security analysis for existing KDF proposals is provided in
Chapter 3. All the security proofs are based on the random oracle model (ROM).
In 1993, Bellare and Rogaway made proving cryptographic protocols easier and
more efficient by introducing the idea of ROM that allows all parties to access the
public random oracle [6]. Note that Krawczyk also provides the security proof
for his KDF proposal in [37] by using ROM. In the ROM, in order to obtain the
value H(x), the adversary needs to query the random oracle with input x, where
H can be a hash function, block cipher or stream cipher. The random oracle
queries are simulated by the challenger as follows. On input a string x, if x has
not been queried before, then output H(x) ∈R {0, 1}n, where n is the output
length of the H function. If x has been queried before, output the same value
H(x) as before.
One might ask why the security proof is based on the ROM. Proofs in the
standard model which are usually based on standard complexity-theoretic as-
sumptions [6] would be clearly preferable. However, for the research in this thesis,
the ROM approach is appropriate. Firstly, as observed by others [37, 61], many
hash-based KDFs proposed in the literature and used in standards seem impos-
sible to prove secure based on the standard properties of the underlying hash
functions. Yet one would like to show that these “practical” hash-based KDFs
have some level of security that justifies their use. For example, it does not seem
possible to prove the security of PBKDF1 in Table 3.3, which is standardised
in PKCS#5 [34], without considering idealised properties of the underlying hash
function. An extensive discussion on the applicability of the ROM in the analysis
of KDFs is given by Krawczyk [37].
2.4 Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers are symmetric encryption schemes used mainly to provide con-
fidentiality for messages. Symmetric encryption is also known as private key or
single key encryption. The same key is used for both encryption and decryption.
In stream cipher, the plaintext is encrypted one character at a time, usually
using a bitwise XOR with the corresponding character of the keystream, to give
a character of the ciphertext stream. Stream ciphers are suitable for applications
where message length is unknown and their speed makes them suitable for real
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time applications.
Stream ciphers are inspired by the one-time pad cipher(OTP) [47, 55]. The
OTP uses a truly random key, the same length as the plaintext. The key is
XORed with the plaintext to produce ciphertext. There are differences between
OTP and practical stream ciphers in terms of ‘key’. Stream ciphers use short
initial key and the keystream generator to generate the keystream of the length
of the plaintext. The plaintext is XORed with the keystream, resulting in ci-
phertext. If the OTP’s key is truly random which is as long as the plaintext and
never reused, the ciphtertext will not be able to decrypt without knowing the
entire value of key. However, for stream ciphers, once we know the initial key,
the adversary can generate the entire keystream and the keystream is used to
decrypt the ciphertext.
A typical stream cipher consists of a keystream generator (KG) which pro-
duces an output sequence based on the initial key. The resulting output se-
quence appears to be unpredictable or random. The output sequence can be in
bits, bytes or words: Z1, Z2, . . . , Zt. To encrypt, the keystream is combined with
plaintext using bitwise XOR to produce ciphertext. To decrypt, the ciphertext
is XORed with an identical keystream to produce plaintext. Figure 2.5 shows
the encryption and decryption process for a binary additive synchronous stream
ciphers.
Figure 2.4: Stream Cipher Model [55]
For each time interval t each of the following are defined:
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• A keystream Zt;
• A binary plaintext Mt;
• A binary ciphertext Ct.
Encryption: Ct = Mt ⊕ Zt
Decryption: Mt = Ct ⊕ Zt
The critical component of a stream cipher is the keystream generator which
produces a binary output sequence. For example, if the keystream generators
generate endless zeros keystream, the ciphertext is the plaintext. Also, if the
keystream sequence is repeated, this weakness allows the adversary to recover
the plaintext by using the repeated keystream to decrypt the ciphertext. Note
that, in this research we are just interested in the keystream generators that
generate the output sequence in bits as the component to construct the KDFs.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the generic keystream generators, where the inputs to
the keystream generator are the secret key and the publically known IV. The
purpose of using a known IV as an input to the keystream generator is to enable
generation of multiple distinct keystream sequences from the same secret key,
but for different IVs.
Figure 2.5: Keystream generator [55]
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For stream ciphers, initialization and keystream generation are the two major
processes. Output from the initialization process is “initial state” which is ready
for the keystream generation process.
There are three major components in the keystream generation process: in-
ternal states, next state function and output function. The output function takes
the internal state and produces the keystream character. The next state function
takes the internal state and generates a new internal state. The output function
is applied to generate next keystream character. Note that the keystream gener-
ation state update function can be different or similar to the initialisation state
update function.
The overall aim in a stream cipher is to use a keystream generation process
which ‘approximates’ an ideal pseudorandom keystream generator as given by
Definition 2.7 and Definition 2.8.
Definition 2.7 A pseudorandom generator is said to pass all polynomial-time
statistical tests if no polynomial-time algorithm can correctly distinguish between
an output sequence of the generator and a truly random sequence of the same
length with probability significantly greater than 1
2
[41].
Definition 2.8 Let KEYSPACE, IVSPACE, ISSPACE, ZSPACE be a set space
over {0, 1}k, {0, 1}i, {0, 1}is and {0, 1}∗ respectively. A keystream generator is a
pseudorandom generator that takes the inputs key and IV and generates arbitrary
length of keystream. KG(key, IV): {0, 1}k × {0, 1}i → {0, 1}is → {0, 1}∗.
2.5 General Attacks on KDF Proposals
This section gives a brief overview of generic attacks which apply to all current
KDF proposals. In the current literature, hash functions and block ciphers are
two cryptographic primitives used in constructing KDFs. The cryptographic
strength of these KDF proposals depends upon the underlying hash functions or
block ciphers cryptographic strength. The most common generic attacks against
KDFs are brute force attack, finding collisions based on the birthday paradox or
time-memory-data tradeoff (TMTD) attacks.
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2.5.1 Brute force
A brute force attack is a straight forward searching method which attempts to
guess the correct input by trying all possible options from the input set space.
The brute force attack might be utilized when the adversary cannot take ad-
vantage or there are no weaknesses in KDF proposals. The adversary has to
systematically check all the possible ‘input’ values until he or she finds the cor-
rect one. There are three possible unknown ‘inputs’ that the adversary can try
to brute force: the private string p, intermediate value PRK , and internal state
of the cipers that are used to construct the KDFs. Note that, the adversary may
choose to brute force the unknown ‘inputs’ that have ‘short’ length. The PRK
is preferentially chosen by the adversary as, usually PRK has a shorter length
than the private string and the internal state. We provide a detailed description
for each of these possibilities, and the consequences if the adversary brute forces
that ‘input’ as below.
i. Private string p. The adversary can brute force the private string for both
single phase and two-phase KDF proposals. This is the stronger attack that
brute force the PRK or internal state, as this allows the adversary to generate
all cryptographic keys with known salt and known context information. If the
length of the private string is pl, then the security level of the corresponding
KDF proposal is not larger than 2pl. This also means a longer private string
will require more time to find the correct private string than a shorter one.
ii. Intermediate value PRK . For two-phase KDF, the adversary may brute
force the intermediate value PRK . If the length of the PRK is kl, then the
security level of the PRK is 2kl. Once the adversary finds the intermediate
value, then they can generate all the cryptographic keys with multiple known
context information.
iii. Internal states. The internal state brute force can be applied into single
phase or two-phase KDF proposals. If the length of the internal states are
is, the complexity to brute force the internal state is 2is.
• Hash functions and block ciphers divide the input into a series of equal-
sized blocks, with some padding necessary if the last block input is not
of the appropriate length. The input blocks are processed in sequence
with a one-way compression function, and the output is a fixed block
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size, we denote the output size as hl. The adversary can brute force
the internal state for the last block of input to retrieve the hl bits of
output. Assume the KDF based on hash functions or block ciphers
are used to generate a cryptographic key. The number of bits of the
derived cryptographic key are greater than hl, for example 2hl which
means two output blocks. To retrieve this derived cryptographic key,
the adversary has to brute force internal state for these two output
blocks. The brute force’s complexity for this scenario is 2× 2is.
• The keystream generator of a stream cipher is used to generate the
cryptographic key which is presented in Section 4. In general, the
keystream generator has two major processes, namely initialization pro-
cess and keystream generation process as stated in Section 2.4. Internal
state is the output from the initialization process which will be used in
keystream generation process to generate an arbitrary length of crypto-
graphic key. Hence, the complexity to retrieve this single cryptographic
key by brute force of the internal state is 2is. Internal state recovery for
stream ciphers only permits the generation of single cryptographic key
from the same private string and public strings. If new public string(s),
salt and/or context information are injected into the keystream gener-
ator, and the keystream generator has to resynchronize, new internal
state is formed. Note that, this is also the case for KDF based on hash
functions and block ciphers.
2.5.2 Collision
Assume a message m has length of ml and a random function H maps m to an
output with length of n. Collision will happen when ml > n. For the function H
on a random message m, we have message collision when H(m1) = H(m2), where
m1 6= m2. When the length of the output is n-bit then by birthday paradox [41]
after calculating H for 2
n
2 distinct messages, there is a 50% chance of message
collision.
It may be possible to construct message collisions for algorithms like MD5
and SHA1 in substantially less than 2
n
2 . For MD5, Wang et. al [58] found a
message collision in less than 264 calculations. For SHA1, Wang et. al found
a collision with 269 calculations [59] which is relatively faster than the birthday
paradox. In Section 3.7, it will be shown how these collisions can be applied to
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construct attacks on KDFs based on MD5 and SHA1.
2.5.3 Time-Memory-Data Tradeoffs
Time-Memory-Data tradeoffs (TMDT) are a generic method of inverting oneway
functions, such as block ciphers and stream ciphers. The aim of an TMDT attack
on stream ciphers can be either to recover the internal states or the secret key
given a segment of keystream. If the adversary manages to recover the internal
state at any stage of keystream generation, then they may generate the forward
keystream to decrypt the ciphertext generated with a specific IV. Secret key
recovery is a stronger attack, as the adversary may use the secret key together
with different IVs and generate any keystream to decrypt all the ciphertexts
encrypted with the secret key. In this research, we focus on TMDT against
stream ciphers.
Generally, TMDT attacks are composed of two phases: firstly, an offline
preprocessing phase and then followed by an online computational phase. In
the offline phase, the adversary constructs a lookup table that contains possible
secret keys/internal states. During the online phase, the attacter expects to
recover the particular secret keys/internal states from a given known keystream.
The complexity of a TMDT attack is usually taken to be the sum or maximum
of T , M and D. In any TMDT attack there are five key parameters:
• M represents the size of memory (hard disks or DVDs) need in constructing
the look-up table. The technique of TMDT is allowing the attack on the
ciphers much more faster than brute force attack providing that the ciphers
have no known attack. Hence, M must be smaller than search space either
secret key or initial internal state (N).
• D represents the number of data points available to an adversary in the
real-time phase, such as ZI1 , Z
I
2 , . . . , Z
I
t , where I = 1, 2 . . . D and t = log
(N).
• P represents pre-computation time taken to prepare the look-up table.
However, P will not be considered when measuring the complexity of
TMTD as the adversary may perform this pre-computation at their leisure
[29].
• T represents on-line time complexity.
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• N represents the size of the search space either secret key or initial internal
state.
The basic idea of TMDT attacks against stream ciphers is as follows.
i. Offline preprocessing phase.
(a) An adversary selects either M different secret keys or internal states.
We denote the secret keys or the internal states as xj, where j =
1, 2, . . .M .
• If secret keys
– For integer j = 1 to M , do the following:
∗ Two inputs are chosen: k-bit random secret key and i-bit
known IV.
∗ Load the secret key and IV into the states as described by
the cipher algorithm. Pad if necessary the remaining bits of
states. Go through the initialization and keystream genera-
tion process as described by the cipher algorithm.
∗ Take the first k+ i-bit of keystream as output from the KG.
We denote the keystream as Z1, Z2, . . . , Zt, where t = k + i.
Note, k + i = log (N).
• If Internal states
– For integer j = 1 to M , do the following:
∗ Take a cipher algorithm to send an internal state of is bits
and generate is bits of keystream Z1, Z2, . . . , Zt, where t = is.
Note, is = log N .
(b) Adversary stores (xj, Zj1 , Z
j
2 , . . . , Z
j
t ) in the look-up table.
• If secret keys
– Secret key and IV are stored in the first column of the look-up
table.
– k + i bits keystream are stored in the second column of the
look-up table.
• If Internal states
– Internal states are stored in the first column of the look-up
table.
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– is bits keystream are stored in the second column of the look-up
table.
(c) Adversary sorts the second column of the look-up table in increasing
order.
(d) P denotes the table construction time.
ii. Online computation phase.
(a) A keystream with length of D + log(N) − 1 bits is provided to the
adversary.
(b) The adversary uses a sliding window to produce allD possible keystream
segments of length log(N), ZI1 , Z
I
2 , . . . , Z
I
t , where I = 1, 2 . . . D and t =
log (N).
(c) The adversary will compare the D possible keystream segments (ZI1 ,
ZI2 , . . ., Z
I
t ) with the keystream from the pre-computed look-up table.
If there is a match, then the secret key/initial state was xj.
(d) The whole process must complete in time T .
TMDT attack was originally introduced by Hellman [29] for attacking block
ciphers which maps the secret key space to the ciphertext space by encrypting a
chosen plaintext using block cipher. He stated the TMDT curve as T.M2 = N2
with a typical point of T = M = N
2
3 and the pre-computation time is P = N .
Hellman’s work is further investigated by Fiat and Naor in [23] to recover the
secret key of block ciphers. However, the finding from Fiat and Noar is weaker
than Hellman’s work. The TMDT curve introduced by Fiat and Noar is T.M3 =
N3. The pre-computation time from Fiat and Noar is P = N which statisfied
the point of T = M = N
3
4 as show in Table 2.4. Both methods also can be
applied in attacking hash functions.
Next, Hellman’s ideas were extended to attack stream ciphers. The first class
of attack is to recover the internal state (Key, IV) which maps the internal state
space to a keystream segment of a stream cipher as presented in [8, 21, 31]. The
second class is to recover secret key which maps the keyspace to a keystream
of a stream cipher as shown in [21, 31]. To make TMDT meaningful, T and M
should be at least smaller than N , but T.M ≥ N and T ≥ D2 [8, 21, 31]. The
summarized complexity of TMDT and the curve from different researchers as
discussed above is shown in Table 2.4.
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Approach Reference TMDT P M T D Can apply to,
Hellman (H) [29] T.M2 = N2 N
2
3 N
2
3 N
2
3 1 Block ciphers, Hash functions
Fiat and Naor (FN) [23] T.M3 = N3 N N
3
4 N
3
4 1 Block ciphers, Hash functions
Biryukov and Shamir (BS) [8] T.M2.D2 = N2 N
2
3 N
1
3 N
2
3 N
1
3 Stream ciphers
Hong and Sarkar (HS) [31] T.M2.D2 = N2 N
3
4 N
1
2 N
1
2 N
1
4 Stream ciphers
Dunkelman and Keller (DK) [21] T.M2.D2 = N2 N
2
3 N
1
3 N
2
3 N
1
3 Stream ciphers
Table 2.4: TMD tradeoffs.
Prior to year 2000, usually the keystream generator of the stream cipher is
generated from a short secret key and small internal state size. These ciphers
are vulnerable to TMDT attack, as the adversary may recover the secret key
with less effort than brute force attack. In modern stream ciphers which are
designed after year 2000, the keystream generator of the stream cipher uses an
IV in addition to the short secret key to create a large search space. Hong and
Sarkar [30] found that for stream ciphers using IV, if the IV is shorter than the
secret key, then the cipher is vulnerable to TMDT as key recovery takes less time
than brute force attack. Hence, Dunkelman and Keller [21] proposed using IV at
least as long as the secret key to resist TMDT attack. Biryukov and Shamir [8]
suggested that the internal state size of a stream cipher should consist of at least
twice the number of bits used for the secret key in order to be resistant to TMDT
attacks.
2.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter establishes the theoretical background used in the following chap-
ters of the thesis. This includes entropy, extractors, different types of KDF
constructions, stream ciphers and general attacks on KDF proposals.
Entropy is a measurement of uncertainty of a random variable. In this con-
text, entropy refers to Shannon entropy and min-entropy. Min-entropy is used
in this research as min-entropy is more conservative (worse case scenario) in
measuring the uncertainty of a variable whose distribution is non-uniformly dis-
tributed.
An extractor is a basic component for many KDF proposals. Generally,
the extractor transforms a non-uniform distributed input into close-to-uniformly
distributed output. Determistic extractor and statistical extractor are two types
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of extractors having this characteristic. These extractors are designed for specific
inputs and specific applications. Krawczyk [37] defined a more generic extractor
which can applied to different applications, namely computational extractor. A
computational extractors aims to transform a non-unifomly random distribution
input into an output that is computationally indistinguishable from a random
binary string.
KDF can be classified as either single phase or two-phase. The functions
in the two-phase KDF proposals may be designed separately and the security
analysis for these functions may perform separately. In current literature, these
KDF proposals are composed by using hash functions and block ciphers. For both
hash functions and block ciphers, the input is broken up into a series of equal-
sized blocks, with some padding necessary if the last block input is incomplete
size. The input blocks are processed in sequence with a one-way compression
function, and the output is a fixed block size. The KDF should be able to
generate cryptographic keys of arbitrary length. Where the required length is
not a multiple of the output block size, modification is necessary. Generally, the
approach is to produce multiple output blocks until the required length has been
obtained and to discard any bits in excess of the required length. This may be
regarded as wasteful.
Binary addditive stream ciphers may be an alternative cryptographic prim-
itive to construct the KDF which can produce arbitrary length of keystream
(cryptographic key) without discarding any leftover bits. This approach will be
discussed in Chapter 4.
Many existing KDF proposals are designed an ad-hoc proposals and lacking a
security model to compare the security of these KDF proposals. A formal security
framework to analyse the security for different KDF proposals is proposed in next
chapter.
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Chapter 3
Security Framework of KDF
In the current literature on KDFs, two formal security models for KDFs have
been introduced by Yao & Yin in [61] (refer Section 3.3, Definition 3.5) and
Krawczyk [37] (refer Section 3.3.2). However, there are limitations with each of
these security models as neither model captures comprehensive range of capabili-
ties of the adversary. This limitation motivates us to extend the existing security
models and form a comprehensive security framework which includes both pas-
sive adversary and active adversary. Given two different KDF proposals, the one
which satisfies the stronger definition of security is preferred.
The chapter is organised as follows. A general security framework for key
derivation functions using an indistinguishability game is described in Section
3.1. Formal definition of key derivation functions are presented in Section 3.2.
The existing security models proposed by Yao & Yin [61] and Krawczyk [37]
are presented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes four security models that
we define: KPM, KPS, CCM and CPM. Section 3.5 shows the security of two-
phase KDF based on CPM security model. The proof of the relationships and
implications between these five security models are provided in Section 3.6. A
security analysis of existing key derivation function proposals based on these
five security models is presented in Section 3.7. A summary of the chapter is
presented in Section 3.8.
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3.1 General Security Framework
The general security framework is based on an indistinguishability game played
between a challenger C and an adversary A in a polynomial number of time steps
t, where the KDF is considered secure if no A can win the game with probability
significantly greater than the probability of winning by guessing randomly. To
win the game A has to determine if the challenge output given in the game is
the cryptographic key generated by the KDF or a random binary string of the
same length within a polynomial number of time steps. The game runs in two
major stages: the learning stage and the challenge stage. An optional stage
called the adaptive stage may be available for some powerful A, who can repeat
the learning stage after receiving the challenge output. Figure 3.1 illustrates
this indistinguishablility game followed by an explanation of how the game is
conducted.
Figure 3.1: The indistinguishability game.
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i. Learning stage: A private string p is chosen from PSPACE defined by the
KDF. The adversary A can make at most q queries, either q < |SSPACE | ×
|CSPACE | or q < |CSPACE | depending on the type of security models. For
each query, a derived cryptographic key associated with a salt and context
information is provided to A. A can use this information to construct a
lookup table to be used to distinguish the challenge output at the challenge
stage of the game. The capabilities of the adversary determine the level of
control they have over the public inputs to KDF. A passive adversary is just
an observer that obtains the cryptographic key K, but cannot query the
KDF to generate a cryptographic key from their choice of public inputs. An
active adversary is able to interact with the KDF to demand cryptographic
keys corresponding to their choice of public inputs, with the ability to choose
either salt or context information, or both.
ii. Challenge stage: A random bit b ∈R {0, 1} is generated by C. If b =
0, then C computes K ′ = KDF (p, s, c, n), else C outputs a random key
K ′ of length n-bit. An active A may have the ability to choose either salt
or context information, or both, to obtain the challenge output but this is
subject to the restriction that the chosen set of public inputs are not a set
of inputs from the learning stage.
iii. Adaptive stage: Give the challenge output K ′, a powerful active A may
have the capability to learn more about K ′ in an adaptive stage before
guessing whether K ′ is the cryptographic key or a random binary string.
The adaptive stage consists of repeating the steps in the learning stage for
up to q − q′ queries, subject to the restriction that A may not ask anything
directly regarding the public inputs used for the challenge stage.
To complete the game, A guesses whether K ′ is the key or a random string. If A
guesses that K ′ is a cryptographic key, then A sends b′ = 0. Otherwise, A sends
b′ = 1. A wins the game if b′ = b.
If the adversary is unable to distinguish between a cryptographic key derived
from a private string using the KDF and a random binary string of the same
length, then the KDF is secure in terms of indistinguishability. Formally, we say
that the KDF is (t, q, )-secure if the probability of the adversary winning the
game in time at most t with at most q queries is Pr[b = b′] ≤ 1
2
+ , where 
is negligible. If the adversary is able to distinguish the challenge output with a
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probability greater than 1
2
, then the adversary is considered to have an ‘advan-
tage’ in distinguishing the cryptographic keys which are produced by the KDF
and the KDF is considered insecure.
3.2 Formal Definition of KDF
In this section, we provide the formal security definitions for both single phase
KDF and two-phase KDF. These formal security definitions are refered to the
security framework illustrated at Figure 3.1.
3.2.1 Single Phase KDF
Single phase KDF generates n-bit of cryptographic key from the inputs p, s, c and
n. The derived cryptographic key should be computationally indistinguishable
from a random binary string of the same length.
Definition 3.1 (Single phase KDF). Let PSPACE, SSPACE and CSPACE be
set spaces of {0, 1}pl, {0, 1}sl and {0, 1}cl respectively. A single phase KDF is
a function F : {0, 1}pl × {0, 1}sl × {0, 1}cl → {0, 1}n. It is called a (t, q, )-
secure single phase KDF if an adversary A running in a polynomial number of
time steps t and making at most q queries to the KDF can distinguish between
cryptographic key (derived from p) or a random binary string of the same length
with probability not larger than (1
2
+ ), where  is negligible.
3.2.2 Two Phase KDF
A two-phase KDF has two subfunctions: an extractor and an expander. The
extractor generates an intermediate value PRK from the inputs p and s. The
derived PRK is secret, unknown to the adversary. The expander takes PRK , c
and n as inputs and generates n-bit of output, intended for use as a cryptographic
key. The cryptographic key should be computationally indistinguishable from a
random binary string.
Definition 3.2 (Computational extractor Single Salt) [37]. Let PSPACE and
SSPACE be set spaces of {0, 1}pl and {0, 1}sl respectively. A function Ext :
{0, 1}pl × {0, 1}sl → {0, 1}kl is called a (tX , X)-computational extractor if an
adversary A running in a polynomial number of time steps tX can distinguish
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between PRK (derived from p) or a random string of the same length, with
probability not larger than (1
2
+ X) where p is chosen from {0, 1}pl and s chosen
from {0, 1}sl. If Ext is a (tX , X)-computational extractor with min-entropy m
then we call it a (m, tX , X)-computational extractor, where X is negligible.
Definition 3.3 (Computational extractor Multiple Salts). Let PSPACE and
SSPACE be set spaces of {0, 1}pl and {0, 1}sl respectively. A function Ext :
{0, 1}pl × {0, 1}sl → {0, 1}kl is called a (tX , qX , X)-computational extractor if
an adversary A running in a polynomial number of time steps tX and making
at most qX queries to the extractor, A can distinguish between PRK (derived
from p) or a random string of the same length, with probability not larger than
(1
2
+ X) where p is chosen from {0, 1}pl and s chosen from {0, 1}sl. If Ext is a
(tX , qX , X)-computational extractor with min-entropy m then we call it a (m,
tX , qX , X)-computational extractor, where X is negligible.
Definition 3.4 (Expander) [37]. An expander is a (tY , qY , Y )-secure variable-
length-output pseudorandom function family if an adversary A running in a poly-
nomial number of time steps tY and making at most qY queries to the expander,
A can distinguish the cryptographic key generated by the expander from a random
string of the same length with probability not larger than (1
2
+ Y ), where Y is
negligible.
3.3 Existing Security Models
Here, two existing formal security models are presented. These are proposed by
Yao & Yin [61] and Krawczyk [37] respectively.
3.3.1 Yao & Yin
Yao & Yin proposed a security model for evaluating password-based KDFs.
Password-based KDFs derive cryptographic keys from passwords. A public ran-
dom string (s) and a number of iterations c are used in practice to significantly
increase the difficulty of a brute force attack [61].
In [61], Yao & Yin introduce two attack models; weakly secure and strongly
secure, to evaluate the security of password-based KDF proposals. These attack
models assume the public random string and the number of iterations are known
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and/or chosen and the password p is secret. There are two types of queries that
an adversary A can make; these are denoted as Type 1 and Type 2.
a. Type 1: Query the underlying function H on input x and obtain H(x), where
H is the cryptographic primitive used to construct the KDF. This query is
simulating an adversary who performs offline key search attack.
b. Type 2: For an unknown password p, A can query the KDF with their chosen
s and c to obtain the cryptographic key K, such that K = KDF (p, s, c, n).
The weak or passive adversary only can make Type 1 queries. Strong or ac-
tive adversary can make both Type 1 or Type 2 queries. The complete security
definition proposed by Yao & Yin is given as below.
Definition 3.5 {Yao and Yin security model} Consider the following game
played between an adversary A and the challenger C:
• Challenge stage
1. C chooses p
R← PSPACE. (Note, R indicates chosen at random)
2. C chooses s← SSPACE and c← CSPACE.
(a) If b = 0, C outputs K ′ = F (p, s, c, n)
(b) else C outputs K ′ R← {0, 1}n
3. C sends K ′, s and c to A.
• Learning stage
1. For i = 1, . . . , q′ ≤ q,
2. If A is a passive adversary, A only can choose query Type 1.
3. If A is active adversary, A can choose query Type 1 or Type 2.
a. Type 1:
i. A chooses arbitrary length of string xi.
ii. A sends xi to C.
iii. C computes H(xi).
b. Type 2:
i. A chooses si ← SSPACE and ci ← CSPACE, where (si, ci) 6=
(s, c).
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ii. A sends si and ci to C
iii. C computes Ki = KDF (p, si, ci, n).
iv. A is provided the cryptographic key Ki.
4. A outputs b′ = 0, if A believes that K ′ is cryptographic key, else outputs
b′ = 1.
5. A wins the game if b′ = b.
The KDF is (t, q, ) Yao and Yin KDF-secure if for all probabilistic adversaries
A running in time t and making at most q < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE | queries
to the KDF with known s and known c, A can win the above indistinguishability
game with probability not larger than (1
2
+ ).
This security model is slightly different to generic security model which was
described in Section 3.1. For example, this indistinguishability game has only
2 stages: a challenge stage and a learning stage. There are no adaptive stages,
and the adversary is provided the challenge output in the begining of the game.
Additionally, the active adversary is not allowed to choose their public string to
get the challenge output during the challenge stage. This security model restricts
the active adversary to choose the public input during the learning and challenge
stage.
3.3.2 Adaptive Chosen Context Information Model with
Single Salt (CCS) - Krawczyk
Krawczyk defined a formal security analysis for evaluating the security of a KDF
in [37]. The formal security model for KDFs proposed by Krawczyk [37] is in-
cluded in our framework. We refer to this model as CCS-secure. This model is
applicable to situations where the adversary choose their own context informa-
tion, while the randomly generated salt is provided. For this security model, the
adversaries are capable of influencing the inputs in the indistinguishability game,
and are allowed to query multiple context information under the same private
seed value with the same randomly generated salt.
Definition 3.6 {CCS-secure}
Consider the following game played between an adversary A and the chal-
lenger C:
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• Learning stage
1. C chooses p← PSPACE.
2. C chooses s
R← SSPACE.
3. A is provided witht the value s.
4. For i = 1, . . . , q′ ≤ q,
(a) A chooses ci ← CSPACE.
(b) C computes Ki = KDF (p, s, ci, n).
(c) A is provided the derived cryptographic key, Ki.
• Challenge stage
1. A chooses c← CSPACE (subject to restriction c /∈ ci, . . . , cq′).
2. C chooses b
R←{0, 1}.
(a) If b = 0, C outputs K ′ = F (p, s, c, n),
(b) else C outputs K ′ R← {0, 1}n.
3. C sends K ′ to A.
• Adaptive stage
1. Step 4 in Learning stage is repeated for up to q − q′ queries (subject
to restriction ci 6= c).
2. A outputs b′ = 0, if A believes that K ′ is cryptographic key, else
outputs b′ = 1.
3. A wins the game if b′ = b.
The KDF is (t, q, ) CCS-secure if for all probabilistic adversaries A running in
a polynomial time t and making at most q < |CSPACE | queries to the KDF with
known fixed salt and chosen context information, A can win the above indistin-
guishability game with probability not larger than (1
2
+ ).
In [37], Krawczyk showed the condition under which a two-phase KDF (def-
inition of computational extractors - Definition 3.2, the definition of expander -
Definition 3.4) can be considered CCS-secure (Definition 3.6) as follows in The-
orem 3.1.
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Theorem 3.1 Let Ext be a (tX , X)-computational extractor with respect to
the private string p and Exp a (tY , qY , Y )-secure variable-length-output pseu-
dorandom function family, then the above extract-then-expand KDF scheme is
(min{tX , tY }, qY , X + Y )-CCS secure with the respect to the private string
p [37].
There is a limitation in Krawczyk formal security model since the capability of
the strong active adversary is restricted. The adversary is only able to choose the
context information. In real applications, there may exist a sophisticated active
adversary that can influence all the possible public inputs for KDFs. Therefore,
based on this limitation, a security model that allows the adversary to influence
all possible public inputs (both s and c) is proposed.
As in Section 3.7, one can show that Adam’s KDF proposal [1] is secure in
Krawczyk security model. However, if there exist an adversary who is allowed
to choose both s and c, then Adam’s KDF may not be a secure KDF proposal.
Hence, there is a need to consider a security model that allows an active adversary
who may query both s and c.
3.4 Defining the Security Models
The major security goal for a KDF is that the cryptographic keys generated by
the KDF are indistinguishable from random binary strings of the same length.
This goal is formalized as an adversary’s inability to gain any useful information
about cryptographic keys generated by the KDF from a private string and/or
public string, even though public inputs are known by the adversary. We consider
this security goal in situations where the capability of the adversary differs and
use this to establish five security models:
• Known Public Inputs Model with Multiple Salts - KPM
• Known Public Inputs Model with Single Salt - KPS
• Adaptive Chosen Context Information Model with Multiple Salts - CCM
• Adaptive Chosen Context Information Model with Single Salt - CCS (Krawczyk
[37])
• Adaptive Chosen Public Inputs Model with Multiple Salts - CPM
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Two models, KPM and KPS, are weak security models as the adversary A
is only an observer. The other models, CCM, CCS and CPM, are stronger
security models as the adversary is active. The difference between these three
security models lies in the capability of A in choosing the public inputs. For
CCM and CCS, A can only choose c while A can choose both s and c in CPM.
Table 3.1 briefly summarizes the capability of the adversary in the five security
models. The symbol ‘X’ indicates that the adversary is able to query the KDF to
generate the cryptographic keys from their choice of public inputs. The symbol
‘X’ indicates that the adversary is not able to choose the public inputs although
these are known by the adversaries. The symbol ‘-’ indicates that the adversaries
are not able to learn more about the challenge output at the adaptive stage. Each
of these security models is discussed in greater detail in the following sections.
Security Models KPM KPS CCM CCS CPM
Type of Adversary Passive Passive Active Active Active
Type of Salt Multiple Fixed Multiple Fixed Fixed or Multiple
Number of Queries,
q <
|SSPACE | × |CSPACE | |CSPACE | |SSPACE | × |CSPACE | |CSPACE | |SSPACE | × |CSPACE |
Capability A in
choosing:
Learning Stage
Salt X X X X X
Context information X X X X X
Challenge Stage
Salt X X X X X
Context information X X X X X
Adaptive Stage
Salt - - X X X
Context information - - X X X
Table 3.1: The capability of the adversary in the five security models.
3.4.1 Known Public Inputs Model with Multiple Salts
(KPM)
For the KPM security model, the adversary can observe the salt and context
information, and the resulting derived key. In this indistinguishability game, at
the learning stage, each cryptographic key is generated from a fixed private string
together with a different salt, and with the same or different context information.
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These cryptographic keys are provided to adversaries. At the challenge stage, A
is presented with a binary string. If the KDF is secure, A should not be able to
distinguish whether this string is a cryptographic key or a random string of the
same length.
Definition 3.7 {KPM-secure}
Consider the following game played between an adversary A and the chal-
lenger C:
• Learning stage
1. C chooses p← PSPACE.
2. For i = 1, . . . , q′ ≤ q,
(a) C chooses si
R← SSPACE and ci ← CSPACE.
(b) C computes Ki = KDF (p, si, ci, n).
(c) A is provided with the triple (Ki, si, ci).
• Challenge stage
1. C chooses s
R← SSPACE and c← CSPACE.
2. C chooses b
R←{0, 1}.
(a) If b = 0, C outputs K ′ = KDF (p, s, c, n),
(b) else C outputs K ′ R← {0, 1}n.
3. C sends K ′, s and c to A.
4. A outputs b′ = 0, if A believes that K ′ is cryptographic key, else
outputs b′ = 1.
5. A wins the game if b′ = b.
The KDF is (t, q, ) KPM-secure if for all probabilistic adversaries A running
in a polynomial number of time steps t and making at most q < |SSPACE | ×
|CSPACE | queries to the KDF with known multiple salt and known context infor-
mation, A can win the above indistinguishability game with probability not larger
than (1
2
+ ).
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3.4.2 Known Public Inputs Model with Single Salt (KPS)
For the KPS, the adversary is an observer. In this indistinguishability game,
each cryptographic key is generated from a fixed private string together with
a fixed salt, and with different context information. The major difference of
KPM-secure and KPS-secure is that for KPM-secure, multiple salts are used to
generate the cryptographic keys while for KPS-secure, a fixed salt is used for
generating one or more cryptographic keys.
Definition 3.8 {KPS-secure}
Consider the following game played between an adversary A and the chal-
lenger C:
• Learning stage
1. C chooses p← PSPACE.
2. C chooses s
R← SSPACE.
3. A is provided with the value s.
4. For i = 1, . . . , q′ ≤ q,
(a) C chooses ci ← CSPACE.
(b) C computes Ki = KDF (p, s, ci, n).
(c) A is provided with the pair (Ki, ci).
• Challenge stage
1. C chooses c← CSPACE (subject to restriction c /∈ ci, . . . , c′q).
2. C chooses b
R←{0, 1}.
(a) If b = 0, C outputs K ′ = KDF (p, s, c, n)
(b) else C outputs K ′ R← {0, 1}n
3. C sends K ′ and c to A.
4. A outputs b′ = 0, if A believes that K ′ is cryptographic key, else outputs
b′ = 1.
5. A wins the game if b′ = b.
The KDF is (t, q, ) KPS-secure if for all probabilistic adversaries A running
in a polynomial number of time steps t and making at most q < |CSPACE |
queries to the KDF with known fixed salt and known context information, A can
win the above indistinguishability game with probability not larger than (1
2
+ ).
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3.4.3 Adaptive Chosen Context Information Model with
Multiple Salts (CCM)
For the CCM model, the adversaries are active, and are capable of choosing the
context information in the indistinguishability game. For CCM, the adversaries
are allowed to query multiple context information used with the same private
string and with different randomly generated salt to form the cryptographic
keys.
Definition 3.9 {CCM-secure}
Consider the following game played between an adversary A and the chal-
lenger C:
• Learning stage
1. C chooses p← PSPACE.
2. For i = 1, . . . , q′ ≤ q,
(a) C chooses si
R← SSPACE.
(b) A is provided si.
(c) A chooses ci ← CSPACE.
(d) C computes Ki = KDF (p, si, ci, n).
(e) A is provided the derived cryptographic key, Ki.
• Challenge stage
1. C chooses s
R← SSPACE.
2. A is provided s
3. A chooses c← CSPACE.
4. C chooses b
R←{0, 1}.
(a) If b = 0, C outputs K ′ = KDF (p, s, c, n),
(b) else C outputs K ′ R← {0, 1}n.
5. C sends K ′ to A.
• Adaptive stage
1. Step 2 in Learning stage is repeated for up to q − q′ queries (subject
to restriction {si, ci} 6= {s, c}).
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2. A outputs b′ = 0, if A believes that K ′ is cryptographic key, else
outputs b′ = 1.
3. A wins the game if b′ = b.
The KDF is (t, q, ) CCM-secure if for all probabilistic adversaries A running
in a polynomial number of time steps t and making at most q < |SSPACE | ×
|CSPACE | queries to the KDF with known multiple salt and chosen context in-
formation, A can win the above indistinguishability game with probability not
larger than (1
2
+ ).
3.4.4 Adaptive Chosen Context Information Model with
Single Salt (CCS)
The fourth security model is adaptive chosen context information model with
single salt proposed by Krawczyk, the detailed description for this model is shown
in Section 3.3.2.
3.4.5 Adaptive Chosen Public Inputs Model with Multi-
ple Salts (CPM)
The Krawczyk security model restricts the capability of the strong active ad-
versary. The adversary is only able to change the context information. In some
situations, an active adversary may exist that can influence all the possible inputs
for KDFs: the salt and the context information as shown in [2]. This situation
has motivated us to create a security model called CPM-secure. For a KDF to
be CPM-secure, we assume an adversary A who is allowed to choose both public
inputs, salt and context information. For instance, the adversary may choose
a null or non-random salt value. The adversary’s chosen salt value and differ-
ent chosen context information is used to generate the cryptographic keys. The
adversaries are also able to choose whether to respond to the challenger imme-
diately or to progress to the adaptive stage. Again the adversaries are allowed
to make no more than q queries.
Definition 3.10 {CPM-secure}
Consider the following game played between an adversary A and the chal-
lenger C:
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• Learning stage
1. p← PSPACE.
2. For i = 1, . . . , q′ ≤ q,
(a) A chooses si ← SSPACE and ci ← CSPACE.
(b) C computes Ki = KDF (p, si, ci, n).
(c) A is provided the derived cryptographic key, Ki.
• Challenge stage
1. A chooses s ← SSPACE and c ← CSPACE. (subject to restriction
{s, c} /∈ {si, ci}, . . . ,{s′q, c′q} ).
2. C chooses b
R←{0, 1}.
(a) If b = 0, C outputs K ′ = KDF (p, s, c, n),
(b) else C outputs K ′ R← {0, 1}n.
3. C sends K ′ to A.
• Adaptive stage
1. Step 2 in Learning stage is repeated for up to q − q′ queries (subject
to restriction {si, ci} 6= {s, c}).
2. A outputs b′ = 0, if A believes that K ′ is cryptographic key, else
outputs b′ = 1.
3. A wins the game if b′ = b.
The KDF is (t, q, ) CPM-secure if for all probabilistic adversaries A running
in a polynomial number of time steps t and making at most q < |SSPACE | ×
|CSPACE | queries to the KDF with chosen salt and chosen context information,
A can win the above indistinguishability game with probability not larger than (1
2
+ ).
3.5 The Security of Two-phase KDF based on
CPM Security Model
The following theorem establishes the security of a KDF built using extract-then-
expand approach. The proof is using ROM and it follows from the definition of
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computational extractors (Definition 3.3), the definition of expander (Definition
3.4) and the definition of KDF CPM-secure (Definition 3.10).
Theorem 3.2 Let Ext be a (tX , qX , X)-computational extractor with respect to
the private string p and Exp a (tY , qY , Y )-secure variable-length-output pseu-
dorandom function family, then the above extract-then-expand KDF scheme is
(min{tX , tY }, min{qX , qY }, X + Y )-CPM secure with the respect to the private
string p.
Proof: Let A be an adversary in the CPM game of Definition 3.10 that runs
for time tA ≤ min{tX + tY }, makes qA ≤ min{qX , qY } queries, and wins with
probability 1
2
+A. On the basis of A we build the adversaries BX and BY against
extract-then-expand KDF with challenger C. BX and BY will make use of the
capability of A, so that A is playing the CPM game with BX and BY while at
the same time both BX and BY are playing the extract-then-expand KDF game
with C.
The game is conducted as below:
• Learning stage
1. C chooses p
R← PSPACE .
2. For i = 1, . . . , q′A ≤ qA,
(a) A chooses si ← SSPACE and sends it over to BX .
(b) BX forwards si to C.
(c) C chooses b
R←{0, 1}.
i. If b = 0, C outputs PRK = Ext(p, si). We refer to this as
“real”.
ii. else C outputs PRK
R← {0, 1}kl. We refer to this as “random”.
(d) C sends PRK to BX .
(e) BX forwards PRK to A.
(f) A chooses ci ← CSPACE and sends it over to BY .
(g) BY forwards ci to C.
(h) C computes Ki = Exp(PRK , ci, n).
(i) BY is provided the derived cryptographic key, Ki
(j) BY forwards Ki to A.
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• Challenge stage
1. A chooses s← SSPACE and forwards s to BX .
2. BX forwards s to C.
3. C chooses b
R←{0, 1}.
(a) If b = 0, C outputs PRK = Ext(p, s).
(b) else C outputs PRK
R← {0, 1}kl.
4. A chooses c← CSPACE , A sends c to BY .
5. BY forwards c to C.
6. C computes K ′ = Exp(PRK , c, n).
7. C sends K ′ to BY and BY forwards K ′ to A.
• Adaptive stage
1. Step 2 in Learning stage is repeated for up to qA − q′A queries (sub-
ject to restriction {si, ci} 6= {s, c}).
2. A outputs b′ = 0, if A believes that PRK is real consequently K ′ is
cryptographic key, else outputs b′ = 1. A sends b′ to BY . BY simply
forwards b′ to C.
3. BX and BY win the game if b
′
A = bC .
To prove the theorem, firstly, let’s review the input and output of an extrac-
tor adversary BX . BX forwards si∀i = 1, 2 . . . , qX from A to C and BX receives
PRK i∀i = 1, 2 . . . , qX and forwards PRK i to A, the PRK i can be ‘real’ or just a
random binary string. BX receives the output from A, which is a bit b
′ ∈ {0, 1}.
BX forwards b
′ to C. By the assumed security of the extractor with the respect
to p we have that for any distinguisher BX that runs time ≤ tX and making
≤ qX queries:
|Pr(BX outputs ‘0’: PRK is real)−Pr(BX outputs ‘1’: PRK is random) < X(1)
Next, we first note that when PRK is real, i.e., PRK is set to the output of
the extractor, then the run of A by BX is a perfect simulation of a real run of
A which wins the extract-then-expand KDF game with probability 1
2
+ A. On
the other hand, when PRK is random, then the execution of A by BY acts as
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expander distinguisher with running time tA ≤ tB and making ≤ qB queries, so
its winning probability is of the form 1
2
+ Y ∗ for a value Y ∗ ≤ Y . We thus have
that when PRK is real, the probability that BX outputs ‘0’ is the same as the
probability that A wins which is 1
2
+ A, while for random PRK the probability
that BY outputs ‘1’ is
1
2
+ Y ∗ with Y ∗ ≤ Y .
To complete the proof we need to show A < X + Y by using (1).
X > |Pr(BX outputs 0:PRK is real)− Pr(BX outputs 0:PRK is random)|
= |Pr(A wins) - Pr(BY wins)|
= |1
2
+ A − (12 + Y ∗)| = |A − Y ∗ | ≥ A − Y
Thus, A < X + Y which proves the theorem. 
Discussion: Impact of collision in CPM security model As discussed in
Chapter 2, naturally when the input length is greater than output length, collsion
based on birthday paradox might happen. If collision happens, one might find
two different inputs will produce the same output. This will have a big impact
for CPM security. We provide a detailed description as follows.
Assume a random function F is used to form the two-phase KDF. The first
phase is an extractor which takes a private string and salt to generate the PRK .
A collision will happen when the total of the private string length pl and the salt
length sl is greater than the PRK length kl with approximately 2
kl
2 queries. We
denote the number collision operation 2
kl
2 as σ.
For CPM indistinguishable game, the challenger choose the p and the adver-
sary is allowed to choose s and c to generate cryptographic key(s). However,
during the challenge stage, the adversary is not allowed to choose a pair (s, c)
which appeared at the learning stage. While at the adaptive stage, the adversay
is not allow to choose the pair of (s, c) which was queried at challenge stage.
Now, let’s simulate this scenario by using CPM indistinguishability game.
Note, this simulation is only valid when sl > σ.
• Learning stage
1. p← PSPACE .
2. For i = 1, . . . , q′ ≤ q,
(a) A chooses si ← SSPACE and c← CSPACE .
(b) C computes Ki = Exp(Ext{p, si}, c, n).
(c) A is provided the derived cryptographic key, Ki.
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(d) Note: the iteration is stop when collision is found, such that i = σ,
Kσ = Exp(Ext{p, sσ}, c, n) = Exp(Ext{p, si}, c, n), where i ∈
{1, 2 . . . , . . . σ − 1} and assume the i for si is τ .
3. For i = σ + 1 ≤ q,
4. A chooses sτ ← SSPACE and c∗ ← CSPACE .
5. C computes Kσ+1 = Exp(Ext{p, sτ}, c∗, n).
6. A is provided the derived cryptographic key, Kσ+1.
• Challenge stage
1. A chooses sσ ← SSPACE and c∗ ← CSPACE . ({sσ, c∗} 6= {sτ , c∗}).
2. C chooses b
R←{0, 1}.
(a) If b = 0, C outputs K ′ = Exp(Ext{p, sσ}, c∗, n),
(b) else C outputs K ′ R← {0, 1}n.
3. C sends K ′ to A.
• Adaptive stage
1. Without play the adaptive stage, A will win the game by checking
K ′ ?= Kσ+1.
2. If answer is positive A outputs b′ = 0, else outputs b′ = 1.
3. A wins the game b′ = b.
Therefore, the two-phase KDFs are not secure in CPM game when σ < q <
|SSPACE | × |CSPACE |.
To solve this problem, one may restrict the adversary to make queries q not
greater than σ where collision is found for the PRK , such that σ < |SSPACE |.
However, if σ > 2m, where m is the min-entropy of the private string, then the
adversary is allow to make queries q not greater than 2m. If q < σ or q < 2m, all
two-phase KDF proposals are secure in CPM model.
3.6 Relating the Five Security Models
The models described above provide assurance for varying levels of security.
A KDF which is considered secure under one model may not be secure under
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another. For example, a KDF may be KPM-secure but not CPM-secure. In
this section, we establish more precisely the relations between these five security
models. Figure 3.2 gives a summary of these relations.
Figure 3.2: The relationship between the proposed five security models.
3.6.1 Implications between Security Models
We start by studying the implication between the different security notions.
These are shown as Lemmas 3.1- 3.4 in Figure 3.2.
Lemma 3.1 CPM ⇒ CCM. If a KDF is secure with the respect to the CPM
security notion, then it is also secure with the respect to the CCM security notion.
Proof: Assume a KDF is CPM-secure but not CCM-secure. Since the KDF is
not CCM-secure, then there exists an adversary A who can win the CCM game
with probability greater than 1
2
+ . Now, we assume an adversary B who plays
the CPM game with C. B will make use of the capability of A, so that A is
playing the CCM game with B while B is playing the CPM game with C.
The game is conducted as below:
• Learning stage
1. C chooses p← PSPACE .
2. For i = 1, . . . , q′ ≤ q,
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(a) B chooses si ← SSPACE and sends it over to A.
(b) A chooses ci ← CSPACE and sends it over to B.
(c) B forwards si and ci to C.
(d) C computes Ki = KDF (p, si, ci, n).
(e) B is provided the derived cryptographic key, Ki
(f) B forwards Ki to A.
• Challenge stage
1. B chooses s← SSPACE and forwards s to A.
2. A chooses c← CSPACE , A sends c to B.
3. B forwards s and c to C.
4. C chooses b
R←{0, 1}.
(a) If b = 0, C outputs K ′ = KDF (p, s, c, n),
(b) else C outputs K ′ R← {0, 1}n.
5. C sends K ′ to B and B forwards K ′ to A.
• Adaptive stage
1. Step 2 in Learning stage is repeated for up to q − q′ queries (subject
to restriction {si, ci} 6= {s, c}).
2. A outputs b′ = 0, if A believes that K ′ is cryptographic key, else
outputs b′ = 1. A sends b′ to B and B simply forwards b′ to C.
3. B wins the game if b′A = bC .
From the above game simulation, B forwards the challenge output from C
to A. B receives the response output from A and B simply forwards the corre-
sponding output to C. Therefore, the probability that B wins the CPM game
is equal to the probability that A wins the CCM game. Our assumption is that
the KDF is not CCM-secure. That is the probability that A wins the CCM
game is greater than 1
2
+ . Therefore, B wins the CPM game with probability
greater than 1
2
+ . This implies that the KDF is not CPM-secure. This is a
contradiction. Hence, CPM ⇒ CCM. 
Lemma 3.2 CCM ⇒ KPM. If a KDF is secure with the respect to the CCM
security notion, then it is also secure with the respect to the KPM security notion.
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Proof: Assume a KDF is CCM-secure but not KPM-secure. Since the KDF is
not KPM-secure, then there exists an adversary A who can win the KPM game
with probability greater than 1
2
+ . Now, we assume an adversary B who plays
the CCM game with C. B will make use of the capability of A, so that A is
playing the KPM game with B while B is playing the CCM game with C.
The game is conducted as below:
• Learning stage
1. C chooses p← PSPACE .
2. For i = 1, . . . , q′ ≤ q,
(a) C chooses si
R← SSPACE .
(b) C sends si to B and B sends it over to A.
(c) B chooses ci ← CSPACE and sends it over to C.
(d) C computes Ki = KDF (p, si, ci, n).
(e) B is provided the derived cryptographic key, Ki.
(f) B forwards Ki and ci to A.
• Challenge stage
1. C chooses s
R← SSPACE and sends it over to B
2. B chooses c← CSPACE , B sends c to C.
3. C chooses b
R←{0, 1}.
(a) If b = 0, C outputs K ′ = KDF (p, s, c, n),
(b) else C outputs K ′ R← {0, 1}n.
4. C sends K ′ to B.
5. B forwards K ′, s and c to A.
6. A outputs b′ = 0, if A believes that K ′ is cryptographic key, else
outputs b′ = 1. A sends b′ to B and B simply forward them to C.
7. B wins the game if b′A = bC .
From the above game simulation, B forwards the challenge output from C
to A. B receives the response output from A and B simply forwards the corre-
sponding output to C. Therefore, the probability that B wins that CCM game
is equal to the probability that A wins the KPM game. Our assumption is that
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the KDF is not KPM-secure. That is the probability that A wins the KPM
game is greater than 1
2
+ . Therefore, B wins the CCM game with probability
greater than 1
2
+ . This implies that the KDF is not CCM-secure. This is a
contradiction. Hence, CCM ⇒ KPM. 
Lemma 3.3 CPM ⇒ CCS. If a KDF is secure with respect to the CPM security
notion, then it is also secure with the respect to the CCS security notion.
Proof: Assume a KDF is CPM-secure but not CCS-secure. Since the KDF is
not CCM-secure, then there exist an adversary A who can win the CCS game
with probability greater than 1
2
+ . Now, we assume an adversary B who plays
the CPM game with C. B will make use of the capability of A, so that A is
playing the CCS game with B while B is playing the CPM game with C.
The game is conducted as below:
• Learning stage
1. C chooses p← PSPACE .
2. B chooses s← SSPACE and sends it over to A.
3. For i = 1, . . . , q′ ≤ q,
(a) A chooses ci ← CSPACE and sends it over to B.
(b) B simply forwards s and ci to C.
(c) C computes Ki = KDF (p, s, ci, n).
(d) B is provided the derived cryptographic key, Ki.
(e) B forwards Ki to A.
• Challenge stage
1. A chooses c ← CSPACE , (subject to restriction c 6= ci,∀i). A sends
c to B.
2. B forwards c to C.
3. C chooses b
R←{0, 1}.
(a) If b = 0, C outputs K ′ = KDF (p, s, c, n),
(b) else C outputs K ′ R← {0, 1}n.
4. C sends K ′ to B and B forwards K ′ to A.
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• Adaptive stage
1. Step 2 in Learning stage is repeated for up to q − q′ queries (subject
to restriction ci 6= c).
2. A outputs b′ = 0, if A believes that K ′ is cryptographic key, else
outputs b′ = 1. A sends b′ to B and B simply forwards b′ to C.
3. B wins the game if b′A = bC .
From the above game simulation, B forwards the challenge output from C to
A. B receives the response output from A and B simply forwards the correspond-
ing output to C. Therefore, the probability that B wins the CPM game is equal
to the probability that A wins the CCS game. Our assumption is that the KDF
is not CCS-secure. That is the probability that A wins the CCS game is greater
than 1
2
+. Therefore, B wins the CPM game with probability greater than 1
2
+.
This implies that the KDF is not CPM-secure. This is a contradiction. Hence,
CPM ⇒ CCS. 
Lemma 3.4 CCS ⇒ KPS. If a KDF is secure with respect to the CCS security
notion, then it is also secure with the respect to the KPS security notion.
Proof: Assume a KDF is CCS-secure but not KPS-secure. Since the KDF is not
KPS-secure, then there exists an adversary A who can win the KPS game with
probability greater than 1
2
+ . Now, we assume an adversary B who plays the
CCS game with C. B will make use of the capability of A, so that A is playing
the KPS game with B while B is playing the CCS game with C.
The game is conducted as below:
• Learning stage
1. C chooses p← PSPACE .
2. C chooses s
R← SSPACE .
3. C sends s to B and B simply forwards s to A.
4. For i = 1, . . . , q′ ≤ q,
(a) B chooses ci ← CSPACE and sends it over to C.
(b) C computes Ki = KDF (p, s, ci, n).
(c) B is provided the derived cryptographic key, Ki.
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(d) B forwards Ki and ci to A.
• Challenge stage
1. B chooses c ← CSPACE , (subject to restriction c 6= ci,∀i). B sends
c to C.
2. C chooses b
R←{0, 1}.
(a) If b = 0, C outputs K ′ = KDF (p, s, c, n),
(b) else C outputs K ′ R← {0, 1}n.
3. C sends K ′ to B.
4. B forwards K ′ and c to A.
5. A outputs b′ = 0, if A believes that K ′ is cryptographic key, else
outputs b′ = 1. A sends b′ to B and B simply forward them to C.
6. B wins the game if b′A = bC .
From the above game simulation, B forwards the challenge output from C to A.
B receives the response output from A and B simply forwards the corresponding
output to C. Therefore, the probability that B wins the CCS game is equal to
the probability that A wins the KPS game. Our assumption is that the KDF is
not KPS-secure. That is the probability that A wins the KPS game is greater
than 1
2
+ . Therefore, B wins the CCS game with probability greater than 1
2
+ .
This implies that the KDF is not CCS-secure. This is a contradiction. Hence,
CCS ⇒ KPS. 
3.6.2 Non-implications between Security Models
To prove the non-implications between the security models (Corollaries 3.1-3.12
in Figure 3.2), we analyse five KDFs, KDF1-KDF5, all based on an underlying
hash function H (Table 3.2). Of these KDFs, KDF5 is the proposal from [37].
The other four are (contrived) KDF designs which are useful to demonstrate the
separation between some of the security models. In what follows, all the proofs
are given in the random oracle model (ROM). Perhaps the most interesting
observation from our results in this section is that security when the salt value is
fixed does not imply security when different salt values are used and conversely.
We present the summary of the security levels of KDF1−KDF5 proposals
in Table 3.2. KDF1 −KDF5 will be explained in more detail in the following
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section. ‘‖’ is the symbol of concatenation. H is an ideal hash function that
we model using a ROM and which is used to construct this KDF. The results
presented in Table 3.2 are based on the existence of ideal hash functions which
perform well in ROM. It should be noted that a similar assumption has been
made by Krawczyk [37] in proving security of extract-then-expand KDF scheme
in Theorem 3.1. The symbol ‘X’ indicates that the KDF proposal is secure
under that particular security model. The symbol ‘X’ indicates that the KDF
is not secure for that KDF security model. The number of queries made by
the adversary to the random oracle and the KDF are denoted as qF and qk
respectively.
Table 3.2: Security analysis of KDF proposals based on the proposed formal
security framework for KDF.
Theorem KDF proposals KPM KPS CCM CCS CPM
1 KDF1 = H(p‖s)‖H(p‖s‖c) X X X X X
2 KDF2= H(p‖c)H(p‖s‖c) X X X X X
3 KDF3 = H(p‖s‖c1)‖ H(p‖s‖c2) X X X X X
4 KDF4 = H(p‖s1‖c1)‖ H(p‖s2‖c2) X X X X X
5 KDF5 = H(H(p, s), c) [37] X X X X X
A KDF which is secure in KPM and CCM but not secure in KPS,
CCS and CPM
Here we analyse the security of KDF1, by considering a cryptographic key K
obtained from a KDF which consists of the concatenation of two component
parts. The first part is a function of p and s, and the second part is a function
of p, s and c. Note that both parts depend on the value s. Each of the two parts
makes use of H, which is an ideal hash function that we model using a ROM.
The derived cryptographic key (n-bit) is the concatenation of the two outputs of
H. KDF1 is defined as,
K = KDF1(p, s, c, n) = H(p‖s)‖H(p‖s‖c),
We show that it KDF1 is KPM-secure and CCM-secure but not secure in KPS,
CCS and CPM. In addition, we use the analysis of KDF1 to prove the non-
implications of corollaries 3.1-3.5 in Figure 3.2.
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Theorem 3.3 KDF1 is secure with the respect to KPM, CCM and is not secure
in KPS, CCS and CPM.
Proof: Firstly, we show that KDF1 is CCM-secure. Recall from Definition 3.9,
KDF1 will be CCM-secure if the adversary is unable to distinguish between
a key produced by the KDF and a random string with probability not greater
than 1
2
+  after making q queries in the learning stage and in the adaptive stage,
(where  is negligible and q < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE |).
During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE and C uses F to compute
Ki = KDF1(p, si, ci, n), where si ∈R SSPACE is chosen by C and ci ∈ CSPACE
is chosen by A. In the challenge stage, the challenge key is computed as K ′ =
KDF1(p, s, c, n), where s ∈R SSPACE is chosen by C and c ∈ CSPACE is
chosen by A.
Once C sends K ′ to A and A can continue learn the cryptographic keys which
are derived from KDF1 up to q − q′ queries.
Since H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by KDF1 or a random string of the same length if:
a) s = si for some i = 1 . . . qk. In this case, H(p‖s) = H(p‖si) and A will know
whether K ′ is the key generated by KDF1 by checking that the first half of
K ′ is equal with first half of Ki. The probability is, Pr[s = si] ≤ qk|SSPACE | .
b) Query p such as p′ = p and find H(p′‖s) = H(p‖s) or H(p′‖s‖c) = H(p‖s‖c).
This implies that A guessing p with at most probability qH|PSPACE | .
c) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF1(p, s, c, n), with s 6= si for
some i = 1 . . . qk, we have Pr[s 6= si]= 1− qk|SSPACE | .
d) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF1(p, s, c, n), with p′ 6= p, we
have Pr[p′ 6= p] = 1− qH|PSPACE | .
The probability that A wins this indistinguishability game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|s = si]Pr[s = si] + Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] +
Pr[A wins|s 6= si ∧ p′ 6= p]Pr[s 6= si ∧ p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
qk
|SSPACE |
)
+ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE |
)
+ 1
2
(
1− qk|SSPACE | − qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ qk
2|SSPACE | +
qH
2|PSPACE | ,
where  = qk
2|SSPACE | +
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
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A is only has a negligible ‘advantage’ over randomly guessing the challenge
output. Therefore, KDF1 is CCM-secure. KDF1 is KPM-secure by Lemma
3.2.
Secondly, we show KDF1 is not KPS-secure. Recall from Definition 3.8, a
KDF will be KPS-secure, if after making q < |CSPACE | queries at the learning
stage and at the challenge stage, A is unable to distinguish whether the challenge
output is a key produced by the KDF or a random string of the same length with
probability greater than 1
2
+ , where  is negligible.
During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE , s ∈R SSPACE , ci ∈
CSPACE and C uses F to compute Ki = KDF1(p, s, ci, n). In the challenge
stage, challenge key K ′ is computed by K ′ = KDF1(p, s, c, n), where s is same
as the learning stage and C chooses c ∈ CSPACE such that c 6= ci∀i.
As mentioned above, A can distinguish whether K ′ is generated by KDF1
or a random string of the same length if s = si for some i = 1 . . . qk. In this case,
H(p‖s) = H(p‖si). Therefore, in the challenge stage A will be able to distinguish
between a derived key and a truly random string based on the observation of the
first part of the challenge K ′. The probability is, Pr[s = si] = 1, as s is fixed in
the case of CCS and KPS.
Therefore, KDF1 is not KPS-secure. Hence, KDF1 is not CCS-secure by
Lemma 3.4 and is not CPM-secure by Lemma 3.3. 
The proof of Corollary 3.1 - 3.5 are an immediate result of Theorem 3.3:
Corollary 3.1 CCM 9 KPS. If a KDF is CCM-secure, it may not be KPS-
secure.
Corollary 3.2 CCM 9 CCS. If a KDF is CCM-secure, it may not be CCS-
secure.
Corollary 3.3 KPM 9 KPS. If a KDF is KPM-secure, it may not be KPS-
secure.
Corollary 3.4 KPM 9 CCS. If a KDF is KPM-secure, it may not be CCS-
secure.
Corollary 3.5 CCM 9 CPM. If a KDF is CCM-secure, it may not be CPM-
secure. 
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A KDF which is secure in KPS and CCS but not secure in KPM,
CCM and CPM
Here we analyse the security of KDF2, again by considering a cryptographic
key K which is generated from a KDF, consisting of the concatenation of two
component parts. The first part is a function of p and c, and the second is a
function of p, s and c. Here, we assume that the set space of s is greater than
set space of c, such that |SSPACE | > |CSPACE |. Again, we assume that the
function H of the KDF is an ideal hash function which we model using a ROM.
The derived cryptographic key (n-bit) is the concatenation of the two outputs of
H. KDF2 is defined as,
K = KDF2(p, s, c, n) = H(p‖c)‖H(p‖s‖c),
We show that KDF2 is KPS-secure and CCS-secure but not secure in KPM,
CCM and CPM. Furthermore, we use the analysis of KDF2 to prove the non-
implications of Corollaries 3.6 - 3.10 in Figure 3.2.
Theorem 3.4 KDF2 is secure with the respect to KPS, CCS and is not secure
in KPM, CCM and CPM.
Proof: Firstly, we prove that KDF2 is CCS-secure. Based on Definition 3.6, the
KDF will be CCS-secure if after making q < |CSPACE | queries at the learning
stage and at the adaptive stage, A is unable to distinguish if the challenge output
K ′ is a key produced by the KDF or a random string of the same length with
probability not greater than 1
2
+ , where probability  is negligible.
In the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE , s ∈R SSPACE and C uses
H to compute Ki = KDF2(p, s, ci, n), where A chooses ci ∈ CSPACE . At the
challenge stage, the challenge key is computed as K ′ = KDF2(p, s, c, n), where
s is same as at the learning stage and c ∈ CSPACE is chosen by A. C sends K ′
to A.
Once A receives K ′, A continues to learn the cryptographic keys which are
derived from KDF2 up to q − q′ queries.
H is modeled as a ROM, hence, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by KDF2 or a random string of the same length if:
a) c = ci for some i = 1 . . . qk. In this case, H(p‖c)‖H(p‖s‖c) =H(p‖ci)‖H(p‖s‖ci),
which means K ′ = Ki, where Ki is one of the key at the learning stage. Hence,
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A can distinguish whether K ′ is the key generated by KDF2 by checking that
K ′ is one of the keys which had been generated at the learning stage. How-
ever, recall Definition 3.6, during the challenge stage, A is not allow to choose
c = ci∀i which had been chosen at the learning stage. It means, c 6= ci∀i.
Consequently, the probability is Pr[c = ci] = 0.
b) Query p such as p′ = p and find H(p′‖c) = H(p‖c) or H(p′‖s‖c) = H(p‖s‖c).
This implies that A guessing p with at most probability qH|PSPACE | .
c) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF2(p, s, c, n), with p′ 6= p, we
have Pr[p′ 6= p] = 1− qH|PSPACE | .
The probability that A winning this indistinguishability game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] + Pr[A wins|p′ 6= p]Pr[p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE |
)
+ 1
2
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ qH
2|PSPACE | , where  =
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
A is only has a negligible ‘advantage’ over randomly guessing the challenge
output. Therefore, this KDF is CCS-secure. KDF2 is KPS-secure by Lemma
3.4.
Secondly, we show KDF2 is not KPM-secure. Recall from the Definition 3.7,
the KDF will be KPM-secure if after making q queries where q < |SSPACE | ×
|CSPACE | at the learning stage and at the challenge stage, A is not able to
distinguish between a key produced by the KDF and a truly random binary
string with the same length with probability greater than 1
2
+ , where  is
negligible.
During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE , s ∈R SSPACE , ci ∈
CSPACE and uses H to compute Ki = KDF2(p, si, ci, n). A receives Ki, si
and ci. In the challenge stage, the challenge key K
′ is computed by K ′ =
KDF2(p, s, c, n), where s ∈R SSPACE and c ∈ CSPACE .
Since H is modeled as a ROM, A can distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by KDF2 or a random string of the same length, only if C chooses
c = ci for some i = 1 . . . qk. This implies that c has been chosen at the learning
stage, where the first half of K ′ is similar with the first half of Ki for some
i = 1 . . . qk at the learning stage. A can distinguish the challenge output is
cryptographic key by observing the first component part of K ′. Since set space
of s is greater than set space of c, therefore, c will be reused, the probability is,
Pr[c = ci] = 1.
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Therefore, KDF2 is not KPM-secure. Hence, KDF2 is not CCM-secure by
Lemma 3.2 and is not CPM-secure by Lemma 3.1. 
The proof of Corollary 3.6 - 3.10 are an immediate result of Theorem 3.4:
Corollary 3.6 CCS 9 KPM. If a KDF is CCS-secure, it may not be KPM-
secure.
Corollary 3.7 CCS 9 CCM. If a KDF is CCS-secure, it may not be CCM-
secure.
Corollary 3.8 KPS 9 KPM. If a KDF is KPS-secure, it may not be KPM-
secure.
Corollary 3.9 KPS 9 CCM. If a KDF is KPS-secure, it may not be CCM-
secure.
Corollary 3.10 CCS 9 CPM. If a KDF is CCS-secure, it may not be CPM-
secure.
A KDF which is secure in KPM, KPS and not secure in CCM, CCS
and CPM
Now we analyse the security of KDF3, where a cryptographic key K is obtained
from a KDF which consists of the concatenation of two component parts. The
derived cryptographic key (n-bit)is the concatenation of these two component
parts. Each component part is dependent on the value of c. Each component
part is a function of p concatenated with s and c. The function H which is used
in this KDF is a function which is again modelled using ROM. KDF3 is defined
as,
K = KDF3(p, s, c, n) = H(p‖s‖c1)‖H(p‖s‖c2),
where c = c1‖c2, c ∈ CSPACE and the length of c1 is equal with c2.
We show that KDF3 is KPM-secure and KPS-secure but not secure in CCM,
CCS and CPM. Next, we use the analysis of KDF3 to prove the non-implications
of corollaries 11 and 12 in Figure 3.2.
Theorem 3.5 KDF3 is secure with the respect to KPM, KPS and is not secure
in CCM, CCS and CPM.
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Proof: Firstly, we show that KDF3 is KPM-secure. Based on Definition 3.7,
a KDF will be KPM-secure if A plays the KPM indistinguishability game and
after making q < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE | queries at the learning stage, A can
only distinguish whether the challenge output K ′ is a key produced by the KDF
or a random binary string with the same length with probability not greater than
1
2
+ , where probability  is negligible.
During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE , si ∈R SSPACE , ci ∈
CSPACE and C uses F to compute Ki = KDF3(p, si, ci, n). A is provided
Ki, si and ci. In the challenge stage, the challenge key is computed as K
′ =
KDF3(p, s, c, n), where s ∈R SSPACE and c is chosen by C.
Since F is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by KDF3 or a random string of the same length if:
a) C chooses c ∈ CSPACE , c = c1‖c2, where c1 = c2. In this case, A can check
the challenge key K ′, the first half is equal with the second half of K ′, such
as H(p‖s‖c1) = H(p‖s‖c2). However, with a high probability the c chosen
by C is most likely different such that c1 6= c2. In fact, the probability is,
Pr[c1 = c2] ≈ 1|CSPACE | .
b) s = si and c = ci for some i = 1 . . . qk. In this case, KDF3(p, s, c, n) =
KDF3(p, si, ci, n) and A will distinguish K
′ is one of the cryptographic key
at the learning stage, such as K ′ = Ki for some i = 1 . . . qk. The probability
is, Pr[s = si ∧ c = ci] ≤ qk|SSPACE |×|CSPACE | .
c) Query p such as p′ = p and find KDF3(p, s, c, n) = KDF3(p′, s, c, n). This
implies that A guessing p with at most probability qH|PSPACE | .
d) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF 3(p, s, c, n), with c1 6= c2, we
have Pr[c1 6= c2]= 1− 1|CSPACE | .
e) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF3(p, s, c, n), with s 6= si and
c 6= ci for some i = 1 . . . qk, we have Pr[s 6= si ∧ c 6= ci]= 1− qk|SSPACE ||CSPACE | .
f) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF3(p, s, c, n), with p′ 6= p, we
have Pr[p′ 6= p] = 1− qH|PSPACE | .
The probability that A wins the game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|c1 = c2]Pr[c1 = c2] +
3.6. Relating the Five Security Models 63
Pr[A wins|s = si ∧ c = ci]Pr[s = si ∧ c = ci] +
Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] +
Pr[A wins|c1 6= c2 ∧ s 6= si ∧ c 6= ci ∧ p′ 6= p] ×
Pr[c1 6= c2 ∧ s 6= si ∧ c 6= ci ∧ p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
1
|CSPACE |
)
+ 1
(
qk
|SSPACE ||CSPACE |
)
+ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE|
)
+
1
2
(
1− 1|CSPACE | − qk|SSPACE ||CSPACE | − qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ 1
2|CSPACE | +
qk
2|SSPACE ||CSPACE | +
qH
2|PSPACE | ,
where  = 1
2|CSPACE | +
qk
2|SSPACE ||CSPACE | +
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
A is only has a negligible ‘advantage’ over randomly guessing the challenge
output. Therefore, KDF3 is KPM-secure.
Secondly, we show that KDF3 is KPS-secure. Recall from Definition 3.8, the
KDF will be KPS-secure if after making q < |CSPACE | queries at the learning
stage, A is only has a negligible ‘advantage’ over randomly guessing whether the
challenge output K ′ is either a key produces by the KDF or a truly random
binary string with the same length.
During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE . C chooses a fixed
s ∈R SSPACE which is used for entire game and chooses different ci ∈ CSPACE .
Then, C uses F to compute Ki = KDF3(p, s, ci, n). A is provided Ki, s and ci.
In the challenge stage, the challenge key is computed as K ′ = KDF3(p, s, c, n),
where c is chosen by C.
Since H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by KDF3 or a random string of the same length if:
a) C chooses c ∈ CSPACE , c1 = c2. Hence, H(p‖s‖c1) = H(p‖s‖c2), A can
distinguish the challenge key K ′ where the first half of the K ′ is equal with
the second half of the K ′. However, the c chosen by C is most likely different
such that c1 6= c2. In fact, the probability is Pr[c1 = c2]≈ 1|CSPACE | .
b) Query p such as p′ = p and find KDF3(p, s, c, n) = KDF3(p′, s, c, n). This
implies that A guessing p with at most probability qH|PSPACE | .
c) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF3(p, s, c, n), with c1 6= c2,
we have Pr[c1 6= c2]= 1− 1|CSPACE | .
d) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF3(p, s, c, n), with p′ 6= p, we
have Pr[p′ 6= p] = 1− qH|PSPACE | .
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The probability that A wins the game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|c1 = c2]Pr[c1 = c2] + Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] +
Pr[A wins|c1 6= c2 ∧ p′ 6= p]Pr[c1 6= c2 ∧ p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
1
|CSPACE |
)
+ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE|
)
+ 1
2
(
1− 1|CSPACE | − qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ 1
2|CSPACE | +
qH
2|PSPACE | ,
where  = 1
2|CSPACE | +
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
A is only has a negligible ‘advantage’ over randomly guessing the challenge
output. Hence, KDF3 is KPS-secure.
Thirdly, we show KDF3 is not CCM-secure. Recall Definition 3.9, the KDF
will be CCM-secure if after making q < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE | queries at the
learning stage and at the adaptive stage, A has only a negligible ‘advantage’
to distinguish whether the challenge output is a cryptography key derived from
KDF or a truly random string with the same length.
In the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE and si ∈R SSPACE , then C
uses H to compute Ki = KDF3(p, si, ci, n), where ci ∈ CSPACE is chosen by
A. A receives Ki and si. In the challenge stage, the challenge key is computed as
K ′ = KDF3(p, s, c, n), where s ∈R SSPACE is chosen by C and c ∈ CSPACE
is chosen by A.
Once C sends K ′ to A and A continues to learn the cryptographic keys KDF3
up to q − q′ queries at the adaptive stage.
Since H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by KDF3 or a truly random string of the same length if A chooses
c ∈ CSPACE , c1 = c2. In this case, H(p‖s‖c1) = H(p‖s‖c2), A can distinguish
the challenge key K ′ where the first half of K ′ is equal with the second half of
K ′. Since A chooses c, hence, the probability is, Pr[c1 = c2] = 1. Thus, KDF3
is not CCM-secure and KDF3 is not CPM-secure by Lemma 3.1.
Next, we show KDF3 is not CCS-secure. Recall from Definition 3.6, a KDF
will be CCS-secure if an adversary making q < |CSPACE | queries at the learning
stage and at the adaptive stage is still unable to distinguish whether the challenge
output is the derived cryptographic key from the KDF or a truly random binary
string with the same length with probability greater than 1
2
+ , where  is
negligible.
During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE and s ∈R SSPACE ,
which are fixed for entire game, then C uses F to computeKi = KDF3(p, s, ci, n),
where ci is chosen by A. A receives Ki and s. In the challenge stage, the challenge
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key is computed as K ′ = KDF3(p, s, c, n), where c is chosen by A.
C sends K ′ to A and A continues to learn the cryptographic keys KDF3 up
to q − q′ queries at the adaptive stage.
Since H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by KDF3 or a truly random string of the same length if, A chooses
c ∈ CSPACE , c1 = c2, so that H(p‖s‖c1) = H(p‖s‖c2). Thus, A can distinguish
the challenge key K ′ where the first half of K ′ is equal with the second half of K ′.
c is chosen by A, hence, the probability is, Pr[c1 = c2] = 1. Therefore, KDF3 is
not CCS-secure and KDF3 is not CPM-secure by Lemma 3.3. 
The proof of Corollary 3.11 - 3.12 are an immediate result of Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 3.11 KPM 9 CCM. If a KDF is KPM-secure, it may not be CCM-
secure.
Corollary 3.12 KPS 9 CCS. If a KDF is KPS-secure, it may not be CCS-
secure.
A KDF which is secure in CCM, CCS, KPM and KPS but not secure
in CPM
Here we analyse the security of KDF4, by considering a cryptographic key K
obtained from a KDF which consists of the concatenation of two component
parts, from which each of the component part is dependent on the value of c.
The function H which is again modelled by ROM. The derived cryptographic
key (n-bit)is the concatenation of the two outputs of H. KDF4 is defined as,
K = KDF4(p, s, c, n) = H(p‖s1‖c1)‖ H(p‖s2‖c2),
where s = s1‖s2, s ∈ SSPACE , c = c1‖c2, c ∈ CSPACE . We assume the length
of s1 is equal with s2, as well as the length of c1 is equal with c2.
In the following section, we prove Theorem 3.6 based on KDF4 is secure in
CCM, CCS, KPM and KPS but not secure in CPM.
Theorem 3.6 KDF4 is secure with the respect to CCM, CCS, KPM and KPS.
Proof: Firstly, we show that KDF4 is CCM-secure. Based on Definition 3.9,
a KDF will be CCM-secure if A plays the CCM indistinguishability game and
after making q < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE | queries at the learning stage and
adaptive stage, A can only distinguish whether the challenge output K ′ is a key
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produced by the KDF or a truly random binary string with the same length with
probability not greater than 1
2
+ , where  is negligible.
In the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE . For each query C chooses
si ∈R SSPACE , then C uses H to compute Ki = KDF4(p, si, ci, n), where
ci ∈ CSPACE is chosen by A. A receives Ki and si. In the challenge stage, the
challenge key is computed as K ′ = KDF4(p, s, c, n), where s ∈R SSPACE is
chosen by C and c ∈ CSPACE is chosen by A.
A receives K ′ and A continues to learn the cryptographic keys KDF4 up to
q − q′ queries at the adaptive stage.
Since H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by KDF4 or a truly random string of the same length if:
a) s = s1‖s2, s1 = s2 and c = c1‖c2, c1 = c2, such as H(p‖s1‖c1) = H(p‖s2‖c2).
A can distinguish K ′ by observing that the first half of K ′ is equal with the
second half of K ′. s is chosen randomly from SSPACE , hence the probability
is Pr[s1 = s2] ≤ 1|SSPACE | . c is chosen by A, the probability is Pr[c1 = c2] = 1.
b) s = si and c = ci for some i = 1 . . . qk. In this case, we can observe that
KDF4(p, s, c, n) = KDF4(p, si, ci, n), it means K
′ = Ki for some i = 1 . . . qk
where Ki is one of the key at the learning stage. The probability is, Pr[s =
si ∧ c = ci] ≤ qk|SSPACE | .
c) Query p such as p′ = p. In this case, we may observe that KDF4(p, s, c, n) =
KDF4(p′, s, c, n). This implies that A guessing p with at most probability
qH
|PSPACE | .
d) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF4(p, s, c, n), with s1 6= s2
and c1 = c2, as C chooses randomly s ∈R SSPACE and A can chooses c,
hence, we have Pr[s1 6= s2]= 1− 1|SSPACE | and Pr[c1 = c2]= 1.
e) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF4(p, s, c, n), with s 6= si and
c 6= ci for some i = 1 . . . qk, we have Pr[s 6= si ∧ c 6= ci]= 1− qk|SSPACE ||CSPACE | .
f) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF4(p, s, c, n), with p′ 6= p, we
have Pr[p′ 6= p] = 1− qH|PSPACE | .
The probability that A wins the game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|s1 = s2 ∧ c1 = c2]Pr[s1 = s2 ∧ c1 = c2] +
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Pr[A wins|s = si ∧ c = ci]Pr[s = si ∧ c = ci] +
Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] +
Pr[A wins|s1 6= s2 ∧ c1 = c2 ∧ s 6= si ∧ c 6= ci ∧ p′ 6= p] ×
Pr[s1 6= s2 ∧ c1 = c2 ∧ s 6= si ∧ c 6= ci ∧ p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
1
|SSPACE | × 1
)
+ 1
(
qk
|SSPACE |
)
+ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE|
)
+
1
2
(
1−
(
1
|SSPACE | × 1
)
− qk|SSPACE | − qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ qk+1
2|SSPACE | +
qH
2|PSPACE | ,
where  = qk+1
2|SSPACE | +
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
A is only has a negligible ‘advantage’ over randomly guessing the challenge
output. Therefore, KDF4 is CCM-secure. By Lemma 3.2, this implies KDF4
is KPM-secure.
Secondly, we show that KDF4 is CCS-secure. Recall from Definition 3.6, the
KDF will be CCS-secure if after making q < |CSPACE | queries at the learning
stage and adaptive stage, A is only has a negligible ‘advantage’ over random
guessing whether the challenge output K ′ is a key produced by the KDF or a
truly random binary string with the same length.
In the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE and s ∈R SSPACE , then C
uses H to compute Ki = KDF4(p, si, ci, n), where ci ∈ CSPACE is chosen by
A. A receives Ki and si. In the challenge stage, the challenge key is computed
as K ′ = KDF4(p, s, c, n), where c is chosen by A.
A receives K ′ and A continues to learn the cryptographic keys KDF4 up to
q − q′ queries at the adaptive stage.
Since H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by KDF4 or a truly random string of the same length if:
a) s = s1‖s2, s1 = s2 and c = c1‖c2, c1 = c2, such as H(p‖s1‖c1) = H(p‖s2‖c2).
A can distinguish K ′ by observing that the first half of K ′ is equal with the
second half of K ′. s is chosen randomly from SSPACE , the probability is
Pr[s1 = s2] ≤ 1|SSPACE | . c is chosen by A, the probability is Pr[cqk−2 = cqk−1]
= 1.
b) Query p such as p′ = p and find KDF4(p, s, c, n) = KDF4(p′, s, c, n) . This
implies A guessing p with at most probability qH|PSPACE | .
c) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF4(p, s, c, n), with s1 6= s2
and c1 = c2, as C chooses randomly s ∈R SSPACE and A can chooses c,
hence, we have Pr[s1 6= s2]= 1− 1|SSPACE | and Pr[c1 = c2]= 1.
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d) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF4(p, s, c, n), with p′ 6= p, we
have Pr[p′ 6= p] = 1− qH|PSPACE | .
The probability that A winning the game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|s1 = s2 ∧ c1 = c2]Pr[s1 = s2 ∧ c1 = c2] +
Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] +
Pr[A wins|s1 6= s2 ∧ c1 = c2 ∧ p′ 6= p] Pr[s1 6= s2 ∧ c1 = c2 ∧ p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
1
|SSPACE | × 1
)
+ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE |
)
+ 1
2
(
1−
(
1
|SSPACE | × 1
)
− qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ 1
2|SSPACE | +
qH
2|PSPACE | ,
where  = 1
2|SSPACE | +
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
A is only has a negligible ‘advantage’ over random guessing the challenge
output. Hence, KDF4 is CCS-secure. By Lemma 3.4, this implies KDF4 is
KPS-secure.
Finally, we show KDF4 is not CPM-secure. Recall from Definition 3.10, a
KDF will be CPM-secure if an adversary making q < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE |
queries at the learning stage and at the adaptive stage is still unable to distinguish
whether the challenge output is the derived cryptographic key from the KDF or
a truly random binary string with the same length with probability greater than
1
2
+ , where  is negligible.
During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE and C uses F to com-
pute Ki = KDF4(p, si, ci), where si and ci are chosen by A from SSPACE and
CSPACE respectively. A receives Ki. In the challenge stage, the challenge key
is computed as K ′ = KDF4(p, s, c, n), where both s and c are chosen by A.
A receives K ′ and A continues to learn the cryptographic keys KDF4 up to
q − q′ queries at the adaptive stage.
Since, H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by KDF4 or a truly random string of the same length if A chooses
s = s1‖s2, s1 = s2 and c1 = c2, such as K ′ = H(p‖s1‖c1)‖H(p‖s2‖c2). A can
distinguish K ′ where the first half of K ′ is equal with the second half of K ′.
s and c are chosen by A, hence the probability is Pr[s1 = s2 ∧ c1 = c2] = 1.
Therefore, A can distinguish between a derived cryptographic key and a truly
random string based on the observation of the two repetition component parts,
and hence KDF4 is not CPM-secure. Thus, KDF4 is CCM-secure, CCS-secure,
KPM-secure and KPS-secure but not CPM-secure. 
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A KDF which is secure in all security models
Finally, for completeness we provide a proof of a KDF which is CPM-secure. We
denote this KDF is KDF5. KDF5 is presented by Krawczyk in [37]. KDF5
consists of two modules, extract and expand phases. The extractor phase is a
function H which that takes p together with s and then produces a pseudoran-
dom key. The expander phase is a function H which takes the output from the
extractor together with c and produces n-bit cryptographic keys. In this KDF
design, the extract module is constructed using HMAC-SHA512 and the expand
module is constructed using HMAC-SHA256. For this case, n is 256 bit. How-
ever, here we model these functions H based on a generic hash function which
can be modelled by the ROM. The design of KDF5 is,
K = KDF5(p, s, c, n) = H(H(p, s), c)
Theorem 3.7 KDF5 is secure with the respect to all five security models.
Proof: Firstly, we show that KDF5 [37] is CPM-secure. Recall from Definition
3.10, the KDF being CPM-secure means the inability of A to distinguish between
the derived cryptographic key from the KDF and a truly random string with the
same length after making q < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE | queries in the learning
stage and in the adaptive stage. During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R
PSPACE and C uses F to compute Ki = KDF5(p, si, ci, n), where si and ci are
chosen by A from SSPACE and CSPACE respectively. A is provided Ki.
In the challenge stage, the challenge key is computed asK ′ = KDF5(p, s, c, n),
where s and c are chosen by A. C sends K ′ to A and A continues to learn the
cryptographic keys up to q − q′ queries.
Since H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by KDF5 or a truly random string of the same length if:
a) (s, c) = (si, ci) for some i = 1 . . . qk, which means that H(H(p, s), c) =
H(H(p, si), ci). A will distinguish K
′ is one of the key at the learning stage.
However, based on Definition 3.10, the chosen pair (s, c) is restricted not to
equal any pair (si, ci) ∀ i in the learning stage. Hence, the probability is
Pr[(s, c) = (si, ci)] = 0.
b) Query p such as p′ = p. In this case, we may observe that KDF5(p, s, c, n) =
KDF5(p′, s, c, n). This impliesA guessing p with at most probability qH|PSPACE | .
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c) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF5(p, s, c, n), with p′ 6= p, we
have Pr[p′ 6= p] = 1− qH|PSPACE | .
The probability that A wins this indistinguishability game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] + Pr[A wins|p′ 6= p]Pr[p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE |
)
+ 1
2
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ qH
2|PSPACE | , where  =
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
A is only has a negligible ‘advantage’ to distinguish the challenge output.
Therefore, KDF5 is CPM-secure. Hence KDF5 is secure in CCM, KPM, CCS
and KPS by Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 respectively.

3.7 KDF Security Analysis
In this section we present a security analysis of various current KDF proposals
according to the classification (KPM, CCM, KPS, CCS and CPM) discussed
above. The detailed description of these KDF proposals can be found at Ap-
pendix A. A summary result for this security analysis is presented in Table 3.3,
while the following sections provide detailed descriptions of the relevent proofs.
The symbol ‘q’ denotes number of queries. The symbol ‘X’ indicates that the
KDF proposal is secure under that particular security model. The symbol ‘X’
indicates that the KDF is not secure for that KDF security model. The sym-
bol ‘N/A(-)’ indicates that the KDF is not analysed under that security model
(KPM or CCM), as the public salt s in the proposed KDF is null (fixed). KPM
and CCM are two security models which generate cryptographic keys from a
fixed private string together with a different salt, and with the same or different
context information. If s is null, the KDF can only follow the security models
of KPS, CCS and CPM. The symbol ‘N/A(*)’ indicates that the KDF is not
analysed under KPS or CCS, as the the proposed KDF requires different salts
in L component parts to generate one cryptographic key.
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Table 3.3: Real aplication security analysis.
Standard Phase Cryptographic KPM KPS CCM CCS CPM Remarks
Primitive
NIST SP800-56A Single Hash functions X X X X X q = 0
N/A(-) X N/A(-) X X q > 0
NIST SP800-56B Single Hash functions X X X X X q = 0
N/A(-) X N/A(-) X X q > 0
NIST SP800-56C Two HMAC-SHA2 families X X X X X q ≥ 0
Block Ciphers X X X X X q ≥ 0
NIST SP800-108 Single Hash functions X X X X X q = 0
N/A(-) X N/A(-) X X q > 0
Block ciphers X X X X X q = 0
N/A(-) X N/A(-) X X q > 0
TLS version 1.0, 1.1 Two HMAC-MD5 X X X X X q > 239
X X X X X q < 239
HMAC-SHA1 X X X X X q > 269
X X X X X q < 269
TLS version 1.2 Two HMAC-SHA256 X X X X X q ≥ 0
IKEv1 Two HMAC-MD5 X X X X X q > 239
X X X X X q < 239
HMAC-SHA1 X X X X X q > 269
X X X X X q < 269
IKEv2 Two HMAC-SHA2 families X X X X X q ≥ 0
Block ciphers X X X X X q ≥ 0
PBKDF1 Single Hash functions X X X X X q > 0
PBKDF2 Single Hash functions X X X X X q ≥ 0
PBKDF3 Single HMAC-SHA1 X X X X X q ≥ 0
HMAC-SHA2 families X X X X X q ≥ 0
HKDF Two HMAC-SHA2 families X X X X X q ≥ 0
Adam et.al Single Hash functions X X X X X q = 0, L = 1
X N/A(*) X N/A(*) X q > 0, L > 1
SRTP Single Block ciphers X X X X X q ≥ 0
References: SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm
HMAC - Keyed-hash Message Authentication Code
HMAC-SHA2 families - HMAC-SHA224, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384, HMAC-SHA512
Block cipher - Advanced Encryption Standard(AES)
3.7.1 NIST SP800-56A, SP800-56B and SP800-108
In this section, we present the security proof of the KDFs proposed in NIST
SP800-56A, NIST SP800-56B and NIST SP800-108 (detailed description can be
found in Appendix A).
We provide the security proof for all of these KDFs simultaneously. The
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reason is the general construction of KDF for these standards are similar such
as KDF (p, c, n) = H(p, c, n), salt s is not required. H can be a hash function or
block cipher which performs well in ROM. Besause s is not required, the security
proofs relating to KPM and CCM are omitted when q > 0. This is because,
in KPM and CCM indistinguishability game, for each query different s is used
to derive the cryptographic key. We show the security proof for these KDFs as
below.
Theorem 3.8 If q = 0, the KDFs in NIST SP800 are secure in all security
models, namley KPM, CCM, KPS, CCS and CPM.
Proof: Here we give that these KDFs are CPM-secure. Recall from the Def-
inition 3.10, a KDF is CPM-secure, if A is unable to determine whether the
challenge output K ′ is the cryptographic key K generated from the KDF or a
random binary string of the same length after making q queries in the learning
stage and adaptive stage, where q < |SSPACE |× |CSPACE | and the probability
that A can distinguish K ′ is not greater than 1
2
+. If q = 0, it means, A can play
neither at the learning stage nor at the adaptive stage. In the challenge stage,
A chooses c and sends to C. Then, C chooses b ∈R {0, 1}. If b = 0 a challenge
key is computed as K ′ = KDF (p, c, n) = H(p, c, n). Otherwise, K ′ is a random
binary string. Then, A is provided K ′.
Since H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by the KDF or a random string of the same length if:
a) Finding correct p such as p′ = p. This implies that A guessing p with at most
probability 1|PSPACE | .
b) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF (p, c, n), with p′ 6= p, we
have Pr[p′ 6= p] =
(
1− 1|PSPACE |
)
.
The probability that A wins this indistinguishability game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] + Pr[A wins|p′ 6= p]Pr[p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
1
|PSPACE |
)
+ 1
2
(
1− 1|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ 1
2|PSPACE | , where  =
1
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
A is only has a negligible ‘advantage’ to distinguish the challenge output.
Therefore, these KDFs are CPM-secure. Hence, these KDFs are secure in CCM,
KPM, CCS and KPS by Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4
respectively. 
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Theorem 3.9 If q > 0, the KDFs in NIST SP800 are secure in KPS, CCS and
CPM.
Proof: Firstly, we prove these KDFs are secure in CPM. Recall from Definition
3.10, a KDF is CPM-secure means the inability of A to distinguish between the
derived cryptographic key from the KDF and a truly random string with the same
length after making q < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE | queries in the learning stage
and in the adaptive stage. During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE
and C uses F to compute Ki = KDF (p, ci, n), where ci is chosen by A from
CSPACE . A is provided Ki.
In the challenge stage, the challenge key is computed as K ′ = KDF (p, c, n),
where c is chosen by A and C sends K ′ to A. A continues to learn the crypto-
graphic keys up to q − q′ queries.
Since H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by the KDF or a truly random string of the same length if:
a) Query p such as p′ = p. This implies A guessing p with at most probability
qH
|PSPACE | .
b) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF (p, c, n), with p′ 6= p, we
have Pr[p′ 6= p] =
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
.
The probability that A wins this indistinguishability game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] + Pr[A wins|p′ 6= p]Pr[p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE |
)
+ 1
2
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ qH
2|PSPACE | , where  =
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
A is only has a negligible ‘advantage’ to distinguish the challenge output.
Therefore, these KDFs are CPM-secure. Hence, these KDFs are secure in CCS
and KPS by Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 respectively. 
3.7.2 TLS version 1.0, 1.1 and IKEv1
In this section, we give the security proof of the KDFs proposed in TLS version
1.0 [18], TLS version 1.1 [19] and IKEv1 [27]. The general construction of KDF
for these standards are similar such as KDF (p, s, c, n) = H(H(p, s), c). H can
be HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1 which performs well in ROM.
Theorem 3.10 The KDFs are secure in all five security models, namely KPM,
CCM, KPS, CCS and CPM.
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Proof: Firstly, we show that these KDFs are CPM-secure. Recall from Defini-
tion 3.10, a KDF is CPM-secure if A cannot distinguish whether the challenge
output is the derived cryptographic key from the KDF or just a truly random
string with the same length after making q < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE | queries in
the learning stage and in the adaptive stage.
During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE and C uses F to compute
Ki = KDF (p, si, ci, n), where si and ci are chosen by A from SSPACE and
CSPACE respectively. A is provided Ki.
In the challenge stage, the challenge key is computed as K ′ = KDF (p, s, c, n),
where s and c are chosen by A and C sends K ′ to A. A continues to learn the
cryptographic keys up to q − q′ queries.
Since F is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by KDF or a truly random string of the same length if:
a) (s, c) = (si, ci) for some i = 1 . . . qk, which means that A will distinguish K
′ is
one of the key at the learning stage. However, based on Definition 3.10, the
chosen pair (s, c) is restricted not to equal (si, ci) ∀ i in the learning stage.
Hence, (s, c) 6= (si, ci).
b) Query p such as p′ = p. This implies A guessing p with at most probability
qH
|PSPACE | .
c) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF (p, s, c, n), with p′ 6= p, we
have Pr[p′ 6= p] = 1− qH|PSPACE | .
The probability that A wins this indistinguishability game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] + Pr[A wins|p′ 6= p]Pr[p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE |
)
+ 1
2
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ qH
2|PSPACE | , where  =
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
A is only has a negligible ‘advantage’ to distinguish the challenge output.
Therefore, KDF is CPM-secure. Hence the KDF is secure in CCM, KPM, CCS
and KPS by Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 respectively.

Theorem 3.11 When H is HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1, the KDFs are not
CPM secure.
Proof: The KDFs of TLS and IKE are hash based KDFs which follows the
two-phase model and which are based on the hash function HMAC-MD5 and
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HMAC-SHA1, as shown in Table A.7 and Table A.9. The security for this KDF
is based on the underlying security of the ciphers (HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-
SHA1) which are used to construct the KDF. This means, if the security of
underlying ciphers are compromised, it will affect the security strength of KDFs
itself. For example, MD5 and SHA1 are broken; we can find the collision using
about 239 MD5 operations [58] and 269 SHA1 operations [59] respectively. We
denote the collision operations as φ.
As discussed in Section 3.4.5, the KDF is not considered CPM-secure if q ≥ σ,
where sl > σ. For MD5 and SHA1, if using collisions based on birthday paradox,
the adversary can make queries at least σ queries, where σ for MD5 is 264 and
for SHA1 is 280.
Firstly, we show the HMAC-MD5 based KDFs are not CPM secure. The
adversary A in CPM is an active adversary who can make queries at most q < σ.
For each query, the adversary queries different si and with a single c, such that
KDF (p, s, c, n) = (H{p, si}, c), where i = 1, 2, . . . , σ and H is the KDF function
which is HMAC-MD5. As MD5 is broken, with around q ≈ φ queries to HMAC-
MD5 based KDF, A will be able to find collision to the intermediate value PRK .
For example, H(H{p, si}, c) = H(H{p, sφ}, c), where i = τ and , τ < φ. The
adversary still can make more queries (σ− φ). Next, A queries pair (sτ , c′). The
challenger computes Kφ+1 = H(H{p, sτ}, c′) and sends Kφ+1 to A. During the
challenge stage, A queries (sφ, c
′) and A received the challenge output K ′. The
adversary A wins the game as A will be able to distinguish the challenge output
by simply verifying K ′ ?= Kφ+1. Hence, HMAC-MD5 based KDFs are not CPM
secure.
By the same token, we may show that HMAC-SHA1 based KDFs also are
not CPM secure. The adversary may find the collision of the intermediate value
PRK with approximately q ≈ φ which is less than σ. Hence, there is an attack
on HMAC-SHA1 based KDFs 
3.7.3 Two Phase KDF Proposals
The KDF of NIST SP800-56C [14], TLS version 1.2 [20], IKEv2 [36] and HKDF
[37] are two-phase KDFs consisting of an extractor and an expander. The gen-
eral construction of two-phase KDF for these standards are KDF (p, s, c, n) =
H(H(p, s)c). H can be hash functions or block ciphers which performs well in
ROM. Here, we give the security proof for these KDFs as below.
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Theorem 3.12 These two-phase KDFs are secure with the respect to all five
security models.
Proof: Firstly, we show that these KDFs are CPM-secure. Based on Definition
3.10, a KDF is CPM-secure if after making q < |SSPACE |×|CSPACE | queries at
the learning stage and at the adaptive stage, A is unable to distinguish whether
the challenge output K ′ is a key produced by the KDF or a random string of the
same length with probability greater than 1
2
+ , where  is negligible.
During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE and C uses F to compute
Ki = KDF (p, si, ci, n), where si and ci are chosen by A from SSPACE and
CSPACE respectively. A is provided Ki.
In the challenge stage, the challenge key is computed as K ′ = KDF (p, s, c, n),
where s and c are chosen by A and C sends K ′ to A. A continues to learn the
cryptographic keys up to q − q′ queries.
Since H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by KDF or a truly random string of the same length if:
a) (s, c) = (si, ci) for some i = 1 . . . qk, which means that H(H(p, s), c) =
H(H(p, si), ci). A will distinguish K
′ is one of the key at the learning stage.
However, based on Definition 3.10, the chosen pair (s, c) is restricted not to
equal (si, ci) ∀ i in the learning stage. Hence, the probability is Pr[(s, c) =
(si, ci)] = 0.
b) Query p such as p′ = p. In this case, we may observe that KDF (p, s, c, n) =
KDF (p′, s, c, n). This implies A guessing p with at most probability qH|PSPACE | .
c) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= H(H(p, s)c), with p′ 6= p, we have
Pr[p′ 6= p] = 1− qH|PSPACE | .
The probability that A wins this indistinguishability game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] + Pr[A wins|p′ 6= p]Pr[p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE |
)
+ 1
2
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ qH
2|PSPACE | , where  =
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
A only has a negligible ‘advantage’ to distinguish the challenge output. There-
fore, these KDFs are CPM-secure. Hence they are also secure in CCM, KPM,
CCS and KPS by Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 respec-
tively. 
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3.7.4 Adam et.al [1]
In the paper of “On the security of Key Derivation Functions” a KDF was pro-
posed by Adam et. al in 2004 [1], which we denote as Adam’s KDF. A crypto-
graphic key K is obtained which consists of the concatenation of L component
parts. Each component part is a function of p is concatenated with s and again
with p. Adam KDF’s is,
KDF (p, s, n) = H(p, s1, p)‖H(p, s2, p)‖ . . . ‖H(p, sj, p), where
(s1, s2, . . . , sj) ∈ SSPACE .
The property for the salt is s1 6= s2 6= . . . 6= sj. Therefore, each of the L
component parts will have a different string such as H(p, s1, p) 6= H(p, s2, p) 6=
. . . 6= H(p, sj, p). H is hash functions which performs well in ROM. If KDF’s
Adam satisfies the salt property, that is, s1 6= s2 6= . . . 6= sj, then this KDF can
have two different security level as shown ni Theorem 3.13 and Theorem 3.14.
We give each theorem proof as below.
Theorem 3.13 If q = 0 and L = 1, then Adam’s KDF is secure in all five
security definitions.
Proof: Firstly, we prove that if q = 0 and L = 1, Adam’s KDF is secure in all
five security models. Here we show that Adam’s KDF is CPM-secure. If q = 0, it
means A can play neither at the learning stage nor at the adaptive stage. In the
challenge stage, when b = 0 a challenge key is computed as K ′ = KDF (p, s, n) =
H(p, s1, p), where L = 1, else, K ′ is a random binary string. A is provided K ′.
Since H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the key
generated by the KDF’s Adam or a random string of the same length if:
a) Query p such as p′ = p. This implies A guessing p with at most probability
qH
|PSPACE | .
b) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF (p, s, n), with p′ 6= p, we
have Pr[p′ 6= p] =
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
.
The probability that A wins this indistinguishability game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] + Pr[A wins|p′ 6= p]Pr[p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE |
)
+ 1
2
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ qH
2|PSPACE | , where  =
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
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A only has a negligible ‘advantage’ to distinguish the challenge output. There-
fore, KDF’s Adam is CPM-secure. Hence, this KDF is secure in CCM, KPM CCS
and KPS by Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 respectively.

Theorem 3.14 If q > 0, then Adam’s KDF is secure in KPM and CCM but
not in CPM.
Proof: Firstly, we prove that Adam’s KDF is CCM-secure when q > 0. Recall
by CCM security definitions, the probability that A can distinguish whether the
challenge output is the cryptographic key produced by the KDF or a random
binary string of the same length is not greater than 1
2
+ , where A makes q <
|SSPACE | × |CSPACE | queries at the learning stage and the adaptive stage.
During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE and sji ∈R SSPACE .
C uses H to compute Ki = H(p, s
1
i , p)‖H(p, s2i , p)‖ . . . ‖H(p, sji , p). A receives sji
and Ki.
In the challenge stage, the challenge key is computed by the challenger
such that K ′ = H(p, s1, p)‖H(p, s2, p)‖ . . . ‖H(p, sj, p), where p is similar at the
learning stage and s1, s2, . . . , sj is chosen randomly from SSPACE by C.
A receives K ′ and A continues to learn the cryptographic keys KDF’s
Adam up to q − q′ queries at the adaptive stage.
Since H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish if K ′ is the key
generated by KDF or a random string of the same length, only if:
a) The value of s1, s2, . . . , sj is chosen before at the learning stage. For example
s1 = s∗i for some i = 1 . . . qk. In this case, H(p, s
1, n) . . . = . . . H(p, s∗i , n) . . .,
A will distinguish the first component of the K ′ is similar with one of the
component of the cryptographic keys at the learning stage, for some i =
1 . . . qk. The probability is Pr[s
1, s2, . . . , sj = s1i , s
2
i , . . . , s
j
i ] ≤ qk|SSPACE | .
b) Query p, p′ = p and find KDF (p, s, n) = KDF (p′, s, n). This implies A
guessing p with at most probability qH|PSPACE | .
c) Randomly guessing the challenge keyK ′ ?= KDF (p, s, n), with (s1, s2, . . . , sj 6=
s1i , s
2
i , . . . , s
j
i ), for some i = 1 . . . qk, we have Pr[s
1, s2, . . . , sj 6= s1i , s2i , . . . , sji ]
=
(
1− qk|SSPACE |
)
.
d) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF (p, s, n), with p′ 6= p, we
have Pr[p′ 6= p] =
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
.
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The probability that A wins this indistinguishability game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|s1, s2, . . . , sj = s1i , s2i , . . . , sji ] ×
Pr[s1, s2, . . . , sj = s1i , s
2
i , . . . , s
j
i ] + Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p]
+Pr[A wins|s1, s2, . . . , sj 6= s1i , s2i , . . . , sji ∧ p′ 6= p] ×
Pr[s1, s2, . . . , sj 6= s1i , s2i , . . . , sji ∧ p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
qk
|SSPACE |
)
+ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE |
)
+ 1
2
(
1− qk|SSPACE | − qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ qk
2|SSPACE | +
qH
2|PSPACE| ,
where  = qk
2|SSPACE | +
qH
2|PSPACE| is negligible.
A has a negligible ‘advantage’ in randomly guessing the challenge output.
Therefore, after making q queries, Adam’s KDF is CCM-secure and KPM-secure
by Lemma 3.2.
Secondly, we show KDF’s Adam is not secure in CPM. In CPM model, A
is allowed to choose the salt value. Assume L is two, the derived cryptographic
key is H(p, s1, p)‖H(p, s2, p). During the learning stage, for the first query, A
chooses (s1i , s
2
i ) ∈ SSPACE and A receives the derived cryptographic key is
H(p, s1i , p)‖H(p, s2i , p), where i = 1. During the challenge stage, A requests the
challenge key with the chosen salt (s1, s2) ∈ SSPACE , where s1 = s2i , s2 = s1i
and i = 1. H is modeled as a ROM, so A can distinguish the challenge key such
that H(p, s1, p)‖H(p, s2, p) = H(p, s2i , p)‖H(p, s1i , p), where i = 1. Therefore, A
can distinguish the challenge output is either the derived cryptographic key or a
random binary string. Thus, Adam’s KDF is not CPM. 
3.7.5 PBKDF1 [34]
PBKDF1 is a single stage KDF which was proposed by Kaliski in 2000 [34]. In
PBKDF1 the cryptographic key K is obtained by using an iterative function H of
p and s where c is the number of iterations to be performed for the function. The
number of iterations are used for key strengthening, which refers to a technique
used for increasing the time to test each possible input (password). In this design,
Kaliski assumes that H is an ideal hash function that performs well in ROM.
The KDF is defined as below:
PBKDF1(p, s, c, n) = Hc(p, s), assuming c is an integer value.
Theorem 3.15 PBKDF1 is secure with the respect to KPM, CCM but not secure
in KPS, CCS and CPM
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Proof: Firstly, we show PBKDF1 is CCM-secure. Based on Definition 3.9, for a
KDF which is CCM-secure if after making q < |SSPACE |×|CSPACE | queries at
the learning stage and at the adaptive stage, A has only a negligible ‘advantage’
over random guessing in distinguishing whether the challenge output K ′ is a
key produced by the KDF or a truly random binary string of the same length.
During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE , si ∈R SSPACE and uses F
to compute Ki = H
ci(p, si), where A chooses ci which will be a positive integer.
At the challenge stage, a challenge key is computed as K ′ = Hc(p, s), where
C chooses s and A chooses c.
A receives K ′ and continues to learn the cryptographic keys up to q − q′
queries at the adaptive stage.
Since H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the
cryptographic key generated from PBKDF1 or is a random binary string of the
same length if:
a) s = si for some i = 1 . . . qk. This implies that s has been chosen at the
learning stage and A can choose c∗−1, that is K ′ = Hc
∗−1
(p, s) where A
can distinguish the challenge output K ′ by computing H(K ′) ?= Hc
∗
(p, si),
where Hc
∗
(p, si) is one of the keys at the learning stage. The probability is,
Pr[s = si] ≤ qk|SSPACE | .
b) Query p such as p′ = p and find KDF (p′, s, c, n) = KDF (p, s, c, n). This
implies that A guessing p with at most probability qH|PSPACE | .
c) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF (p, s, c, n), with s 6= si for
some i = 1 . . . qk, we have Pr[s 6= si]=
(
1− qk|SSPACE |
)
.
d) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= KDF (p, s, c, n), with p′ 6= p, we
have Pr[p′ 6= p] =
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
.
The probability that A wins this indistinguishability game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|s = si]Pr[s = si] + Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] +
Pr[A wins|s 6= si ∧ p′ 6= p]Pr[s 6= si ∧ p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
qk
|SSPACE |
)
+ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE |
)
+ 1
2
(
1− qk|SSPACE | − qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ qk
2|SSPACE | +
qH
2|PSPACE | ,
where  = qk
2|SSPACE | +
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
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A only has a negligible ‘advantage’ over randomly guessing the challenge out-
put. Therefore, PBKDF1 is CCM-secure. PBKDF1 is KPM-secure by Lemma
3.2.
Secondly, we show PBKDF1 is not secure in KPS. Recall from Definition
3.4.2, a KDF is KPS-secure if A plays the KPS indistinguishability game, and
after making q < |CSPACE | queries, A is not be able to distinguish whether the
challenge output is a key produced by the KDF or a random binary string with
the same length with probability greater than 1
2
+ , where  is negligible. In
KPS, s is fixed for entire indistinguishability game and C chooses c and p, c is
known by A, while p is secret from A. In learning stage, A is provided q derived
cryptographic keys, such that Ki = H
ci(p, s), where i = 1, . . . , q. During the
challenge stage, A is provided a challenge key K ′ and c. A can distinguish the
challenge key K ′ by satisfying either one condition as below:
• If c < ci(ci 6= 1), A may compute Ki ?= Hci−c(K ′), where i = 1, . . . , q.
• If c > ci, i = 1, . . . , q, A may compute K ′ ?= Hc−ci(Ki), where i = 1, . . . , q.
If the answer is equivalent, the challenge key is the derived cryptographic key
from the PBKDF1
Thus, PBKDF1 is not KPS-secure. Therefore, PBKDF1 is not CCS-secure
by Lemma 3.4 and not CPM-secure by Lemma 3.3. 
Discussion of Flaw in PBKDF1
Yao and Yin showed a straightforward attack on PBKDF1. For a fixed salt s and
two queries on c, where c is number iteration count, c0 < c1, let Ki = H
ci(p||s).
Then, it is easy to compute K1 = H
(c1−c0)(K0). This relation allows an adversary
to distinguish the derived cryptographic keys from PBKDF1 [61]. In our security
proof of Theorem 3.15, we use the same attack to show that PBKDF1 is not
secure in KPS, CCS and CPM. PBKDF1 still remains secure in KPM and CCM,
as the cryptographic keys are derived from the same password and different salt
value in these two models.
Note that, our proposed five security models are used to capture five different
attack scenarios. A KDF may secure in one security model but not secure in the
other security model. The security proof of PBKDF1 shows the usefulness of
having five different security models.
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3.7.6 PBKDF2 [34]
PBKDF2 is another password based key derivation functions which was proposed
by Kaliski [34]. The PBKDF2 was designed to improve the security of PBKDF1
by adding exclusive-ors as an additional layer of protection. In PBKDF2, the
cryptographic key K is derived by XORing the cth iterations of function F of
p, s and i, where i is number of blocks required for the derived cryptographic
keys. H is the function that perform well in ROM. The detail explanation can
be found at Appendix A, while the general KDF as below:
PBKDF2(p, s, c, l, n) = H(p, s, c, l, n) , l = 1, . . . , L
Theorem 3.16 PBKDF2 is secure with the respect to KPM, CCM, KPS, CCS
and CPM
Proof: Firstly, we show PBKDF2 is CPM-secure. Recall from Definition 3.9, a
KDF is CCM-secure if after making making q < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE | queries
at the learning stage and at the adaptive stage, the probability for A to distin-
guish the challenge ouput is the derived cryptographic key or the random string
is not greater than 1
2
+ . During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE
and uses H to compute Ki = H(p, si, ci, l, n), where A chooses si and ci and ci
will be a positive integer.
At the challenge stage, a challenge key is computed as K ′ = H(p, s, c, l, n),
where C chooses s and A chooses c.
A receives K ′ and continues to learn the cryptographic keys up to q − q′
queries at the adaptive stage.
Since, F is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the
cryptographic key generated from PBKDF2 or is a random binary string of the
same length if:
a) Query p such as p′ = p and find H(p′, s, c, l, n) = H(p, s, c, l, n). This implies
A guessing p with at most probability qH|PSPACE | .
b) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= H(p, s, c, l, n), with p′ 6= p, we
have Pr[p′ 6= p] =
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
.
The probability that A winning this indistinguishability game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] +Pr[A wins|p′ 6= p]Pr[p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE |
)
+ 1
2
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
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≤ 1
2
+ qH
2|PSPACE | , where  =
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
A only has a negligible ‘advantage’ over randomly guessing the challenge
output. Therefore, PBKDF2 is CPM-secure. Hence PBKDF2 is secure in CCM,
KPM, CCS and KPS by Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4
respectively.
Discussion of Flaw in PBKDF2
Yao and Yin claimed PBKDF2 suffers from nonrandomness [61]. For a fixed
salt s and three queries on c where c be three consecutive iteration counts, such
that, c1, c2, c3. Let Ki = H(p, s, ci, l, n) = V ar1 ⊕ V ar2 ⊕ V arci (Appendix
A.1.5). Then, we have K1 ⊕ K2 = V arc2 and K2 ⊕ K3 = V arc3 . This relation
allows an adversary to compute the relation among these three keys: K2⊕K3 =
Hp(K1 ⊕ K2) [61], where p is the password. The adversary can use dictionary
attack or brute force attack to find the password. This finding demonstrates that
PBKDF2’s key strengthening does not function as desired, namely which is to
slow down the time to brute force the password. It should be noted that the key
strengthening setting is different from the general-purpose KDFs that we have
studied here. We do not capture key strengthening in our five security models.
So that, the weakness in PBKDF2 as demonstrated in [61] is not shown in our
security framework.
We defined the security goal for a KDF is that the cryptographic keys gener-
ated by the KDF are indistinguishable from random binary strings of the same
length. If the best that the adversary can do is by brute force the input to
distinguish the derived cryptographic keys, then we say that the KDF is secure.
In our security proof of Theorem 3.16, we demonstrate that PBKDF2 is CPM
secure as the adversary may not be able to distinguish the derived cryptographic
keys from PBKDF2. The best that adversary can do is to break the security of
PBKDF2 by brute forcing the password. This imply that PBKDF2 is secure in
CCM, KPM, CCS and KPS by Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3 and Lemma
3.4 respectively.
3.7.7 PBKDF3 [61]
PBKDF3 is another password based key derivation functions which was proposed
by Yao & Yin after finding some flaws in PBKDF1 and PBKDF2. The derived
cryptographic key K is generated by using a function H of p, s and c, where c
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is an integer. The detailed explanation can be found at Appendix A, while the
general KDF as below:
PBKDF3(p, s, c, n) = Hc(p, s, c)
Theorem 3.17 PBKDF3 is secure with the respect to KPM, CCM, KPS, CCS
and CPM
Proof: Firstly, we show PBKDF3 is CPM-secure. Recall from Definition 3.10, a
KDF is CPM-secure if after making making q < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE | queries
at the learning stage and at the adaptive stage, the probability for A to distin-
guish whether the challenge ouput is the derived cryptographic key or a random
string is not greater than 1
2
+ .
During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE and uses H to compute
Ki = H
ci(p, si, c), where A chooses si ∈ SSPACE and ciCSPACE and ci will be
a positive integer.
At the challenge stage, a challenge key is computed as K ′ = Hc(p, s, c), where
A chooses s and c.
A receives K ′ and continues to learn the cryptographic keys up to q − q′
queries at the adaptive stage.
Since, F is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the
cryptographic key generated from PBKDF3 or is the random binary string of
the same length if:
a) Query p such as p′ = p and find Hc(p′, s, c) = Hc(p, s, c). This implies that
A guessing p with at most probability qH|PSPACE | .
b) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= Hc(p, s, c), with p′ 6= p, we have
Pr[p′ 6= p] =
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
.
The probability that A wins this indistinguishability game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] +Pr[A wins|p′ 6= p]Pr[p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE |
)
+ 1
2
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ qH
2|PSPACE | , where  =
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
A is only has a negligible ‘advantage’ over randomly guessing the challenge
output. Therefore, PBKDF3 is CPM-secure. Hence PBKDF3 is secure in CCM,
KPM, CCS and KPS by Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4
respectively.
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3.7.8 SRTP [5]
Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) is a single phase KDF based on
block ciphers. The derived cryptographic key K is generated by using a function
H of p, s and c. The detailed explanation can be found at Appendix A, while
the general KDF as below:
KDF(p, s, c, n) = H(p, s, c)
Theorem 3.18 The KDF is secure with the respect to KPM, CCM, KPS, CCS
and CPM
Proof: Firstly, we show this SRTP’s KDF is CPM-secure. Based on Definition
3.10, a KDF is CPM-secure if after making q < |SSPACE |×|CSPACE | queries at
the learning stage and at the adaptive stage, A is unable to distinguish whether
the challenge output K ′ is a key produced by the KDF or a random string of the
same length with probability greater than 1
2
+ , where  is negligible.
During the learning stage, C chooses p ∈R PSPACE and uses H to compute
Ki = H(p, si, ci), where A chooses si ∈ SSPACE and ciCSPACE .
At the challenge stage, a challenge key is computed as K ′ = H(p, s, c), where
A chooses s and c.
A receives K ′ and continues to learn the cryptographic keys up to q − q′
queries at the adaptive stage.
Since, H is modeled as a ROM, A can only distinguish whether K ′ is the
cryptographic key generated from SRTP’s KDF or is the random binary string
of the same length if:
a) Query p such as p′ = p and find H(p′, s, c) = H(p, s, c). This implies that A
guessing p with at most probability qH|PSPACE | .
b) Randomly guessing the challenge key K ′ ?= H(p, s, c), with p′ 6= p, we have
Pr[p′ 6= p] =
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
.
The probability that A wins this indistinguishability game is:
Pr[A wins] = Pr[A wins|p′ = p]Pr[p′ = p] +Pr[A wins|p′ 6= p]Pr[p′ 6= p]
≤ 1
(
qH
|PSPACE |
)
+ 1
2
(
1− qH|PSPACE |
)
≤ 1
2
+ qH
2|PSPACE | , where  =
qH
2|PSPACE | is negligible.
A is only has a negligible ‘advantage’ over randomly guessing the challenge
output. Therefore, SRTP’s KDF is CPM-secure. Hence SRTP’s KDF is secure in
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CCM, KPM, CCS and KPS by Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3 and Lemma
3.4 respectively.
3.8 Chapter Summary
A formal security model is presented for KDF based on a cryptosystem ‘game’
played between an adversary with a challenger. We denoted this ‘game’ as in-
distinguishability game. Here, the challenger is the KDF. To win this game, the
adversary must distinguish whether the challenge output given by the challenger
is the cryptographic key generated by the KDF or just a random binary string.
The formal security framework in this research includes five different security
models: KPM, KPS, CCM, CCS and CPM. Note, CCS is proposed by Krawczyk
while the remaining four security models are proposed in this research. The
adversary in CCS has a limited capability who only can choose context informa-
tion while playing the indistinguishability game. We proposed a security model
namely CPM which gives adversary more power namely the capability of select-
ing salt and context information while playing the indistinguishability game. The
relations between these five security models are established by using existing and
modified KDF proposals. The relations are illustrated in Figure 3.2. KPM and
KPS are weak security models as the adversary is only an observer. The other
models, CCM and CCS are stronger security models as the adversary is active
and can interact with the challenger while CPM is the strongest security model
as the adversary has maximum influence with the choice of public KDF inputs.
As shown, if a KDF is CPM-secure, then the KDF is secure in the remaining
four security models, namely KPM, KPS, CCM and CCS.
Once the comprehensive security framework was formed, it was used to anal-
yse existing KDF proposals as presented in Table 3.3. One may observe that
a KDF may have different level of security. For example, PBKDF1 [34] is se-
cure in KPM and CCM security models but not secure in KPS, CCS and CPM
security models. On the other hand, when the security of the cryptographic
primitives that are used to construct the KDF is compromised, then the KDF is
not CPM-secure but it may remain secure in KPM, CCM, KPS and CCS which
has been shown in Theorem 3.11. The above examples demonstrate that the
comprehensive security framework provides precise specification of the level of
security achieved by the KDF proposals.
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In next chapter, a new KDF based on stream ciphers is proposed, denoted as
SCKDF. A formal security proof for the SCKDF will be provided which is based
on the security framework.
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Chapter 4
Key Derivation Function: The
SCKDF Scheme
As discussed in Chapter 1, the keystream generator of a stream cipher has many
similarities to a KDF. A keystream generator takes two inputs: an initial secret
key and publicly known information, and produces arbitrary length pseudoran-
dom output. In addition, stream ciphers are often used in resource-constrained
applications for their speed and simplicity of implementation in hardware. This
seems to make a keystream generator a “natural” choice as a primitive in a KDF
instead of a hash function or block cipher as noted in [33] especially in resource
constrained applications. Based on these characteristics of the stream ciphers as
mentioned above, this research proposes a new secure and efficient KDF based on
stream ciphers (SCKDF). The SCKDF is proposed using two-phase KDF model.
A formal definition of a stream cipher is given in Chapter 2.
The chapter is organised as follows. The new SCKDF algorithm is presented
in Section 4.1. A security proof of this algorithm is given in Section 4.2. The
performance of this algorithm in comparison to block cipher and hash function
based KDFs is given in Section 4.3. A summary of the work in this chapter is
given in Section 4.4.
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4.1 Stream Cipher Based KDF
The proposed SCKDF is a two-phase model where both the extractor and the
expander are based on ideal keystream generators which satisfy Definition 2.7
and Definition 2.8. A pseudorandom keystream generator takes two inputs: a
key and an IV. In SCKDF, the pair of inputs to the pseudorandom keystream
generator (key, IV) are replaced with the input pair (p, s) for the extractor phase
and the input pair (PRK , c) for the expander phase. It should be noted these
changes can be viewed as being “natural” since we are replacing the key and
IV with private string and public information respectively. Detailed descriptions
and specification for these phases are as follows.
4.1.1 Extractor
In this section, we propose an extractor based on the pseudorandom keystream
generator for a stream cipher. The extractor takes p and s as the inputs and
produces an output sequence PRK . Let v and w denote the key size and IV
size respectively, for the stream cipher. Similarly, let r denote the key size of
the stream cipher in the expander phase. (Note that is possible the same stream
cipher may be used for both extractor phase and expander phase, but this is not
necessary.) Figure 4.1 depicts our proposed stream cipher based extractor. The
extractor process is as follows.
1. Input: p, s, pl, sl, r.
2. Process:
(a) If s is null.
i. Divide private string p into blocks, where each block is of length
of v + w. Let Di denote the i
th block of p. The total number of
blocks is L = d pl
v+w
e.
ii. If the length of the last block DL is less than v+w bits, the block
is padded with ‘0’s. Go to Step 3.
(b) Else (if s is not null). Public string s is proposed to have same
length as w of pseudorandom keystream generator. However, if sl < w
, set the remaining bits with ‘0’s.
i. If pl < v.
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Figure 4.1: Extractor based on stream ciphers
A. Pad the remaining bits of p with ‘0’s.
B. Use the p as the key and s as the IV for the pseudorandom
keystream generator.
C. Generate r bits of keystream.
D. Proceed to Step 4.
ii. Else, if pl > v.
A. Use the first v bits of p as the key and s as the IV for the
pseudorandom keystream generator.
B. Generate v + w bits of keystream.
C. The remaining bits of p are divided into blocks, where each
block is of length of v + w. Let Di denote the i
th block of p.
The total number of blocks is L = dpl−v
v+w
e. If the length of the
last block DL is less than v+w bits, the block is padded with
‘0’s.
D. XOR the v + w bits of keystream produced in Step 2(b)iiB
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with D1 of p.
E. Go to Step 3.
3. For i = 1 to L, do the following:
(a) If i = L. Use the first v bits of Di as the key and remaining w bits of
Di as the IV and generate r bits of keystream. Proceed to Step 4.
(b) Else, if i < L.
i. Use the first v bits of Di as the key and remaining w bits of Di
as the IV for the pseudorandom keystream generator.
ii. Generate v + w bits of keystream.
iii. The v + w bits of keystream are XORed with Di+1 of p.
iv. i := i+ 1.
4. Output:
• An r-bit string, denoted PRK .
4.1.2 Expander
In this section, we describe a stream cipher based expander. This function takes
as inputs the output of extractor phase PRK , together with an arbitrary length
binary string c, the context information. The expander output is a pseudorandom
binary string. Let v and w denote the key size and IV size respectively for the
stream cipher. Figure 4.2 illustrates our proposed stream cipher based expander.
The expander process is as follows.
1. Input: PRK , c, cl, and n.
• If c is null, then c is padded with ‘0’s, cl = w.
2. Process:
(a) The context information c is divided into blocks, where each block size
is of length of w. Let Di denote the i
th block of c. The total number
of blocks is L = d cl
w
e.
(b) If the length of the last block DL is less than w bits, the block is
padded with ‘0’s.
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Figure 4.2: Expander based on stream ciphers
i. If L = 1.
A. Use PRK (from the extractor phase) as the key and c as the
IV for the pseudorandom keystream generator.
B. Generate n bits of keystream.
C. Proceed to Step 3.
ii. Else, if L > 1.
A. Use PRK (from the extractor phase) as the key and the first
block D1 as the IV for the pseudorandom keystream genera-
tor.
B. Generate v bits of keystream.
C. Proceed to Step 2c.
(c) For i = 2 to L, do the following:
i. If i = L.
A. Use v bits of keystream as the key and the Di as the IV for
the pseudorandom keystream generator.
B. Generate n bits of keystream.
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C. Proceed to Step 3.
ii. Else, if i < L.
A. Use v bits of keystream as the key and the Di the IV for the
pseudorandom keystream generator.
B. Generate v bits of keystream.
C. i := i+ 1.
3. Output: An n-bit binary string suitable for use as a cryptographic key.
4.2 The Security of SCKDF
SCKDF is a two-phase KDF proposal. Both the extractor and the expander are
constructed using the keystream generator of a stream cipher. It is assumed that
this keystream generator is an ideal keystream generator (satisfying Definition
2.7 and Definition 2.8 in Section 2.4). Based on this assumption, we will show
below that SCKDF is secure under all five security models from Chapter 3. Note
that a similar assumption of an ideal primitive was also made by Krawczyk in
proving Theorem 3.1 in [37].
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that a keystream generator satisfies Definition 2.7 and
Definition 2.8. If an extract-then-expand SCKDF is built from this keystream
generator, then the extract-then-expand SCKDF scheme is (min{tX , tY }, min{qX , qY },
X + Y )-CPM secure with the respect to the private string p.
Proof: To satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.2, we need to show:
i. the extractor is a (tX , qX , X)-computational extractor;
ii. the expander is a (tY , qY , Y )-secure variable-length-output pseudorandom
function family.
To prove (i) assume that extractor is not a (tX , qX , X)-computational extractor.
This would imply that an adversary A has a polynomial time method to distin-
guish whether PRK is derived from p or a random string of the same length. For
the underlying keystream generator this would then imply that the adversary
has a polynomial time method to distinguish between PRK and a truly random
string. This contradicts the assumption that the keystream generator satisfies
Definition 2.7. Hence (i) is true.
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To prove (ii) assume that expander is not a (tY , qY , Y )-secure variable-length-
output pseudorandom function family. This would imply that an adversary A
has a polynomial time method to distinguish between whether cryptographic
key K is derived from PRK or a random string of the same length. For the
underlying keystream generator this would then imply that the adversary has a
polynomial time method to distinguish between K and a truly random string.
This contradicts the assumption that the keystream generator satisfies Definition
2.7. Hence (ii) is true.
Hence by Theorem 3.2 the SCKDF built from the keystream generator is
(min(tX + tY ), min(qX + qY ), X + Y )-CPM secure with respect to the private
string p. 
Corollary 4.1 SCKDF is secure with respect to all five security models.
Since SCKDF is CPM-secure, it is also secure in CCM, KPM, CCS and KPS by
Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 respectively. 
4.3 Performance Measurement
In order to compare the performance of stream cipher, hash function and block
cipher based KDFs, we conducted experiments involving measuring the execution
time taken to generate n bits of cryptographic key from p, s and c. These KDF
proposals are two-phase model. The stream ciphers used in these experiments
include the e-Stream finalists Trivium [11], Sosemanuk [7] and Rabbit [9]. These
ciphers were selected for their software and hardware performance as well as their
security provided. It should be noted that to date there have been no significant
security flaws discovered with any of these three stream ciphers. Hence any
of these three stream ciphers seem to offer a suitable pseudorandom keystream
generator on which to build our SCKDF model in Section 4.1. The hash functions
examined are SHA families and the block cipher used is AES128. The code of the
stream ciphers are taken from [44]. The hash functions based KDF designs follow
the design of HKDF which was proposed by Krawczyk [37]. The code for the
hash functions based KDFs are taken from Internet Engineering Task Force [22].
The code for two-phase block ciphers based KDF is retrieved from [53]. The
lengths of the four parameters (p, s, c and n) are taken from the applications
below:
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• Application 1: Host identity protocol version 2(HIPv2) is based on DH
shared secret key exchange protocol which provides secure communica-
tions and maintains shared IP-layer state between two separate parties [28].
HIPv2 provides protection against atttacks on the confidentiality and in-
tegrity of the communication between these two parties. These protections
require cryptographic keys. The cryptographic keys are generated using a
KDF and the inputs are as below:
– Exp 1 : p = 128 bytes, s = 8 bytes, c= 32 bytes, n = 64 bytes
– Exp 2 : p = 128 bytes, s = 8 bytes, c= 32 bytes, n = 192 bytes
– Exp 3 : p = 256 bytes, s = 8 bytes, c= 32 bytes, n = 64 bytes
– Exp 4 : p = 256 bytes, s = 8 bytes, c= 32 bytes, n = 192 bytes
• Application 2: PKINIT algorithm is applied in Kerberos protocol [62].
PKINIT uses a KDF to generate the cryptographic keys used to protect
confidentiality and intergrity during communication between two parties.
The inputs to the KDF are as below:
– Exp 5 : p = 128 bytes, s = null, c= 64 bytes, n = 64 bytes
– Exp 6 : p = 128 bytes, s = null, c= 64 bytes, n = 192 bytes
– Exp 7 : p = 256 bytes, s = null, c= 64 bytes, n = 64 bytes
– Exp 8 : p = 256 bytes, s = null, c= 64 bytes, n = 192 bytes
• Application 3: The tunneled extensible authentication method (TEAM)
is a method that secures communication between peer and server by using
transport layer security (TLS) to establish a mutually authenticated tunnel.
TEAM provides protection against attacks in confidentiality and integrity
of the inner extensible authentication protocol (EAP) method exchange
and provides EAP peer identity privacy [63]. Again, these protections
require cryptographic keys. These cryptographic keys are derived by using
a KDF from a private master seed. The inputs to the KDF are as below:
– Exp 9 : p = 40 bytes, s = 32 bytes, c= null, n = 128 bytes
4.3.1 Software Performance
For all nine experiments the time is recorded for each of 100 trials. The average
time (mean) and standard deviation for each experiment are presented in Table
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4.1. The execution time was captured using CLOCK MONOTONIC (which can
be found in the programming language C library). All the simulations were
performed on a machine with the following specifications: Intel (R) core (TM) 2
duo CPU E8400 @ 3.00GHz 2.99 GHz, 4GB RAM and running a 64 bit Windows
operating system.
Table 4.1 shows the software performance of the KDFs based on three dif-
ferent cryptographic primitives. The three cryptographic primitives are stream
cipher, hash function and block cipher. Overall, the execution time for all types
of KDF increases, when the lengths of the inputs (p, s, c or n) increase.
From this table the performance results show that all three stream cipher
based KDF’s were significantly more efficient in software than either the hash
function or block cipher based KDF’s. In particular, the most efficient KDF in
all experiments is the Trivium based KDF and the slowest KDF is very clearly
the block cipher based KDF.
KDFs/Exp Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 3 Exp 4 Exp 5 Exp 6 Exp 7 Exp 8 Exp 9
Trivium x 11990.24 12606.16 19795.48 20551.70 14833.79 15477.11 21396.93 22050.50 4913.78
S 211.55 236.86 771.19 1476.67 224.86 211.15 254.74 234.87 209.31
Sosemanuk x 18166.69 18919.52 28326.20 29722.34 20582.50 21626.23 31494.87 32144.96 8123.53
S 161.98 196.42 3166.08 2455.51 771.08 2637.16 884.77 624.44 236.37
Rabbit x 24469.78 26194.43 33725.91 35344.42 29821.59 31628.34 41538.01 43320.91 7777.84
S 240.71 487.34 789.29 297.01 285.12 842.75 768.81 1168.34 174.42
SHA1 x 38208.16 79372.84 41191.99 83663.78 44620.65 96009.75 47655.75 99010.69 55070.93
S 1611.69 666.75 697.64 1959.69 620.96 793.51 988.17 712.13 740.49
SHA224 x 38899.40 77227.30 42314.39 80501.96 41773.70 80796.35 34919.72 74216.05 47922.74
S 400.72 1694.39 706.84 912.03 1208.81 1211.30 586.40 668.50 254.53
SHA256 x 29660.44 68470.76 33065.18 71759.19 31740.92 70927.70 35090.82 74814.85 40384.42
S 797.50 598.69 808.96 630.97 1306.09 1096.33 484.80 1179.88 782.68
SHA384 x 81600.45 132431.73 84053.82 132654.13 83455.04 141444.88 89207.13 147337.23 96139.84
S 1420.81 1423.78 1461.98 949.35 709.66 480.31 1236.67 955.76 556.42
SHA512 x 54752.69 106750.95 60638.23 111596.19 57829.02 118508.26 60576.69 121057.48 74465.89
S 927.28 7612.50 1035.55 1168.90 1826.28 673.99 235.58 1308.28 1115.18
AES128 x 234792.36 492452.75 324947.32 576609.33 321717.10 750476.04 408323.71 830594.70 142481.66
S 715.94 2501.53 10441.95 3267.62 6699.68 10352.90 14956.56 4468.46 3721.44
*Performance time is in nanosecond. x and S are sample mean and standard deviation respectively
Table 4.1: Software performance of KDF.
4.3.2 Hardware Performance
This section presents hardware implementation and performance metrics for
stream ciphers, hash functions and block ciphers. The hardware comparison
is based on the same technology that is 0.13 µm or close to 0.13µm, which is
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0.11 µm. For current literature, there is no latest technology other than 0.13 µm
for stream cipher candidates. Note that the hardware performance comparison is
not comparing the hardware performance of the actual KDF proposals. Rather it
represents the hardware performance of the underlying cryptographic primitives,
as obtained from existing literature. The results indicate that Trivium requires
less resource and has highest throughput, while SHA384 and SHA512 requires
the highest resource in hardware. These results indicate that a hardware based
KDF designed from Trivium using the SCKDF model should offer significant
advantages over other designs in hardware.
Trivium x64 Sosemanuk Rabbit SHA1 SHA224 SHA256 SHA384 SHA512 AES Better is:
Gates 4921 18819 28000 9859 15329 15329 27297 27297 5398 Lower
Throughputs (Mb/s) 22300 6062 473.6 2006 2370 2370 2909 2909 311.09 Higher
Technology 0.13µm 0.13µm 0.18µm 0.13µm 0.13µm 0.13µm 0.13µm 0.13µm 0.11µm
Reference [26] [26] [9] [45] [45] [45] [45] [45] [46]
Table 4.2: Hardware performance of hash functions, block ciphers and stream
ciphers.
4.4 Chapter Summary
In this research, a new KDF based on stream ciphers is proposed, which we
denote as SCKDF. It was demonstrated that the SCKDF is secure (based on the
assumption that the underlying stream cipher is secure) using security framework
from Chapter 3. The SCKDF is simulated with Trivium, Sosemanuk and Rabbit.
It was shown that SCKDF may provide a more efficient KDF than current hash
function or block cipher based proposals provided an efficient stream ciper is
used, such as Trivium. An additional advantage for the SCKDF proposals is the
SCKDF can generate a single long string from same inputs: p, s and c. The long
string are divided into multiple arbitrary length of substrings which are suitably
used as cryptographic keys.
Chapter 5
Modification of SCKDF
As shown in Chapter 4, SCKDFs are more efficient (in terms of running time)
than current hash function or block cipher based KDFs if an efficient stream
cipher is used to construct the SCKDFs.
A security limitation for the SCKDFs in Chapter 4 relates to the short secret
key length of the underlying stream cipher. The security of all KDFs relies on
the strength of underlying primitives. An adversary may be able to perform
simple generic attacks, such as brute force the PRK , find collisions based on the
birthday paradox, or time-memory-data tradeoff attacks to retrieve the PRK or
internal state for these KDF proposals. Hash function and block cipher based
KDFs have a longer PRK than SCKDFs. The adversary may perform these three
generic attacks faster towards SCKDFs compare with hash functions and block
ciphers based KDFs. In this chapter, an alternative SCKDF proposal which
increases the security level of SCKDF to a level comparable with the current
hash function and block cipher KDF proposals is developed.
In this chapter, we propose an alternative design for SCKDF includes both
a two-phase model and also a single phase model. Let SCKDF-1 denote the
alternative SCKDF for the single phase model and SCKDF-2 denote the two-
phase model, respectively.
The chapter is organised as follows. Some limitations of SCKDF are de-
scribed in Section 5.1. The alternative SCKDF algorithms (for both single phase
and two-phase models) are presented in Section 5.2. Security analyses of these
alternative SCKDF algorithms are presented in Section 5.3. The results of an
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investigation into the performance (in terms of running time) of these alternative
SCKDF proposals are presented in Section 5.4. A summary of the work in this
chapter is given in Section 5.5.
5.1 Limitation of SCKDFs compare with Hash
Functions and Block Ciphers based KDFs
This section provides an explanation related to general attacks against nine two-
phase KDF proposals, as simulated in Chapter 4, section 4.3. These KDF pro-
posals include those based on stream ciphers, hash functions and block ciphers.
These generic attacks are brute force, collison and TMDT. For a more detailed
explanation of all these attacks, refer to Chapter 2, Section 2.5.
5.1.1 Brute Force
Assume that the KDF proposals have no known weaknesses. Given the derived
cryptographic keys produced from a single private string p, the adversary may
perform a brute force attack on either the private string p, intermediate value
PRK or internal state. Usually the intermediate value PRK generated by the
extractor is shorter than the private string p and internal state. Therefore, finding
the correct intermediate value PRK together with known context information to
generate the cryptographic keys is usually much faster than finding the correct
private string p and internal state.
Table 5.1 shows the complexity of finding the correct PRK . The length of
PRK used in these KDF proposals determines the feasibility of performing the
brute force PRK attack. The shortest one is the PRK for the Trivium based
KDF with 280 complexity, and the longest one is the PRK for the SHA512 based
KDF with 2512 complexity. Overall, KDFs based on hash functions have better
security against brute force attack on the intermediate value PRK compared
with KDFs based on stream ciphers because of their greater length of PRK .
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KDF based on PRK in bits Brute force
Trivium 80 280
Sosemanuk 128 2128
Rabbit 128 2128
SHA1 160 2160
SHA224 224 2224
SHA256 256 2256
SHA384 384 2384
SHA512 512 2512
AES128 128 2128
Table 5.1: Brute force calculation for different KDF proposals.
5.1.2 Collision
As discussed in Section 2.5.2, collisions happen when two different inputs to
a function produce the same output. This may happen when the length of
an input to a function is larger than the length of an output if enough inputs
are considered. Extractor is a function that takes two inputs, private string p
and salt, and gives as output an intermediate value PRK . Usually PRK from
the extractor is shorter than the total length of private string p and salt s, as
mentioned in Section 5.1.1. Hence, there are pairs of inputs to the extractor
which will produce the same PRK .
Based on the birthday paradox principle, if the extractor produces kl bits of
PRK , an adversary may compute a collision on PRK with approximately 2
kl
2
operations on random input. If the adversary finds the collision, they can gen-
erate the cryptographic keys with multiple context information as discussed in
Chapter 3, Section 3.4.5. Therefore, the basic security property of KDF, indis-
tinguishability from a binary random string of the same length, is compromised.
Table 5.2 shows an upper bound on collision resistance for the intermediate
value PRK based on the birthday paradox for these KDF proposals. One may
use the upper bound on number of collisions as a measurement of the security
level against collision attacks on the PRK for each of these KDF proposals. The
upper bound is a measurement of number queries q in CPM game. The larger
the number of queries q, the longer the time the adversary needs to break the
KDF, which means the KDF is more secure. Note that SHA1 is broken; one
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may find a collision after about 269 SHA1 operations [59]. This has security
implication for the KDF based on SHA1. More detail about the attack on SHA1
based KDFs can refer to Theorem 3.11. Therefore, we may conclude that SHA1
based KDFs are not secure and the remaining eight KDF proposals are secure.
While SHA512 based KDFs are the most secure against this form of attack and
the lowest security are Trivium based KDFs.
KDF based on PRK in bits *Collision
Trivium 80 240
Sosemanuk 128 264
Rabbit 128 264
**SHA1 160 280
SHA224 224 2112
SHA256 256 2128
SHA384 384 2192
SHA512 512 2256
AES128 128 264
*Collision: Number queries q allowed in CPM security model.
**SHA1 is broken, collision found about 269 operations [59].
Table 5.2: Collision based on birthday paradox to different KDF proposals.
5.1.3 TMDT
TMDT attacks are discussed in Section 2.5.3. These may allow the adversary to
find the correct secret key or internal states faster than the generic brute force
attack on secret key. Here the secret key is the intermediate value PRK . We will
apply TMDT attacks to find the correct PRK for stream ciphers, hash functions
and block ciphers based KDFs. It is not practical to recover the private string p
by using TMDT as usually p has a larger search space than PRK . The length
of private string for other current KDF proposals are given in Appendix A.
Table 5.3 provides a summary of the parameter for the TMDT attack to find
the correct PRK for all KDF proposals, and finding the correct internal states
only for SCKDF proposals. The table includes the complexity of approximately
how much memory the adversary requires to construct the look-up table and
the time required in real time for stream cipher, hash function and block cipher
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based KDFs. We may conclude that all these nine KDF proposals ‘resist’ TMDT
tradeoffs attacks. The detailed explanation is as follows:
• Stream cipher based key derivation functions. The three ciphers
Trivium, Sosemanuk and Rabbit do not have any known attack. There-
fore, by using BS curve [8] to perform TMDT attack, the results show the
adversary may require real time T greater than the complexity to brute
force the intermediate value PRK . In addition, for the security framework
defined in Chapter 3, the number queries q allowed is 2
kl
2 , where kl is the
length of PRK . But the figures of P,M, T, and D for both key recovery and
states recovery all exceed this limit of q. Hence, KDFs based on Trivium,
Sosemanuk and Rabbit are secure from TMDT attack.
• Hash function and block cipher based key derivation functions.
Even though the adversary may recover the intermediate value PRK us-
ing TMDT attack, which is relatively faster than a brute force attack on
the PRK , all hash function and block cipher based KDFs are resistant to
TMDT attacks based on the security framework proposed in Chapter 3.
This is because the memory and time required to attack these KDFs exceed
q queries, where M > q also T > q.
KDFs PRK (bits) IV(bits) TMDT - Key Recovery Internal States(bits) TMDT - States Recovery
P M T D P M T D
Trivium 80 80 2106.67 253.33 2106.67 253.33 288 2192 296 2192 296
Sosemanuk 128 128 2170.67 285.33 2170.67 285.33 384 2256 2128 2256 2128
Rabbit 128 64 2128 264 2128 264 512 2342 2170 2342 2170
SHA1 160 - 2106.66 2106.66 2106.66 - -
SHA224 224 - 2149.34 2149.34 2149.34 - -
SHA256 256 - 2170.66 2170.66 2170.66 - -
SHA384 384 - 2256 2256 2256 - -
SHA512 512 - 2341.34 2341.34 2341.34 - -
AES128 128 - 285.34 285.34 283.34 - -
Note: TMDT attacks on stream ciphers are based on BS [8], while TMDT attacks on hash functions and block
ciphers are based on H [29].
Table 5.3: TMDT attacks to different KDF proposals.
5.1.4 Summary of Limitation of SCKDF
It is essential to point out that these KDFs are secure if the underlying ciphers
that are used to construct these KDFs are secure. The main idea for this section
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is to compare the security levels for all these KDFs based primitives which have
different security levels by measuring the complexity to retrieve the intermediate
value PRK . We compare the security level for all of these KDFs based primitives
by using three generic attacks: brute force, collision and TMDT attacks. As
shown by Tables 5.1 - 5.3, hash functions based KDFs have a higher security level
than stream ciphers based KDFs. Trivium based KDFs is the lowest security level
(based on brute force attacks and collisions). The main reason for poor resistance
to attacks is because of the short intermediate value PRK . Therefore, there is
a need to have an alternative stream cipher based KDF that takes a long PRK
as the input to the KDFs. Hence, an alternative stream cipher based KDF is
provided in following section.
5.2 Alternative Designs for SCKDF
The limitation of the current SCKDF is the short PRK as shown in Section 5.1.
Hence, we need to have an alternative SCKDF that has a larger size of PRK
as the input to the expander based KDF. One possible approach is to include
an XOR operator. Let v and w denote the key and IV length respectively of
a pseudorandom number generator of the specific stream cipher. We increase
the PRK size from v to v + w by using an XOR operator as described below.
We denote this two-phase modified SCKDF as SCKDF-2. For completeness,
we proposed a SCKDF that follows the single phase model, which we denote
SCKDF-1. Both proposals are based on ideal keystream generators (satisfying
Definition 2.7 and Definition 2.8). Detailed descriptions and specification for
these proposals are as follows.
5.2.1 Two-Phase Design
Extractor In this section, we propose an alternative extractor based on the
pseudorandom keystream generator for a stream cipher. The extractor takes p
and s as the inputs and produces an output sequence PRK . The public salt s
can be null or arbitrary length random string but not greater than the length
of private string pl. Let v and w denote the key size and IV size respectively,
for the stream cipher and let the total of v and w be denoted as r. If the
public salt is not null, then the private string and the public salt are divided into
blocks, each of length r bits. There is a slight difference between the output size
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generated by the proposed extractor in Chapter 4 and this modified extractor.
The existing extractor will generate PRK , with length equal to the key size of
the pseudorandom keystream generator for the specified stream cipher in the
expander phase; the modified extractor will generate PRK with length equal to
the sum of the key size and IV size of the pseudorandom keystream generator
for the specified stream cipher used in the expander phase. Figure 5.2 depicts
our proposed modified stream cipher based extractor. The extractor process is
as follows.
Figure 5.1: Extractor based on stream ciphers
1. Input: p, s, pl, sl, r.
2. Process:
(a) Divide private string p into blocks, where each block is of length v+w.
Let Di denote the i
th block of p. The total number of blocks is L =
d pl
v+w
e.
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(b) If the length of the last block DL is less than v + w bits, the block is
padded with ‘0’s.
(c) If s is null.
i. Go to Step 2e.
(d) Else If s is not null. Public string, salt s can be arbitrary length but
the length cannot be larger than the length of private string, sl ≤ pl.
i. Divide salt, s into blocks, where each block is of length of v + w.
Let Ei denote the i
th block of s. The total number of blocks is
J = d sl
v+w
e. If the length of the last block EJ is less than v + w
bits, the block is padded with ‘0’s.
ii. XOR the D1 of p with E1 of s.
(e) For i = 1 to L, do the following:
i. If i = L. Use the first v bits of block as the key and remaining
w bits as the IV and generate r bits of keystream. Proceed to
Step 3.
ii. Else, if i > L.
A. Use the first v bits of block as the key and remaining w bits
as the IV.
B. Generate v + w bits of keystream.
• If i <= J . The v + w bits of keystream is XORed with
Di+1 of p and Ei+1 of s.
• Else i > J . The v + w bits of keystream is XORed with
Di+1 of p.
C. i := i+ 1.
3. Output:
• An r-bit string, denoted PRK .
Expander In this section, we describe a modified stream cipher based ex-
pander from Section 4.1.2. This function takes two inputs: one is the output of
extractor phase PRK , the other is an arbitrary length binary string c, the con-
text information. The expander output is a pseudorandom binary string. Let v
and w denote the key size and IV size respectively for pseudorandom keystream
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generator of the specified the stream cipher. Figure 5.2 illustrates our proposed
stream cipher based expander. The expander process is as follows.
Figure 5.2: Expander based on stream ciphers
1. Input: PRK , c, cl, and n.
2. Process:
(a) If c is null.
i. Use the first v bits of PRK as the key and the following w bits
as the IV for the pseudorandom keystream generator.
ii. Generate n-bit of keystream.
iii. Proceed to Step 3.
(b) Else If c is not null.
i. Divide context information c into blocks, where each block is of
length of v+w. Let Di denote the i
th block of c. The total number
of blocks is L = d cl
v+w
e. If the length of the last block DL is less
than v + w bits, the block is padded with ‘0’s.
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ii. XOR the v + w bits of PRK (from the extractor phase) with D1
of c. Use the first v bits of keystream as the key and the following
w bits as the IV for the pseudorandom keystream generator.
iii. If L = 1.
• Generate n-bit of keystream.
• Proceed to Step 3.
iv. Else, if L > 1.
• Generate v + w bits of keystream.
• Proceed to Step 2(b)v.
v. For i = 2 to L, do the following:
A. If i = L.
• XOR the v+w bits of keystream with Di of c. Use the first
v bits of keystream as the key and the following w bits as
the IV for the pseudorandom keystream generator.
• Generate n-bit of keystream.
• Proceed to Step 3.
B. Else, if i < L.
• XOR the v+w bits of keystream with Di of c. Use the first
v bits of keystream as the key and the following w bits as
the IV for the pseudorandom keystream generator.
• Generate v + w bits of keystream.
• i := i+ 1.
3. Output: An n-bit binary string suitable for use as a cryptographic key.
5.2.2 Single Phase Design - Option 1A
SCKDF-1A is single phase model which is based on the pseudorandom keystream
generator for a stream cipher. This design uses an XOR operator where the
private string is XORed with the public string. Let v and w denote the key
and IV size respectively, for the stream cipher. The public inputs, s and c are
concatenated and the resulting string divided into blocks. Similarly, the private
string p is divided into blocks. For these blocks, the length is the sum of the
key and IV lengths pseudorandom keystream generator for the specified stream
cipher. The blocks from the private string and the public input are XORed; the
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first v bits of the resulting block are used as the key and the remaining w bits
of the block used as the IV for the pseudorandom keystream generator. Figure
5.3 depicts SCKDF-1A and the process is as follows.
Figure 5.3: SCKDF-1A
1. Input: p, s, c, pl, sl, cl, n.
2. Process:
(a) Concatenate s with c to form a binary string of total length of sl+ cl,
such that s‖c.
(b) Divide s‖c into blocks, where each block is of length v + w. Let Ei
denote the ith block of s‖c. The total number of blocks is J = d sl+cl
v+w
e.
(c) If the length of the last block EJ is less than v + w bits, the block is
padded with ‘0’s.
(d) Divide the private string p into blocks, where each block is of length
v + w. Let Di denote the i
th block of p. The total number of blocks
is L = d pl
v+w
e.
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(e) If the length of the last block DL is less than v + w bits, the block is
padded with ‘0’s.
(f) XOR the D1 of p with E1 of s‖c.
(g) Set S = max(L, J), for i = 1 to S, do the following:
i. If i = L. Use the first v bits of block as the key and the remaining
w bits as the IV and generate n bits of keystream. Proceed to
Step 3.
ii. Else, if i < L.
A. Use the first v bits of block as the key and the remaining w
bits as the IV.
B. Generate v + w bits of keystream.
• If S = L.
– If i <= J . The v+w bits of keystream are XORed with
Di+1 of p and Ei+1 of s‖c.
– Else i > J . The v+w bits of keystream are XORed with
Di+1 of p.
• Else If S = J .
– If i <= L. The v+w bits of keystream are XORed with
Di+1 of p and Ei+1 of s‖c.
– Else i > L. The v + w bits of keystream are XORed
with Ei+1 of s‖c.
C. i := i+ 1.
3. Output:
• An n-bit string suitable for use as a cryptographic key.
5.2.3 Single Phase Design - Option 1B
SCKDF-1B is a single phase model based on the pseudorandom keystream gener-
ator for a stream cipher. The SCKDF-1B design is a single phase KDF proposals
that concatenate all the inputs into a single string. Let v and w denote the key
size and IV size respectively, for the stream cipher. The private input p is con-
catenated with public inputs s and c to form a long string. This long string
is divided into blocks where each block is the total length of key and IV for
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the pseudorandom keystream generator for a stream cipher. Figure 5.4 depicts
SCKDF-1B and the process is as follows.
Figure 5.4: SCKDF-1B
1. Input: p, s, c, pl, sl, cl, n.
2. Process:
(a) Concatenate p, s and c to form a binary string of total length pl+sl+cl,
such that p‖s‖c.
(b) Divide p‖s‖c into blocks, where each block is of length of v + w.
Let Di denote the i
th block of p‖s‖c. The total number of blocks is
L = dpl+sl+cl
v+w
e.
(c) If the length of the last block DL is less than v + w bits, the block is
padded with ‘0’s.
(d) For i = 1 to L, do the following:
i. XOR the Di of p with Ei of s‖c.
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ii. If i = L. Use the first v bits of block as the key and the remaining
w bits as the IV and generate n bits of keystream. Proceed to
Step 3.
iii. Else, if i < L.
A. Use the first v bits of block as the key and the remaining w
bits as the IV and generate v + w bits of keystream.
B. i := i+ 1.
3. Output:
• An n-bit string suitable for use as a cryptographic key.
5.3 Security Analysis of the Alternative Design
of SCKDF
In this section, the formal security proof for SCKDF-2 and SCKDF-1 are pre-
sented in Section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 respectively. In Section 5.3.3, we consider the
complexity of general attacks (brute force, collision and TMDT) towards the
newly proposed SCKDF-2 and SCKDF-1.
5.3.1 The Security of SCKDF-2
SCKDF-2 is a two-phase KDF proposal which consists of two sub-functions,
namely an extractor and an expander. As for the SCKDF of Chapter 4, both
the extractor and the expander used in SCKDF-2 are based on ideal keystream
generators (satisfying Definition 2.8 and Definition 2.7 in Section 2.4).
The following theorem establishes the security of SCKDF-2 based on the
highest CPM security model. In this model, the adversary A can take polyno-
mial number of time steps t to play the CPM game and can make at most q
queries, either q < 2
v+w
2 , (when 2
v+w
2 < |SSPACE | < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE | or
|SSPACE | < 2 v+w2 < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE |) or q < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE |,
(when |SSPACE | < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE | < 2 v+w2 ). After using these re-
sources, the adversary A may win the CPM indistinguishability game with prob-
ability not larger than 1
2
+ , where  is negligible. We now provide the formal
security proof for the SCKDF-2 proposal.
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Theorem 5.1 Suppose that a keystream generator satisfies Definition 2.7 and
Definition 2.8. If an extract-then-expand SCKDF-2 is built from this keystream
generator, then the extract-then-expand SCKDF-2 is (min{tX , tY }, min{qX , qY },
X + Y )-CPM secure with the respect to the private string p.
Proof: To satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.2, we need to show:
i. the extractor is a (tX , qX , X)-computational extractor;
ii. the expander is a (tY , qY , Y )-secure variable-length-output pseudorandom
function family.
To prove (i) assume that extractor is not a (tX , qX , X)-computational extractor.
This would imply that an adversary A has a polynomial time method to distin-
guish whether PRK is derived from p or a random string of the same length. For
the underlying keystream generator this would then imply that the adversary
has a polynomial time method to distinguish between PRK and a truly random
string. This contradicts the assumption that the keystream generator satisfies
Definition 2.7. Hence (i) is true.
To prove (ii) assume that expander is not a (tY , qY , Y )-secure variable-length-
output pseudorandom function family. This would imply that an adversary A
has a polynomial time method to distinguish between whether the cryptographic
key K is derived from PRK or a random string of the same length. For the
underlying keystream generator this would then imply that the adversary has a
polynomial time method to distinguish between K and a truly random string.
This contradicts the assumption that the keystream generator satisfies Definition
2.7. Hence (ii) is true.
Hence by Theorem 3.2 the SCKDF built from the keystream generator is
(tX + tY , qX + qY , X + Y )-CPM secure with the respect to private string p. 
5.3.2 The Security of SCKDF-1
SCKDF-1 option one and option two are single phase KDF proposals which are
constructed using an ideal keystream generator of a stream cipher. It is assumed
that this ideal keystream generator satisfies Definition 2.7 and Definition 2.8 in
Section 2.4. Based on this assumption, the following security proof shows that
SCKDF-1 is CPM-secure. That is, the adversary A can make at most q queries to
the SCKDF-1 with chosen salt and chosen context information, where q < 2
v+w
2 ,
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(when 2
v+w
2 < |SSPACE | < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE | or |SSPACE | < 2 v+w2 <
|SSPACE | × |CSPACE |) or q < |SSPACE | × |CSPACE |, (when |SSPACE | <
|SSPACE | × |CSPACE | < 2 v+w2 ). After this, the adversary A may win the CPM
indistinguishability game with probability not larger than (1
2
+ ), where  is
negligible.
Theorem 5.2 Suppose that a keystream generator satisfies Definition 2.7 and
Definition 2.8. If SCKDF-1 is built from this keystream generator, then the
SCKDF-1 scheme is (t, q, )-CPM secure with the respect to the private string
p.
Proof: Assume that SCKDF-1 is not a (t, q, )-CPM secure. This would
imply that there is an adversary A who has a polynomial time method to dis-
tinguish between a cryptographic key K derived from p and a random string of
the same length. For the underlying keystream generator this would then im-
ply that the adversary has a polynomial time method to distinguish between K
and a truly random string. This contradicts the assumption that the keystream
generator satisfies Definition 2.7.
Hence, the SCKDF-1 built from the keystream generator is (t, q, )-CPM
secure with the respect to private string p. 
5.3.3 General Security Analysis
SCKDF-1 and SCKDF-2 are the alternative SCKDF proposals, where we expand
the input key search length from v to v + w. We provided formal proofs for
the security of SCKDF-1 and SCKDF-2 in Section 5.3.2 and 5.3.1 respectively,
assuming that the underlying keystream generator is a pseudorandom keystream
generator. With this assumption, brute force, collision and TMDT attacks are
three general attacks that can apply to these proposals. In this section, we
expand the results from Section 5.1 to include the complexity to perform three
general attacks for the modified stream cipher based KDFs.
Firstly, we show the complexity of brute force attacks on the secret key. The
modified stream cipher based KDFs increase the complexity of brute force attack
from 2v (SCKDF proposal in Chapter 4) to 2v+w which is comparable with hash
function based KDFs. Table 5.4 compares these results with the previous results
from Table 5.1.
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For example, the complexity of brute force against Trivium based modified
SCKDF has increased from 280 to 2160 as the input secret key is expanded from
2v into 2v+w, which gives this modified SCKDF a security level equal with SHA1
and greater than AES against this type of attack. Similarly, Sosemanuk based
SCKDF-1 and SCKDF-2 has the same security level with SHA256 based KDF.
Overall, the security level of the modified SCKDF proposals against brute force
attakcs are all greater than 2100 which means that it is practically infeasible to
perform the brute-force attack.
KDF based on Existing modified SCKDF
PRK (bits) Brute force PRK /key(bits) Brute force
Trivium 80 280 160 2160
Sosemanuk 128 2128 256 2256
Rabbit 128 2128 192 2192
SHA1 160 2160 -
SHA224 224 2224 -
SHA256 256 2256 -
SHA384 384 2384 -
SHA512 512 2512 -
AES128 128 2128 -
Table 5.4: Brute force calculation to modified stream ciphers based KDF with
different KDF proposals.
Secondly, the complexity of collision attacks for the modified stream cipher
based KDFs are provided. The modified stream ciphers based KDF proposals
are also secure in the security framework proposed in Chapter 3. As mentioned
in Section 5.1.2, the number of queries is restricted , so that q < σ, where σ is
the complexity of finding the collision on PRK . We extended the results from
Table 5.2 and provide the complexity of collision for each of these KDF proposal
in Table 5.5.
The security for the modified stream cipher based KDFs is increased com-
pared with the existing KDFs against collision attacks. Besides that, the mod-
ified stream cipher based KDFs are competitive with the hash function based
KDFs. For example, the security level of modified Trivium based KDF is 280
which is equal with SHA1 based KDFs. To find a collision for modified Sose-
manuk based KDFs is 2128, this complexity is equal with SHA256 based KDFs.
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Next, to find the collision for the modified Rabbit based KDFs, the complexity
is 296, this complexity is greater than SHA1 based KDFs.
KDF based on Existing Modified SCKDF
PRK (bits) *Collision PRK /Key(bits) *Collision
Trivium 80 240 160 280
Sosemanuk 128 264 256 2128
Rabbit 128 264 192 296
SHA1 160 280 -
SHA224 224 2112 -
SHA256 256 2128 -
SHA384 384 2192 -
SHA512 512 2256 -
AES128 128 264 -
Note: *Collision: Number of queries q allowed in CPM security model.
Table 5.5: Collision based on birthday paradox to modified stream ciphers based
KDF with different KDF proposals.
Lastly, the complexity of TMDT for the modified stream cipher based KDFs is
presented (see Table 5.6). The modified stream cipher based KDFs are resistant
from TMDT attacks to recover the key. The adversary requires real time T
in key recovery or state recovery (shown in Table 5.3) which is greater than the
complexity to brute force the intermediate value PRK . In addition, the real time
T is greater than the number of queries q defined in Chapter 3. Besides that, the
security of modified stream cipher based KDFs is higher than that of the stream
cipher based KDF in Chapter 4 and more competitive with hash functions based
KDFs compared with real time T .
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KDF based on Existing Modified
PRK (bits) IV(bits) TMDT PRK /key(bits) IV(bits) TMDT
P M T D P M T D
Trivium 80 80 2106.67 253.33 2106.67 253.33 160 160 2213.33 2106.67 2213.33 2106.67
Sosemanuk 128 128 2170.67 285.33 2170.67 285.33 256 256 2341.33 2170.67 2341.33 2170.67
Rabbit 128 64 2128 264 2128 264 192 192 2256 2128 2256 264
SHA1 160 - 2106.66 2106.66 2106.66 - -
SHA224 224 - 2149.34 2149.34 2149.34 - -
SHA256 256 - 2170.66 2170.66 2170.66 - -
SHA384 384 - 2256 2256 2256 - -
SHA512 512 - 2341.34 2341.34 2341.34 - -
AES128 128 - 285.34 285.34 283.34 - -
Note: TMDT stream ciphers are based on BS [8], while TMDT hash functions and block ciphers are based on H [29].
Table 5.6: TMDT to modified stream ciphers based KDF with different KDF
proposals.
5.3.4 Summary of Security Analysis
Overall, the modified SCKDFs are CPM-secure. This is the highest degree secu-
rity model in Chapter 3. In addition, the modifications of SCKDF provide better
security compared to SCKDF in Chapter 4 and provide a comparable security
level with hash function and block cipher based KDFs, as shown in Table 5.4 - 5.6
(Brute force attacks, collision based on birthday paradox and TMDT attacks).
For example, modified Sosemanuk based KDFs have the same security level with
SHA256 based KDFs. Modified Trivium based KDFs have higher security than
AES128 based KDFs and equal security level as SHA1 based KDFs. While the
security of modified Rabbit based KDFs are equal with SHA384 based which are
the second highest after SHA512 based KDFs.
5.3.5 Discussion: XOR operator in SCKDF-1A and SCKDF-
2
Both SCKDF-1A and SCKDF-2 combine two strings into single string using
XOR logical operation. For the SCKDF-1A, two strings to be combined by
using XOR operator are private string and public string (salt concatenated with
context information). For the extractor of SCKDF-2, the two strings are the
private string and the salt, while for the expander of SCKDF-2, the output from
the extractor PRK and the context information are XORed into single string.
In each case, these combined strings are the input to the keystream generator.
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One possible attack in this case is the bit-flipping method. Boneh, Demillo,
and Lipton introduced this bit-flipping method where a bit stored in a register
is flipped silently without notice to the hardware or the system [10]. Assume a
derived cryptographic key of SCKDF-1A is from a random private string and a
chosen public string. These two strings are combined using XOR operator. To
attack the SCKDF-1A with bit-flipping method, one bit of each of these two
strings (private and public) is flipped at the same position, and thus produce the
same combined string as previously. The combined string is then input to the
keystream generator, so consequently SCKDF-1A will generate the same cryp-
tographic key from two different strings. However, this should not happen in
SCKDF-1A or SCKDF-2 as in the security models from Chapter 3, the private
string is randomly chosen from PSPACE and fixed throughout the indistin-
guishability game. It is assumed that the adversary has no control over the
private string. For SCKDF-2, it is also assumed that the adversary cannot also
control the value of the intermediate value PRK . Hence, under these assump-
tions the adversary is not able to conduct a bit flipping attack on the private
string or the PRK .
5.4 Performance
We now examine the performance of the modified SCKDFs, again using e-Stream
finalists Trivium [11], Sosemanuk [7] and Rabbit [9] as the underlying stream ci-
pher. This performance experiment is performed in a similar manner to the
experiments described in Chapter 4, Section 4.3. That is, measuring the execu-
tion time taken to generate n-bit of cryptographic key from p, s and c. Details
of the lengths of the four parameters (p, s, c and n) and the machine used for
the simulation are as presented in Section 4.3.1. For all nine experiments, the
time is recorded for each of 100 trials. The average time (mean) and standard
deviation for each experiment are presented in Table 5.7.
Overall, the result shows that the modified SCKDFs were relatively faster
compared with existing SCKDF proposal except for SCKDF-1B in Exp 9. Hence
these are also faster than hash function and block cipher based KDF as shown
in Table 5.7 and Table 4.1.
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KDFs/Exp Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 3 Exp 4 Exp 5 Exp 6 Exp 7 Exp 8 Exp 9
Existing SCKDF
Trivium x 11990.24 12606.16 19795.48 20551.70 14833.79 15477.11 21396.93 22050.50 4913.78
S 211.55 236.86 771.19 1476.67 224.86 211.15 254.74 234.87 209.31
Sosemanuk x 18166.69 18919.52 28326.20 29722.34 20582.50 21626.23 31494.87 32144.96 8123.53
S 161.98 196.42 3166.08 2455.51 771.08 2637.16 884.77 624.44 236.37
Rabbit x 24469.78 26194.43 33725.91 35344.42 29821.59 31628.34 41538.01 43320.91 7777.84
S 240.71 487.34 789.29 297.01 285.12 842.75 768.81 1168.34 174.42
SCKDF-1A - Single Phase
Trivium x 8164.59 8801.10 14768.82 15490.92 8352.75 9037.17 15001.52 15658.52 2939.39
S 128.84 154.38 151.63 291.29 175.97 233.75 260.64 296.25 169.12
Sosemanuk x 10816.52 11586.50 21434.64 22067.69 10816.52 11586.50 21434.64 22067.69 5700.81
S 758.02 782.71 861.17 191.41 758.02 782.71 861.17 191.41 162.87
Rabbit x 14495.02 16151.26 26139.68 27724.04 14560.13 16202.58 25770.13 25910.44 6022.49
S 214.90 194.54 478.73 395.01 219.58 214.05 675.17 822.70 228.12
SCKDF-1B - Single Phase
Trivium x 10341.07 10929.46 16945.10 17550.82 11459.84 12014.23 17971.64 18642.39 5033.56
S 431.15 221.92 582.62 213.61 594.63 199.90 197.43 264.07 163.48
Sosemanuk x 15730.50 16527.66 26406.63 27241.59 15730.50 16527.66 26406.63 27241.59 8229.63
S 149.57 171.95 859.11 661.28 149.57 171.95 859.11 661.28 101.72
Rabbit x 16620.04 18221.47 30403.35 32100.62 18923.02 20544.95 32819.17 34451.42 8284.32
S 368.04 190.67 254.45 282.33 245.63 232.87 223.36 232.60 308.76
SCKDF-2 - Two-phase
Trivium x 10323.85 10926.07 16999.96 17608.95 12356.41 13013.42 19032.47 19686.08 3952.27
S 383.07 218.88 589.48 334.92 291.36 191.24 558.30 342.06 171.03
Sosemanuk x 13307.66 14187.05 24298.72 24794.93 15935.73 16698.69 26468.23 27385.30 7925.08
S 127.73 863.80 984.23 272.56 796.58 785.71 540.24 836.09 256.04
Rabbit x 19104.30 20959.00 30793.49 32216.94 21458.55 22995.00 32932.13 34653.35 8188.59
S 389.27 1030.99 1078.29 559.59 970.62 884.84 223.47 329.28 196.08
*Performance time is in nanosecond. x and S are sample mean and standard deviation respectively
Table 5.7: Software performance of existing and modified SCKDF.
5.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, modified SCKDFs are constructed using the keystream genera-
tors of the stream ciphers. For the orginal SCKDF described in Chapter 4, the
short PRK is a limitation which lowers the security level. Therefore, alternative
stream cipher based KDFs with longer PRK are proposed. We have demon-
strated that these alternative stream cipher based KDFs are secure (based on
the assumption that the underlying stream cipher is secure) as well as having
comparable security level with hash function and block cipher based KDF pro-
posals. As well, it was shown that the alternative stream cipher based KDFs are
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more efficient than both the block cipher and hash function based KFDs and the
original stream cipher based KDF in Chapter 4.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
A KDF is a fundamental building block for cryptographic systems, which is used
for generating cryptographic keys from non-uniformly random strings. The de-
rived cryptographic keys should be indistinguishable from random binary strings
of the same length, as these cryptographic keys are used for safeguarding data
storage and transmission over insecure channels.
To date, there are a number of standardised designs for KDFs which are based
on hash functions and block ciphers. Many of these designs are ad hoc and lack
any formal security analysis. Hash functions and block ciphers are often slower
and require more resources than stream ciphers.
A security framework for KDFs and stream cipher based KDFs were two main
outcomes of this research project. In this research, a theoretical framework for
KDFs consisting of a formal security model which captures various capabilities of
the adversary for analyzing KDF proposals was established extending previous
results. Next, a KDF based on stream ciphers which is more efficient than
existing KDF designs but offers an equivalent level of security was designed.
In this chapter, we summarize the results of this thesis and provide directions
for possible future work. Firstly, we give an overview of the contributions of the
individual chapters. Finally, some directions for future work are suggested.
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6.1 Review of Contributions
This thesis makes several contributions to KDF research. Firstly, a formal secu-
rity framework for evaluating the security of KDFs was established. Secondly,
secure and efficient KDFs based on stream ciphers were proposed. The detailed
contributions of each chapter are as follows.
6.1.1 Contributions in Chapter 3
The major security goal of a KDF was defined in Chapter 3. That is, the crypto-
graphic keys output from a KDF should be indistinguishable from random binary
strings of the same length. We analyzed two existing formal security models pre-
sented in the literature (Yao & Yin [61] and Krawczyk [37]) and argued that
neither of these security models completely describes a comprehensive range of
capabilities of the adversary. Hence, a general formal security framework which
can be used to analyze and compare the security levels of different KDF proposals
was developed.
The general formal security framework was simulated using an indistinguis-
ibility game played by a challenger and an adversary. The indistinguishability
game captures the capabilities of adversaries in various attack scenarios. There
are two types of adversaries: active and passive. The adversary will try to win
the game by distinguishing the challenge output provided by the challenger. Ei-
ther the challenge output was the derived cryptographic key from the KDFs
or just a random binary string of the same length. Before receiving or distin-
guishing the challenge output from the challenger, the adversary was allowed to
perform a learning process against the KDF. For example, the active adversary
was capable of mounting a chosen context information attack, or chosen salt and
context information attack. The passive adversary is just an observer in the
indistinguishability game.
Next, five formal security models for the KDFs in the presence of adversaries
were developed. A description for each of these security model is below.
i. Multiple derived cryptographic keys were generated by the KDF by using a
fixed private string, a single salt and different context information. Both
salt and context information were chosen by the challenger and were known
by the adversary. We denote this indistinguishability game as KPS.
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ii. Multiple derived cryptographic keys were generated by the KDF by using a
fixed private string, multiple salts and different context information. Both
salts and context information were chosen by the challenger and were known
by the adversary. We denote this indistinguishability game as KPM.
iii. Multiple derived cryptographic keys were generated by the KDF by using a
fixed private string, a single salt and different context information. The
salt was chosen by the challenger and known by the adversary, the context
information was chosen by the adversary. This indistinguishability game was
first presented by Krawczyk [37] and we denote it as CCS.
iv. Multiple derived cryptographic keys were generated by the KDF by using a
fixed private string, multiple salts and different context information. The
salts were chosen by the challenger and known by the adversary, the context
information was chosen by the adversary. We denote this indistinguishability
game as CCM.
v. Multiple derived cryptographic keys were generated by the KDF by using a
fixed private string, multiple salts and different context information. Both
salt and context information was chosen by the adversary. We denote this
indistinguishability game as CPM.
The five security models described above provide assurance for varying levels
of security. The implication and non-implication relations between these five
security models were established. We pointed out that if a KDF is CPM-secure,
then the KDF will be secure in the remaining four security models. Perhaps the
most interesting observation from these five security models’ relationships was
that the security when the salt value was fixed does not imply security when
different salt values were used and conversely.
Finally, these five security models were used to analyze existing KDF pro-
posals. The security analysis was performed using the random oracle model. We
found that, even though the KDFs prove secure under random oracle model,
once the cryptographic primitives that were used to construct the KDF were
compromised, the KDFs were no longer CPM-secure as shown in Theorem 3.11.
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6.1.2 Contributions in Chapter 4
In Chapter 4, a two-phase theoretical KDF based on stream ciphers was estab-
lished. To construct a KDF using keystream generators from the stream ciphers,
the keystream generators were used as is. In the extractor phase, we used the
private string as the secret key and the salt as the IV in the keystream genera-
tor. In the expander phase, we used the secret intermediate value PRK as the
secret key and the context information as the IV to the keystream generator.
The security of the stream cipher based KDF relies on the security of the stream
ciphers themselves.
Instances of this stream cipher based KDF were simulated using the three
stream ciphers: Trivium, Sosemanuk and Rabbit. The simulation results showed
that these stream cipher based key derivation functions offer efficiency advantages
over key derivation functions based on block ciphers and hash functions. The
simulations showed that KDFs based on Trivium were the most efficient of those
tested.
6.1.3 Contributions in Chapter 5
Our proposed stream cipher based KDF in Chapter 4 was two-phase KDF con-
sisting of an extractor and an expander. Assume this proposed stream cipher
based KDF was used to generate multiple cryptographic keys, the inputs were
private string, fixed salt and different context information. If the adversary aim
to generate these cryptographic keys, they could just find the intermediate value
PRK (derived from the private string and salt), where PRK is the input to the
expander phase. With the PRK together multiple known context information,
the adversary could generate all the cryptographic keys. Presume there is no
weakness for the expander phase. The adversary could perform the three generic
attacks (see Chapter 2) to retrieve the PRK , the longer PRK would be better
as the longer time the adversary will take to get the correct PRK .
In Chapter 5, a limitation of the proposed stream cipher based KDF in Chap-
ter 4 was identified. We found that the security level of hash function and block
cipher based KDFs was higher than our proposed stream cipher based KDF be-
cause the intermediate value PRK for the stream ciphers based KDF are shorter
than hash functions and block ciphers based KDF. Hence, an alternative stream
cipher based KDFs with longer PRK was proposed. This increased the security
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level of this design to be more comparable with the security of hash function and
block cipher KDF proposals.
We increased the PRK length from v bits to v+w bits, where v was the key
length and w was the IV length to the keystream generator. Basically, we divided
the private string and public string into blocks, each of v + w bits. Then, the
exclusive-OR operator was used to XOR the block of private string and public
string. The first v bits of the output from the XORed operation were used as
key and the following w bits were used as the IV in the keystream generator. For
completeness, we also proposed a KDF based on stream ciphers which follows
the single phase model. Both single phase and two phase KDFs based on stream
ciphers were proved to be secure if the underlying stream ciphers are secure.
We also showed that the security level for both alternative single phase and
two-phase designs offer a comparable level of security to designs based on hash
functions and block ciphers. We simulated both designs of modification cipher
based KDFs using the following stream ciphers: Trivium, Sosemanuk and Rabbit.
The results showed both new designs executed faster than the stream cipher
based KDF proposed in Chapter 4 or the hash function and block cipher based
KDFs. In summary, the stream cipher based KDFs from this chapter offer a
suitable design for efficient and secure generation of cryptographic keys.
6.2 Future Work
The areas relevant to the work presented in this thesis provide a foundation
on which the study of KDFs can be continued. Some of the more interesting
problems for future researchs include:
• Extending existing security framework. In the indistinguishability
game defined in Chapter 3, the adversary can only query derived crypto-
graphic keys from the same private string together with different public
strings. The new stream ciphers based KDFs designed in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5 were analysed based on this assumption and shown to be CPM
secure (provided the underlying stream cipher is secure). An interesting
area to be investigated is to allow the adversary to query derived crypto-
graphic keys from different private and public strings. In this case, the
adversary may perform bit-flipping against the private string. The im-
pact from this attack is whether the adversary may distinguish the derived
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cryptographic key from random binary string of the same length. Next,
the relationship and implication between the security models within the
framework needs to be analysed. The KDFs analysed in this thesis both
the existing KDFs and the new proposed stream cipher based KDFs should
be analysed under such an extended framework.
• Practical security analyses. In our thesis, we analysed the KDF security
with a general assumption for private string. For example, the KDF in the
standard NIST SP800-56 [3] will take the private input either ECC or
DH-shared secret. ECC is a random string but DH-shared string is non-
uniformly random. The entropy of these private strings are measured using
min-entropy m. Another interesting area to be investigated is to analyses
this KDF with a practical type of private string. An assume distribution is
made for the private string (uniformly random or non-uniformly random).
As a result, we may observe another trend of security for a KDF with
different types of private strings. Hence, close the gap between practical
security and the security model used in the work.
• Identified properties of stream ciphers that would make them
suitable for KDFs. The KDF proposals in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5
are generic stream cipher based KDFs: any stream cipher can be used
to construct the KDFs. An area for future research is to study different
types of stream ciphers, with the aim of designing new stream ciphers that
are suitable for constructing a KDF. In particular stream ciphers which
have a large internal state seem to offer suitable candidates. If this can be
achieved, an XOR operator may not be required to combine the private
string and public string as in Chapter 5. To design a large internal state
cipher, one may refer to ciphers like Dragon [12], HC-256 [60], RC4 [25,
47] and others. Besides that, this stream cipher should provide a better
performance in software and hardware implementation.
• Mixing and matching different extractors and expanders. The two-
phase KDF proposals consisting of an extractor and an expander can be
designed and analysed separately. For current two-phase KDF proposals,
both extractor and expander are constructed using the same ciphers. One
possible area of future research would be to investigate different ciphers to
construct the extractor and expander, and if so, examine the security and
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efficiency.
A similar work in this direction is to investigate the consequences for the
security of the two-phase KDF proposals if either the extractor or the ex-
pander is compromised. For example, examine whether an attack identified
in expander would lead to a feasible attack on the extractor.
• Explore other applications. The applications of KDFs referred to this
research are mostly from Internet key-agreement protocols as shown in
Appendix A. Another interesting area to be investigated for application
of KDFs is in digital locking and access control systems for securing cars,
buildings, rooms, and other property, as in [56].
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Appendix A
Existing KDF Proposals
To date, all of the specific KDF proposals both single phase and two-phase have
been based on cryptographic hash functions and block ciphers. Hash functions
are widely used for data authentication and data integrity checks, and block
ciphers are mostly used for data confidentiality and data integrity. Examples of
KDFs based on either hash functions or block ciphers are discussed below.
A.1 KDFs Based on Hash Functions
A.1.1 NIST SP800-56
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a United States fed-
eral technology agency which promotes and issues a set of standards and guide-
lines intended to be adopted in industry and government programs in the United
States. SP800-56 is a standard issued by NIST for the specifications of key estab-
lisment schemes. Key establisment is a method in cryptograhy in securing online
communications by which cryptographic keys are shared with authorized users
while preventing discovery by unauthorised users. The key establisment schemes
provided in this standard includes DH-shared secret, elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC), integer factorization cryptography (IFC).
The NIST SP800-56 standard is divided into 3 subcategories: NIST SP800-
56A [3], NIST SP800-56B [4] and NIST SP800-56C [14]. NIST SP800-56A speci-
fies a standard key establishment scheme using DH-shared secret and ECC. This
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specification has referred to the standards developed by the United State Accred-
ited Standards Committee X9 including ANS X9.42 (Agreement of Symmetric
Keys Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography) and ANS X9.63 (Key Agreement
and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography). Another standard NIST
SP800-56B issues the standard of key establishment scheme by using IFC which
is based on ANS X9.44(Key Establishment using Integer Factorization Cryptog-
raphy). Both of the standards describe single phase KDFs, as shown in Figure
A.1 and Table A.2. Figure A.1 is a diagram of the KDF process, while Table
A.2 is an algorithm description of the KDF. In 2011, a third subcategory was
introduced: the standard NIST SP800-56C provides a guideline for two phase
KDF for these key establishment scheme, which is described in Table A.15 and
Table A.17. The detail inputs for the standards are described in Table A.1.
Figure A.1: NIST SP800-56 KDF.
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Table A.1: KDF inputs (NIST SP800-56).
Description
Input: p, s, c, n, counter
• p: private string.
– DH-shared secret or Elliptive Curve Cryptography (ECC) (NIST SP800-56A and NIST SP800-
56C).
– IFC (NIST SP800-56B and NIST SP800-56C).
• s: salt is null.
• c: A bit string equal to the following concatenation:
”AlgorithmID‖PartyUInfo‖PartyVInfo{‖SuppPubInfo‖SuppPrivInfo}”.
– (Compulsory) AlgorithmID: A bit string that indicates which algorithm(s) is used to construct the
KDF. For example:
∗ NISTSP800-56A: AlgorithmID might indicate that bits 1-80 are to be used as an 80-bit
HMAC key and that bits 81-208 are to be used as a 128-bit AES key.
∗ NISTSP800-56B: AlgorithmID might indicate that bits 1-128 are to be used as a 128-bit AES
key, if key confirmation is not performed. If key confirmation is performed, then AlgorithmID
might indicate that bits 1-128 are used as a MacKey, and bits 129-256 are to be used as the
128-bit AES key.
– (Compulsory) PartyUInfo: For example ID of party U.
– (Compulsory) PartyVInfo: For example ID of party V.
– (Optional) SuppPubInfo: A bit string containing additional, mutually-known public information.
– (Optional) SuppPrivInfo: A bit string containing additional, mutually-known private informa-
tion (for example, a shared secret symmetric key that has been communicated through a separate
channel).
• n: length of cryptographic key. n SHALL be less than or equal to hl × (223 − 1), hl is output length of
F .
• counter: 32 bit, big-endian bit string counter as 0000000116.
• F in NIST SP800-56A and NIST SP800-56B: Hash functions.
• F in NIST SP800-56C: HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA224(HMAC-SHA512/224), HMAC-SHA245(HMAC-
SHA512/256), HMAC-SHA384, HMAC-SHA512, AES-CMAC (AES128, AES192, AES256)
DH-share secret Size 1 Size 2 Size 3
pl in bit 1024 2048 2048
sl sl is null
cl cl ≤ hl
counter in bit 32
Minimum n in bit 160 224 256
IFC Size 1 Size 2
pl in bit 1024/2048 2048
sl sl is null
cl cl ≤ hl
counter in bit 32
Minimum n in bit 144 176
ECC Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5
pl in bit 160− 223 224− 255 256− 383 384− 511 > 512
sl sl is null
cl cl ≤ hl
counter in bit 32
Minimum n in bit 160 224 256 384 512
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Table A.2: NIST SP800-56A and NIST SP800-56B.
Steps Description
1 Input: p, c, n, counter
2 Calculate the input block L = d n
hl
e.
3 If L > 223 − 1, indicate an error and stop (This happens due to the limitation in coding as L is an integer).
4 For integer i = 1 to L, do the following:
i. Ki = F (counter‖p‖c).
ii. Increment counter by 1.
iii. Ki = Ki−1‖Ki.
5 Output: Cryptographic key = truncate(n, KL).
A.1.2 NIST SP800-108
In 2008, NIST recommended three different models for single phase key derivation
schemes. These are described in document NIST SP800-108 [13]. These models
are counter mode, feedback mode and double-pipeline iteration mode. These
three different single phase key derivation schemes can be constructed using
either hash functions or block ciphers as the primitives. The techniques are
similar for both hash functions and block ciphers. The only difference is, if block
ciphers are used to construct the KDF, then the length of p (denoted as pl) is
restricted i.e. it must be same as the key size of the block ciphers, while the hash
function based KDFs allow for an arbitrary length pl. A summary table of the
inputs to the KDF is given in Table A.3, and this is followed by a more detailed
discussion of each of the three different KDF schemes.
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Table A.3: KDF inputs (NIST SP800-108).
Description
Input: p, s, c, n
• p: private string.
– HMAC based KDF. pl can be arbitrary length.
∗ If pl > hl, hashing p such as F (p) to get the length of hash digest, where F is hash function.
∗ If pl < hl, append it with ‘0’.
– AES based KDF. pl must be the same key size for the AES.
• s: salt is null.
• c: A bit string equal to the following concatenation: “Label‖0× 00‖Context‖[n]2”
Label: The algorithm identifier or the protocol identifier that use the KDF.
0× 00: An all zero octet.
Context: Application specific data; for example, a nounce or the identities of communicating
parties.
[n]2: Binary value of n, where n is number bit of cryptographic key.
• n: length of cryptographic key.
• F : HMAC, AES-CMAC
I. KDF in counter mode
This section specifies the KDF that uses the counter mode. In counter
mode, the derived key block is computed by using p, c and i as the iteration
variable. The mode is defined in Table A.4 as below.
Table A.4: KDF in counter mode.
Steps Description
1 Input: p, c, n
2 Calculate the input block L = d n
hl
e.
3 If L > 223 − 1, indicate an error and stop.
4 For integer i = 1 to L, do the following:
i. Ki = F (p, [i]2‖c), where [i]2 is binary value of i.
ii. Ki = Ki−1‖Ki.
5 Output: Cryptographic key = truncate(n, KL).
Figure A.2 shows the KDF counter mode in standard NIST SP800.108. This
KDF is similar with the KDF that is used in standard NIST SP800-56A
and NIST SP800-65B.
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Figure A.2: NIST SP800-108 KDF in counter mode.
II. KDF in feedback mode
This section specifies the KDF that uses the feedback mode. In feedback
mode, the derived key block is computed by using p, c, the previous derived
key block and optionally i as the iteration variable. The mode is defined in
Table A.5 as below.
Table A.5: KDF in feedback mode.
Steps Description
1 Input: p, c, n
2 Calculate the input block L = d n
hl
e.
3 If L > 223 − 1, indicate an error and stop (This happen due to the limitation in coding as L is an integer).
4 Set result0 := null and K0 := null or a binary string.
5 For integer i = 1 to L, do the following:
i. Ki = F (p,Ki−1{‖[i]2}‖c), where [i]2 is binary value of i and it is an optional input.
ii. resulti = resulti−1‖Ki.
6 Output: Cryptographic key = truncate(n, resultL).
Figure A.3 shows the KDF feedback mode in standard NIST SP800.108.
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Figure A.3: NIST SP800-108 KDF in feedback mode.
III. KDF in double-pipeline iteration mode
This section specifies the KDF that uses the double-pipeline iteration mode.
The first pipeline, V ari is generated from p and c. The output from the
first pipeline is used as the input to the second pipeline together with p and
c. The mode is defined in Table A.6 as below.
Table A.6: KDF in double-pipeline iteration mode.
Steps Description
1 Input: p, c, n
2 Calculate the input block L = d n
hl
e.
3 If L > 223 − 1, indicate an error and stop (This happen due to the limitation in coding as L is an integer).
4 Set result0 := null and V ar0 := c.
5 For integer i = 1 to L, do the following:
i. Computes V ari = F (p, V ari−1)
ii. Computes Ki = F (p, V ari−1{‖[i]2}‖c), where [i]2 is binary value of i and it is an optional input.
iii. resulti = resulti−1‖Ki.
6 Output: Cryptographic key = truncate(n, resultL).
Figure A.4 shows the KDF Double-pipeline Iteration mode in standard
NIST SP800.108.
136 Appendix A. Existing KDF Proposals
Figure A.4: NIST SP800-108 KDF in double-pipeline iteration mode.
A.1.3 Transport Layer Security(TLS)
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a protocol that provides secure connection over
the Internet for such things as electronic mail, web browsing and any client-server
applications. TLS is an Internet Engineering Task Force standard track protocol.
There are three version of TLS standards: TLS version 1.0 [18], TLS version
1.1 [19] and TLS version 1.2 [20]. The KDF proposals in these standards are a
two phase KDF. All the three TLS standards use the same extractor proposal.
The same expander proposal is applied in TLS version 1.0 and 1.1. But a different
expander proposal is used for TLS version 1.2 as shown in Table A.8. HMAC
is the primitive used to construct the KDF. HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1 are
the primitives for the KDF in TLS version 1.0 and 1.1 while the primitive for
TLS version 1.2 is HMAC-SHA256. Table A.7 shows the inputs to the KDF
across 3 TLS standards. The KDF algorithm for this TLS is illustrated in Table
A.8.
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Table A.7: KDF inputs (TLS).
Description
Input: p, s, c, n
• p: private string.
– RSA: pl is 384 bit.
– DH-share secret. pl is based on the length of multipicative group of integers modulo r, where r is
prime.
• kl is 384 bit.
• s: ClientHello.random ‖ ServerHello.random. sl is 448 bit.
• c: ASCII string concatenated with seed. The ASCII string should be included in the exact form it is
given without a length byte or trailing null character, i.e. seed is a random string with 128 bits.
• n: length of cryptographic key.
– TLS version 1.0: 832 bit.
– TLS version 1.1: 1088 bit.
– TLS version 1.2: 1024 bit.
• TLS version 1.0, TLS verstion 1.1 F : HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA1
• TLS version 1.2 F : HMAC-SHA256 or HMAC-SHA384 or HMAC-SHA512.
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Table A.8: KDF of TLS.
Steps Description (Extraction - TLS Version 1.0, TLS Version 1.1 and TLS Version 1.2)
1 Input: p, s, c, n
2 PRK = F (p, “master − secret”, s).
Steps Description (Expansion - TLS Version 1.0 and TLS Version 1.1)
3 Calculate the input block for HMAC-MD5: La = d n128e and the input block for HMAC-SHA1: Lb = d n160e.
4 If La or Lb > 2
23 − 1, indicate an error and stop.
5 Set resultKa0 :=null, resultK
b
0 := null, K
a
0 = K
b
0 = c.
6 For integer i = 1 to La, do the following:
i. Kai = F (PRK 0,1,...,190,191, K
a
i−1), F is HMAC-MD5 and PRK 0,1,...,190,191 indicates PRK bit number 0 until
191.
ii. resultKai = resultK
a
i−1‖Kai .
7 For integer i = 1 to Lb, do the following:
i. Kbi = F (PRK 192,193,...,382,383, K
b
i−1), F is HMAC-SHA1 and PRK 192,193,...,382,383 indicates PRK bit number
192 until 383.
ii. resultKbi = resultK
b
i−1‖Kbi .
8 resultL = resultK
a
La
⊕ resultKbLb
9 Output: Cryptographic key = truncate(n, resultL).
Steps Description (Expansion - TLS Version 1.2)
3 Calculate the input block L = d n
256
e.
4 If L > 223 − 1, indicate an error and stop (This happen due to the limitation in coding as L is an integer).
5 Set result0 := null, K0 = c.
6 For integer i = 1 to L, do the following:
i. Ki = F (PRK , Ki−1).
ii. resulti = resulti−1‖Ki.
7 Output: Cryptographic key = truncate(n, resultL).
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Figure A.5 is a diagram that illustrates the KDF that is used in TLS1.0 and
TLS1.1.
Figure A.5: KDF in TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1.
Figure A.6 is a diagram that shows the KDF that is used in TLS1.2.
Figure A.6: KDF in TLS 1.2.
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A.1.4 Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is a protocol that builds upon the Internet Security
Association and Key Mangement Protocol (ISAKMP) and the OAKLEY Key
Determination protocols. IKE is widely used for establishing mutual authentica-
tion and setting up security associations in the Internet Protocol Security (IPsec)
protocol suite.
To date, there are two versions of IKE protocol specified in RFC 2409 -
IKEv1 [27] and RFC 4306 - IKEv2 [36]. RFC 2409 (IKEv1) defined a protocol
used in three different authentication key exchange methods, there are Oakley,
SKEME and ISAKMP. While RFC 4306 (IKEv2) is a document intended to
overhaul the IKE protocol defined in RFC 2409.
Here we are interested in the IKE KDF proposals. Generally, the KDF in
both documents produce multiple output blocks until the required length of
cryptographic key has been obtained and then discard any bits in excess of the
required length. There are only minor changes of KDF proposal between IKEv1
and IKEv2. The KDF in IKEv1 only produces 3 output blocks while the KDF in
IKEv2 will produce at most L output blocks (where L = d n
hl
e, hl is the output’s
length of the function) and the input to the IKEv2 KDF includes a counter. The
KDF algorithms for both standards are illustrated in Table A.10. We show the
inputs to IKEv1 and IKEv2 at Table A.9.
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Table A.9: KDF inputs (IKE).
Description
Input: p, s, c, n
• p: private string.
i. IKEv1
– When digital signatures are used for authentication, p is DH-shared secret
– When public key algorithm encryption is used for authentication, p = F (Nib‖Nrb). F is hash
function. Nib and Nrb are the Initiator’s nonce and the Responder’s nonce, respectively.
– When a pre-shared key is used for authentication, p is pre-shared key.
ii. IKEv2: DH-share secret.
• s: a non-secret value.
i. IKEv1
– When digital signatures are used for authentication, s = Nib‖Nrb. Nib and Nrb are the Ini-
tiator’s nonce and the Responder’s nonce, respectively.
– When public key algorithm encryption is used for authentication, s = CKY-I‖CKY-R. CKY-I
and CKY-R are the Initiator’s cookie and the Responder’s cookie, respectively
– When a pre-shared key is used for authentication, s = Nib‖Nrb. Nib and Nrb are the Initia-
tor’s nonce and the Responder’s nonce, respectively.
ii. IKEv2: s = Nib‖Nrb. Nib and Nrb are the Initiator’s nonce and the Responder’s nonce, respec-
tively.
• c: is non-secret string.
i. IKEv1: c is a concatenation string of “gxy‖CKY −I‖CKY −R‖i”. gxy is DH share-secret. CKY-I
and CKY-R are Cookie-Initiator and Cookie-Responder respectively, i = 0, 1, 2.
ii. IKEv2: c is a concatenation string of “Nib‖Nrb‖SPIi‖SPIr”. Nib and Nrb are nonce created
by the initiator and responder, respectively. SPIi and SPIr are security parameter indexes of the
initiator and responder respectively.
• n: length of cryptographic key.
• IKEv1 F : HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA1.
• IKEv2 F : AES families, HMAC-SHA families.
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Table A.10: KDF of IKE.
Steps Description (Extraction)
1 Input: p, s, c, n
2 PRK = F (p, s).
Steps Description (Expansion - IKEv1)
3 Set result0 := null.
4 While i = 0, K0 = F (PRK , c).
For integer i = 1 to 2, do the following:
i. Ki = F (PRK , Ki−1‖c).
ii. resulti = resulti−1‖Ki.
5 Output: Cryptographic key = (n, result2).
Steps Description (Expansion - IKEv2)
3 Calculate the input block L = d n
hl
e.
4 If L > 223 − 1, indicate an error and stop (This happen due to the limitation in coding as L is an integer).
5 Let result0 := null, K1 = H(PRK , c‖1).
6 If L == 1, Go to Step 7.
Else, for integer i = 2 to L, do the following:
i. Computes Ki = F (PRK , Ki−1‖c‖i).
ii. resulti = resulti−1‖Ki.
7 Output: Cryptographic key = truncate(n, resultL).
Figure A.7 shows the KDF that is used in IKEv1.
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Figure A.7: KDF in IKEv1.
Figure A.8 shows the KDF that is used in IKEv2.
Figure A.8: KDF in IKEv2.
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A.1.5 Password based KDF
Kaliski proposed two password based KDFs in 2000, namely PBKDF1 and
PBKDF2 [34]. The password based KDF is specified in RFC 2898 for general use
in computer and communications systems. PBKDF1 is a single phase KDF. The
cryptographic key K is obtained by using a function F of p and s together with
the number of iterations c of the function as shown in Table A.11 and illustrated
in diagram format at Figure A.9. Number of iterations c is used to increase the
cost of producing K, thereby also increase the difficulty of attack in PBKDF1.
Table A.11: PKCS # 5 - PBKDF1.
Steps Description
1 Input: p, s, c, n
• p: Password
• s: random string
• c: an integer (minimum 1000)
• n: length of cryptographic key.
• F : Hash functions.
2 Let K1 = F (p‖s).
3 For integer i = 2 to c, do the following:
i. Ki = F (Ki−1).
4 Output: Cryptographic key = truncate(n, Kc).
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Figure A.9: KDF in PBKDF1.
Another password based KDF, the PBKDF2 was designed to improve the
security of PBKDF1 by adding exclusive-or as addition layer of protection. In
PBKDF2, the cryptographic key K is derived by XORing cth iteration of function
F of p and s as depicted in Table A.12.
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Table A.12: PKCS # 5 - PBKDF2.
Steps Description
1 Input: p, s, c, n
• p: Password
• s: random string
• c: an integer (minimum 1000)
• n: length of cryptographic key.
• F : Hash functions.
2 Calculate the input block L = d n
hl
e.
3 If L > 223 − 1, indicate an error and stop (This happen due to the limitation in coding as L is an integer).
4 Let derived cryptographic key:
K1 = F (p, s, c, 1),
K2 = F (p, s, c, 2),
. . .
KL = F (p, s, c, L)
5 The F is the function of XOR sum of the first c iteration.
F (p, s, c, i) = V ar1 ⊕ V ar2 ⊕ . . .⊕ V arc, where i = 1, 2, . . . , L, where
V ar1 = F (p, s‖i)
V ar2 = F (p, V ar1)
. . .
V arc = F (p, V arc−1)
6 Output: Cryptographic key = truncate(n, K1‖K2‖ . . . ‖KL).
Yao & Yin observed the security flaw of PBKDF1 and PBKDF2, therefore
they proposed a simple password-based KDF in [61]. We denote their password-
based KDF as PBKDF3. PBKDF3 is a single phase KDF. The derived crypto-
graphic key K is generated by using a function F of p, s and c, where c is an
integer. Table A.13 and illustrates it in diagram format at Figure A.10.
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Table A.13: PBKDF3 by Yao & Yin.
Steps Description
1 Input: p, s, c, n
• p: Password
• s: random string
• c: an integer
• n: length of cryptographic key.
• F : HMAC-SHA families.
2 Let K1 = F (p‖s‖c).
3 For integer i = 2 to c, do the following:
i. Ki = F (Ki−1).
4 Output: Cryptographic key = truncate(n, Kc).
Figure A.10: KDF in PBKDF3.
A.1.6 On the security of Key Derivation Functions
Adam et. al [1] proposed a KDF in which the derived cryptographic key K
consists of the concatenation of l component parts. For each component part is
the function F is applied to the combination of p concatenated with s and again
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with p. The specification are provide in Table A.14 and the process is illustrated
it in diagram format at Figure A.11.
Table A.14: Adam et.al. proposals.
Steps Description
1 Input: p, s, c, n
• p: private string.
• s: random string. s1, s2, . . . , sl, where s1 6= s2 6= . . . 6= sl.
• c: null.
• n: length of cryptographic key.
• F : HMAC.
2 Calculate the input block L = d n
hl
e.
3 If L > 223 − 1, indicate an error and stop (This happen due to the limitation in coding as L is an integer).
4 For integer i = 1 to L, do the following:
i. Ki = F (p, si, p).
ii. Ki = Ki−1‖Ki.
5 Output: Cryptographic key = truncate(n, KL).
Figure A.11: KDF from Adam et.al.
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A.1.7 Hash based KDF (HKDF)
Krawczyk presented a two phase KDF using extract and expand phases, in [37,
38]. The extractor phase uses a function F which takes p together with s and
then produces a pseudorandom key PRK . The expander phase is a function F
which takes the output from the extrator together with c and produces n-bit
cryptographic keys. In this KDF design, the extract module is recommended to
use HMAC-SHA512 and expand module is constructed using HMAC-SHA256.
However, the researchers can design their own HKDF with any HMAC-SHA
families. Valid SHA families are SHA1 and SHA2. Figure A.12 is a diagram
which shows the process of the HKDF. The HKDF algorithm is illustrated in
Table A.15.
Figure A.12: KDF in HKDF.
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Table A.15: HKDF.
Steps Description(Extractor)
1 Input: p, s, c, n
• p: private string.
• s: arbitrary length of random string.
• c: arbitrary length of context information.
• n: length of cryptographic key.
• F : HMAC-SHA families
2 Calculate the input block L = d n
hl
e.
3 If L > 223 − 1, indicate an error and stop (This happen due to the limitation in coding as L is an integer).
4 If sl > hl, hash s such as F (s) to get the length of hash digest, where F is hash function. (Go to Step 7)
5 If sl < hl, append it with ‘0’. (Go to Step 7)
6 If sl = hl, go to Step 7.
7 sipad = s⊕ ipad (ipad = the byte 0× 36 repeated B times, where B is hash function block size).
8 Append output from Step 7 with p, such as, sipad‖p.
9 Hash the output from Step 8, such as, F (sipad‖p).
10 sopad = s⊕ opad (opad = the byte 0× 5C repeated B times, where B is hash function block size).
11 Append output from Step 9 with Step 10, such as, sopad‖F (sipad‖p).
12 Hash output from Step 11 to generate PRK , such as, PRK = F (sopad‖F (sipad‖p)).
Steps Description(Expander)
If cryptographic primitives (hash functions) that are used to construct extractor and expander are different
go through entire steps as below, else starts with Step 17.
13 If kl > hl, hashing PRK such as F (PRK ) to get the length of hash digest, where F is hash function. (Go to
Step 16)
14 If kl < hl, append it with ‘0’. (Go to Step 16)
15 If kl = hl, go to Step 16.
16 PRK ipad = PRK ⊕ ipad (ipad = the byte 0× 36 repeated B times, which B is hash function block size).
17 Append output from Step 16 with c, such as, PRK ipad‖c.
18 Hash the output from Step 17, such as, F (PRK ipad‖c).
19 PRK opad = PRK ⊕ opad (opad = the byte 0× 5C repeated B times, which B is hash function block size).
20 Append output from Step 18 with Step 19, such as, PRK opad‖F (PRK ipad‖c).
21 Hash output from Step 20, such as, K1 = F (PRK opad‖F (PRK ipad‖c‖1)).
22 Set result1 := K1.
If L == 1, Go to Step 23.
Else, for integer i = 2 to L, do the following:
i. Ki = F (PRK opad‖F (PRK ipad‖Ki−1‖i))
ii. resulti = resulti−1‖Ki.
23 Output: Cryptographic key = truncate(n, resultL).
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A.2 KDFs Based on Block Ciphers
A.2.1 NIST SP800-56C
NIST SP800-56C [14] is a standard specifying the protocol for key establishment
as mentioned above. The KDF in this standard is a two phase KDF. The stan-
dard proposes hash functions and block ciphers as two primitives to construct
the KDF. Here, we presented block cipher based KDF. The block cipher used
in this standard is AES-CMAC. CMAC is a cipher-based MAC that is based on
a symmetric key block cipher, such as AES [53]. The key sizes of AES block
cipher proposed by NIST SP800-56C are 128, 192 and 256 bit and the output
size is 128 bits. In other words, the AES-CMAC based extractor can use either
AES-128, 192 or 256, but the expansion is fixed to use AES-128.
During the extractor phase, the input p is broken up into 128 bits per block
(D) and processed sequentially by using AES with salt s acting as the AES key.
The process is PRK i = Fs(PRK i−1 ⊕Di), where F is AES (128 or 192 or 256),
1 ≤ i < t, t = d pl
128
e and PRK 0 = 0128. The process is slightly different for the
last block Dt; for this block, the process requires an additional subkey and the
process is PRK t = Fs(PRK t−1 ⊕Dt ⊕Kb), b ∈ {1, 2}. The subkey is generated
from s by using AES-128. If the last block is a padding block, then the subkey
is K2 else the subkey is K1. The algorithm subkey generation as show in Table
A.16. The output from this extraction phase is 128 bit and we denoted it as
PRK .
As mentioned above, only AES-128 can be used to build the expander. The
PRK and c are the inputs to the expander phase where c is broken into blocks
of 128 bits (D). PRK is used as the key to AES. The extractor function is as
below: Ki ⇐ FPRK (Ki−1 ⊕ Di) where F is AES-128, 1 ≤ i < t, t = d cl128e and
K0 = 0
128. The last block of operation is Kt = FPRK (Kt−1⊕Dt⊕Kb), b ∈ {1, 2}.
Take the left most n-bit of the output and remaining bits are discarded. The
detail algorithm of AES-CMAC is shown in Table A.17, the detail inputs for
the standards are described in Table A.1. Figure A.13 and Figure A.14 are the
diagram of extractor phase, while Figure A.15 and Figure A.16 are the diagram
of expander phase.
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Table A.16: Subkey generation process for AES-CMAC.
Steps Description (Subkey Generation)
1 Input: s or PRK
• If subkey generation for AES-CMAC extractor, the input is s. (The ‘s’ is salt which the length is
strictly same size with which AES is used either 128, 192 or 256.The salt can be null but the length
still the same as stated.)
• If subkey generation for AES-CMAC expander, the input is PRK . The length of PRK is 128 bits.
2 Variables, Subkey1, Subkey2 = null.
3 Let V ar = AESs(0
128) or V ar = AESPRK (0
128).
4 Derive Subkey1,
• if MSB1(V ar) = 0, then Subkey1 = V ar << 1;
• else Subkey1 = (V ar << 1)⊕ 012010000111
5 Derive Subkey2,
• if MSB1(Subkey1) = 1, then Subkey2 = Subkey1 << 1;
• else Subkey2 = (Subkey1 << 1)⊕ 012010000111
6 Output: Subkey1, Subkey2.
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Table A.17: AES-CMAC based KDF proposal.
Steps Description (Extractor)
1 Input: p, s.
2 Apply subkey generation (refer Table A.16) by using s.
3 Calculate the input block L = d pl
128
e.
4 If L > 223 − 1, indicate an error and stop (This happen due to the limitation in coding as L is an integer).
5 Let p = p1‖p2‖ . . . ‖pL−1‖pL, and p1, p2, . . ., pL−1 are complete block. If pL is a complete block then pL =
pL ⊕ Subkey1, else pL = pL ⊕ Subkey2.
6 Let PRK 0 = 0
128.
7 For integer i = 1 to L, do the following:
• PRK i = AESs(PRK i−1 ⊕ pi).
8 Output: PRK L.
Steps Description (Expander)
9 Input:
• Output from the AES-CMAC extractor from Step 8, we denote it as PRK , such that PRK = PRK L.
• c = arbitrary length of string ‖ counter. (counter is unsigned 32 bits integer)
• n = length of cryptographic key.
10 Apply subkey generation (refer Table A.16) by using PRK .
11 Calculate the input block L = d cl
128
e.
12 Calculate the output block M = d n
128
e.
13 If L or M is greater than 223 − 1 , indicate an error and stop (This happen due to the limitation in coding as
L and M are an integer).
14 Let V ar0, Ki = 0
128.
15 Let c = c1‖c2‖ . . . ‖cM−1‖cM , and c1, c2, . . ., cM−1 are complete block. If cM is a complete block then cM =
cM ⊕ Subkey1, else cM = cM ⊕ Subkey2.
16 For integer i = 1 to L, do the following:
i. For integer j = 1 to M , do the following:
• V arj = AESPRK (V arj−1 ⊕ cj)
ii. counter increment by 1.
iii. Ki = Ki−1‖V arj.
17 Output: Cryptographic key = truncate(n, Ki).
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Figure A.13 shows the extractor of AES-CMAC based KDF when the last
input block of p is a complete block.
Figure A.13: Extractor of AES-CMAC based KDF - Input blocks p are same
size.
Figure A.14 shows the extractor of AES-CMAC based KDF where the last
input block of p is a padding block.
Figure A.14: Extractor of AES-CMAC based KDF - Last input block of p is a
padding block.
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Figure A.15 shows the expander of AES-CMAC based KDF when the last
input block of c is a complete block.
Figure A.15: Extractor of AES-CMAC based KDF - Input blocks c are same
size.
Figure A.16 shows the expander of AES-CMAC based KDF where the last
input block of c is a padding block.
Figure A.16: Expander of AES-CMAC based KDF - Last input block of c is a
padding block.
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A.2.2 Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)
Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) defines a profile of the Real-time
Transport Protocol (RTP), intended to provide data authentication, data in-
tegrity check, data confidentiality and replay protection to the unicast and mul-
ticast RTP applications [5]. The data protections are achieved by using crypto-
graphic keys derived from the KDF as stated in this standard called RFC 3711.
The KDF defined by SRTP is AES counter mode based KDF. In counter mode,
the AES (F ) takes p as the master key and the message is s. AES-128 counter
mode based KDF is specified in RFC 3711 which supports p with length of 128
bit. While, AES-192 and AES-256 are two primitives proposed to build the KDF
within the SRTP protocol which supports p length with 192 bit and 256 bit re-
spectively as stated in RFC 6188 [39]. Table A.18 and Table A.19 shows the
inputs and the process of AES counter mode based KDF respectively, Figure
A.17 shows the process of SRTP KDF in the format of a diagram.
Table A.18: KDF inputs (SRTP).
Description
Input: p, s, c, n
• p: private string. The pl is either 128 bit or 192 bit or 256 bit.
• s: random string.
• c: is an initial vector. It is formed by ((s×216)⊕ (packetheader ∗264)⊕ (counter×216))‖counter, where
counter is 16 bit.
• n: length of cryptographic key.
• F : AES128, AES192, AES256.
Document RFC3711 RFC6188 RFC6188 RFC6188 RFC6188
Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5
pl in bit 128 192 192 256 256
sl in bit 112
cl in bit 128
Minimum n in bit 288 480 432 480 432
AES AES-128 AES-192 AES-192 AES-256 AES-256
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Table A.19: KDF of SRTP.
Steps Description
1 Input: p, s, c, n
2 Calculate the input block for L = d n
pl
e.
3 If L > 216 − 1, indicate an error and stop (This happen due to the limitation in coding as counter is only 16
bit integer).
4 For integer i = 1 to L, do the following:
i. Ki = F (p, s, c).
ii. counter is increment by 1.
iii. Ki = Ki−1‖Ki.
6 Output: Cryptographic key = truncate(n, KL).
Figure A.17: KDF of SRTP.
A.2.3 Other Block Cipher based KDF
IKEv2 and NIST SP800-108 also proposed KDFs based on block ciphers. The
details of each KDF algorithm are the same as illustrated in Section A, the KDFs
based on Hash Functions. The only difference is the cryptographic primitives that
are used to construct the KDF. It means, the same algorithm is used for the KDF,
but one KDF is built with hash functions while the other is constructed using
block ciphers. Therefore, the detailed algorithm for each standard is omitted
here.
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